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Postcolonial Citizenship in Provincial Indonesia

Gerry van Klinken

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Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
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

Gerry van Klinken

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macmillan

Gerry van Klinken
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

University of Queensland
Brisbane, QLD, Australia

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Preface

Murder in Maumere is the story of one individual in a town so small that even many Indonesians have trouble placing it on a map. At the same time it is the story of an entire nation, and even a universal story. It tells of a desire for freedom, a longing to find a voice that rings out in the face of a hierarchy stiffened by tradition, and by brute state forces.

In 1945, Indonesians fought a revolution for freedom. Yet today, many appear happy on an everyday basis to be ruled like clients by protective patrons. Why is citizenship of the rights-claiming, assertive kind so rare in this postcolonial country? That was the basic (if perhaps somewhat undiplomatic) question behind the Dutch-Indonesian research programme I had the privilege to be part of between 2012 and 2017. 'From clients to citizens? Emerging citizenship in democratising Indonesia' took us to the arena of *local* politics.[1] This social zone has recently become of great interest in Indonesia, as it is in so many Third Wave democracies in the global south. This is where ordinary citizens 'make democracy work.' Investigating state-society relations here promised to be socially productive. How well are ordinary citizens making democracy work? It would also be intellectually exciting. Can we even talk about democracy when there are so many structural and definitional obstacles on the way? The group of international scholars with which I have been working has been interested in this local arena almost since the day Suharto stepped down in 1998.

[1] Some representative publications are in this special edition of the *Journal of Citizenship Studies*: Berenschot and Klinken 2018.

My part was to be the programme's historian, who asks: haven't we seen this before? Our research questions often took me back to two great turning points in Indonesian history: the 1945 revolution and the 1965 anti-communist bloodbath, the birth of a democratic republic and its undoing. Then a couple of remarkable contemporary documents fell into my hands that straddled both moments. Together, they gave a detailed picture of the political history of one little Indonesian town. When I told my colleague Henk Schulte Nordholt about them, he insisted this had to become a book ('small,' he hastened to add). It could be like the *Great Cat Massacre* in Paris in the 1730s described by Darnton (1984), he enthused, or Marquez's *Chronicle of a Death Foretold* (2008 [orig. Spanish 1981]). Such confidence in the potential of the story and, excessively, in me as its chronicler kept me going. I was actually thinking of more polsci literatures on local politics such as the ones on subnational authoritarianism (Sidel 2014), on the politics of belonging (Geschiere 2011), and on the territoriality of citizenship (Linklater 1998). In any case, the microhistory of this one town would be my lens on a dynamic that was common throughout Indonesia, indeed to some extent throughout the postcolonial world. The story of Maumere resonates with similar stories from, for example, Iraq and Iran. There, too, republics that once aimed to connect equally with all their citizens collapsed into anti-communist violence and brought back all the communal divisions of the colonial era.

We 'Clients to Citizens' researchers asked questions about democracy in local settings marked by strong social bonds and indifferent state institutions. They seemed to us bold questions. They crossed over the border separating the standard political sciences with their elite institutions from the world of the everyday. The anthropological study of the state to which they led has proven highly productive in the global south in recent years. At the same time our questions were reflexive. They took us to the border of our own scholarly certainties. What did we really mean by using words like 'citizen,' 'client,' 'democracy,' and even 'state' when writing about these places? Even if these words were translatable into a local Asian language, what sense did they make to the Asians we encountered in our fieldwork? We did not ask this cynically. I know I speak for my colleagues too when I say we believe in democracy, in active citizenship, and in the ideals of Indonesia's 1945 revolution. Yet our area studies specialisation has at least done this for us in the Clients to Citizens project: it continually challenges our own preconceptions about how the world works. Am I making Eurocentric assumptions here? Am I perhaps, on the contrary,

secretly nursing an orientalist perception that Asians are inscrutable, exotic, Other?

Before we launch into the story, I hope the reader will indulge my need for a little theory. Looking back on the work my colleagues and I have done on local politics in Indonesia in the last two decades, I realised it was driven by two separate sets of questions. One was about 'the political.' What kinds of relations tie ordinary denizens of a political community to each other and to power-holders? These were questions about values, political culture, contestation, building a community beyond the family. The other set of questions was systemic. It dealt with the structure of the state—the object of politics—and with political economy. I began to think about citizenship struggles as moving in a two-dimensional space, defined by degree of citizen engagement along one axis, and the tightness of state structure along another.

	Increasing citizen engagement →	
Tighter (more centralised) state structure ↑	Centralised despotism Decentralised despotism	Centralised democracy Decentralised democracy

A state can be centralised and have direct contact with most of its citizens. This requires high capacities. Or it can be decentralised, either because it is too poor to be otherwise or because it deliberately has its wings clipped. In that case it has only indirect contact with its citizens. Local elites do most of the work, in a language of local social values. Historical citizenship movements and counter-movements, as well as elites, can drag a polity out of one quadrant into another. It can move towards (or away from) greater democracy, towards (or away from) a centralised state, or even in a complex diagonal direction.

Sorting out these two dimensions helped me realise that decentralisation and democratisation are not the same thing. The tenacious idea that they are, because decentralisation 'brings the state closer to the people,' has a long history. It is part romanticism about a culturally appropriate indigenous state in which people are 'at home,' part neoliberal conviction about minimising state regulatory capacities. Yet decentralisation can betray citizens as much as centralised authoritarianism does. Where the enthusiasm for democracy in Indonesia today remains undimmed since the overthrow of Suharto 20 years ago, the same cannot be said about decentralisation. People enjoy free democratic elections and a free press,

but decentralisation has in many places led to degraded services, more corruption, and communal tensions.

Back to this book. Its working title for a long time—alliterative but not terribly informative—was *Murder in Maumere*. It plays out in one of those maddeningly complex local arenas, where words often do not have their usual meanings, yet where human passions are as recognisable as anywhere else. I had to read these two documents somewhat against the grain to make sense of them—another maddening reality. Yet to me the story of the flawed firebrand at the heart of both narratives—his name is Jan Djong—carried a powerful message that broke through the banalities in which both documents tried to encapsulate him. The gritty story culminating in his murder, it seemed to me, was a history in which democracy and decentralisation directly opposed each other. There were many Jan Djongs in the provinces in those years. To them the Republic of Indonesia represented existential freedom. Today it is difficult for us to recover the towering hopes that were invested in the central state by politically aware Indonesians in the 1950s and 1960s. They strike many today as naive. Yet politics to achieve the common good continues to inspire, and the state is still the ultimate arena of such politics. I hope this book contributes in some small way to a movement within that country, and perhaps even in the global south more broadly, to recover the democratic republic of which the young men and women dreamed when they fought for their independence against colonialism.

I have many people to thank. *From Clients to Citizens* was supported by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology, and the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture, under the Third Scientific Programme Indonesia-Netherlands (SPIN-3). It is a joy to acknowledge the support of my colleagues at the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). Henk Schulte Nordholt, my research director, is the ever-cheerful inspiration for the book itself; my nearest colleague Ward Berenschot never stopped believing in it despite the years it took to finish; and the many PhD students and postdoctoral fellows who were part of the programme provided the ferment of ideas that give the book any value it may have. The story told here started life as my oration at the University of Amsterdam in 2013, when I took up an extraordinary chair in Southeast Asian history. My students and colleagues there are a constant source of intellectual energy for me as well. Needless to say, none of those named here can be held responsible for the rather contrary interpretations I offer in the following pages.

In Flores I am exceptionally grateful to John Prior, SVD, whom I have known since 2003 and think of as a friend. Originally from the United Kingdom, he has lived in Flores since the mid-1970s. It is he who first told me about Jan Djong, who gave me both the documents about him that provided me with much of my material, and who introduced me to numerous people during visits to Maumere in 2010, 2014, and 2017. I hope the annotated edition of *Menjaring Angin* he has been labouring on in his spare time will soon see the light of day. The SVD fathers at the Candraditya Research Centre in Maumere were unfailingly hospitable. Pater Huberto Hasulie Thomas in particular has been obsessed with the events recounted here for many years and shared his knowledge unstintingly. The SVD Provincial Superior in Ende kindly gave permission to reproduce photos kept at the SVD library in Ende. By far the best living witness to these years still with us today is EP da Gomez. Now in his late 70s, he famously sits on his veranda just outside town and talks about books and history with every scholarly visitor who comes to Maumere. I will always remember these intense discussions.

In addition, I express my deep appreciation to the following people for giving generously their time to talk with me: (in Sikka, unless otherwise noted these live in Maumere) Sam da Cunha (grandson of Samador da Cunha), Adrianus Moang Pitang Say (son of Laurensius Say), Albert Magnus alias Om Berma, Alo Ndato SVD in Botang, Anakletus in Wairhubin, Daniel Woda Palle (related to Sentis da Costa), Heinrich Bollen SVD at Seaworld Club, Huberto Hasulie Thomas SVD, Klaus Naumman at Kewapante, Laurensius Bela'an in Hewokloang, Moses (son of Jan Djong, in Botang), Piet Wari, Sabina Fernandez (daughter-in-law of Samador da Cunha), Siprianus da Silva, Yosef Frederikus ('P.D.') da Lopez SVD; (in Ende) Bruder Rufinus; (in Jakarta) V.B. (Centis/Sentis) da Costa (who passed away in 2016), and Dion Djong (son of Jan Djong).

Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Brisbane, Australia

Gerry van Klinken

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CHAPTER 1

Murder in Maumere

Abstract It is 1966 in the town of Maumere, Flores, Indonesia. A man named Jan Djong is murdered in the jail by people he knew personally. Two little-known local documents written shortly afterwards trace the 20-year history leading up to that murder. Both depict Djong as a hazardous individual, yet both place the citizenship struggles he led at the centre of their narrative about him.

His story exemplifies the agonistic twentieth-century struggles that people in many postcolonial countries have waged to be treated as citizens. Conventional citizenship theory has not known what to do with these struggles, which hardly fit the ideal mold of civic, deliberative movements for rights. This book aims to rethink citizenship theory, so that it can explain popular politics in most of the world.

Keywords Citizenship theory • Postcolonial • Global south • Microhistory • The political • Indonesia • Flores

A citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed.
Aristotle, Politics

Jan Djong expired from his wounds in the jail of Maumere on Tuesday, 1 March 1966.[1] Maumere is a small town on the north coast of Flores, an

[1] The main sources for this chapter are Anonymous (1974) (*Menjaring Angin*), Bollen (1979) (orig. German 1966), Bollen (1966).

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island in eastern Indonesia. It then had a population of just 2000. Djong was 48 years old. He had been the rural district's most energetic politician. After his arrest late in January or early in February 1966, he had been beaten and then paraded around the sweltering little town on foot together with some other prominent figures. They had stripped him of his clothes. Indonesian male underpants then had drawstrings instead of elastic. His drawstrings had been removed, so they kept dropping. From time to time during the month that followed, the detainees were frog-marched in line from the jail behind the police station to the local military office (Kodim) a few hundred metres eastwards for interrogation. Out in the morning, back in the afternoon. Told by their mocking tormentors to sing and dance along the way, the bruised men managed only a pathetic stagger. Eventually, feeling the end was nigh, the Catholic Djong asked his jailers for a pastor to make his confession and receive the extreme unction. They refused. One of them urinated in his face. They buried him in the bank of the river just outside the jail walls. Djong's torturers had been civilians, Catholic local men like himself, officials in various government departments. They all knew each other. After this, between 800 and 1500 others were rounded up around the rural Sikka district. Trucks carried them to their deaths in mass graves prepared for them in every subdistrict. One was in the middle of the coconut plantation belonging to the Catholic mission of Maumere. They were all murdered without interrogation.

Now we rewind more than 12 years, to 19 June 1953. Djong was 36, and death was far from his mind. He was fully engaged in a project, not of his own making, but one that fascinated him: the republican transformation of rural, colonial society. Maumere was a strip of low buildings about three kilometres long on the north coast of central Flores. It had become part of the Republic of Indonesia three years earlier. That Republic had declared itself at the moment of the Japanese surrender in August 1945 and had then fought itself free of Dutch attempts to reassert colonial control. Indonesia thus became part of a great wave of democratisation that swept Southeast Asia immediately after World War II. Maumere was capital of the administrative district called Sikka. Almost half its workers were military and civil servants. The other half worked in trade and small industries that served the town's agrarian hinterland—mainly coconut oil processing. In colonial times Maumere had been the seat of the raja of Sikka. The Dutch appointed such 'traditional' kings as a money-saving alternative to modern governance. They thought the kings would be popular, but in reality the kings behaved in autocratic ways increasingly out of

step with democratising times. The Republic of Indonesia had maintained the hereditary raja of Sikka, but only as an interim measure; his very existence contradicted its ideals. All the politics in the little town revolved around that contradiction.

Djong was angry. During the Japanese occupation, he had risen to the position of the village head. But after the Japanese defeat in August 1945, the raja had sacked him from this position. Now that a new regime in Jakarta was against rajas too, he began to agitate against the one that had tormented him. In June 1953, he organised a 'demonstration.'[2] He got the idea from a young man called Sentis da Costa, a student of law in the big city of Makassar, a day's sailing away. Sentis da Costa was home on holidays and he liked Djong's chutzpah. The demonstrators were subsistence farmers who had walked down from the mountains southeast of Maumere—a region called Iwang Gete centred on Djong's home village of Hewokloang. Later, people remembered there had been 700 participants. It was the first demonstration ever held in the town. They bought cheap coconut-leaf mats at the old markets just east of the Maumere town centre, cut them in two to save money, and painted their slogans on them with whitewash. The Latin came from Sentis da Costa's law classes.

Motto: Regnat Populus (= the People rule)
Eliminate the raja
Where there is a raja = there is colonialism
Where there is a raja = there is slavery
Democracy + raja = nearly 0

What did these demonstrators want? Clearly, they identified the raja as a vestige of Dutch colonialism. His oppressive rule was incompatible with the democracy offered by the Republic. The new republic was much larger than the little kingdom of Sikka, and they wanted to be part of it because it offered them something new. A cousin of Djong still living in Hewokloang today, who was a child at the time, recalled the purpose of the demonstration to me: 'It was so that the Dutch and the Sikka know that we in Iwang can stand alone. Iwang people can also do things—do religion, do schooling' (Fig. 1.1). It was in the first place about recognition as free human beings, perhaps also about jobs and prosperity. And it

[2] Da Gomez in his publications repeatedly dates this demonstration to February 1953, but the police letter proves it was held in June.

Fig. 1.1 Laurensius Bela'an, cousin of Jan Djong (in concrete house replacing the one where Djong was born), at Hewokloang. 'Iwang people can also do things.' (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

wasn't just them. All over the country of (then) 80 million inhabitants, people were rising up in response to mobilisation, demanding rights and resisting traditional local rulers, as well as resisting the Dutch army then trying to recapture the colony after the Pacific War.

Why did Djong have to die? The disaster that struck him 12 years later also killed around half a million others throughout the country. Why did Indonesia as a nation move so precipitately from high hopes to mass murder? The answer takes us to that most fundamental of political drives throughout the global south: the desire for citizenship, which is an insurrectionary desire. The contrast between the two vignettes recounted above raises many questions, which are relevant to Indonesia as a whole. Why was it OK in Maumere to talk like a militant republican in 1953, but not in 1966? Some simple possibilities suggest themselves. Was there perhaps something wrong with Maumere that wreaked itself in the 1960s? Was its culture too rural and conservative to sustain republican ideas for long? Or were its institutions too weak to maintain law and order? Conceivably, yes to both. But no. The murders in Maumere were no local anomaly. They also took place in places with liberal cultures and effective state institutions. Was there then perhaps something wrong with the

Republic of Indonesia itself? Had it stopped mobilising its citizens by 1965 and become instead prepared to murder them? No doubt, yes to that, too. But if so, why did Djong's fellow citizens derive so much sadistic pleasure from this particular murder? The answer must lie deeper. It involves both the state and society. Citizenship is about the relationships straddling those two realms. To solve the murders in Maumere, we need to link a history of citizenship in this postcolonial country with a history of state formation.

The Maumere story represents a fragment of Indonesia's history of citizenship, which remains largely unwritten. The climactic moments in 1953 and 1965 were each part of tumultuous national citizenship struggles. The first flowed directly out of the national revolution for freedom of 1945–1949. The second was part of a nationwide counter-revolutionary bloodbath against citizens holding modern republican or leftist ideas. The story of Djong thus mirrors the transformation of the nation over its first 20 years since independence. Paralleling the elite institutional manoeuvrings in Jakarta were the events created by 'ordinary' people in this little provincial town. Taken together we sense an agonistic, postcolonial citizenship drama involving both elites and large numbers of unexceptional townsfolk.

Such a drama was not unique to Indonesia. Great hopes of participation have crashed often on the rocks of violence variously described as 'internecine' or 'repressive' in twentieth-century societies seeking to escape from colonial or other forms of authoritarianism. Jan Djongs keep on dying all over the world. Years later they were still dying in Baby Doc Duvalier's Fort Dimanche in Haiti, in the camps of an ethnic militia in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Cairo police stations after the collapse of the Arab Spring. Their stories demand an explanation and a future in which such things happen less. Prominent in many accounts have been recommendations for reform to the state. Samuel Huntington (1968) achieved enormous influence with his proposal that developing countries should prioritise 'political order' over the endless politics citizens like Djong wanted. Of course, a healthy, rule-based, political order in which rights and obligations are observed is worth striving for. But such a tidy utopia is not readily brought to life by policing methods, which are essentially methods of neutering citizenship desires. Djong's murder was itself justified in such Huntingtonian terms, as we shall see, though it had little to do with any notion of legal order. Too often, the security studies to which Huntington's recommendations gave such a boost begin by assuming

there is only chaos in poor, postcolonial societies like 1950s Indonesia. This is not only lazy thinking, but it is positively dangerous. It threatens to add retrospectively to the toll of victims by justifying the morally unjustifiable. Much better to press our noses into the story that links citizenship desires with the history of state formation and see where it leads.

Two Texts

I found the story of Djong in two remarkable local texts. They form the basis for the present study. Their narratives span the entire turbulent period between the hope of 1945 and the desolation of the genocidal violence of 1965, between the birth of the republic and the establishment of a military-backed, Huntingtonian 'order' 20 years later. Provincial texts like this are extremely rare. As far as I know the first of the two, entitled *To reap the whirlwind* (*Menjaring Angin*), is the first indigenous document to come to light describing in detail the political life of a small town in Indonesia over the whole period. The second was written by a foreign priest who arrived in the area just before the horrific culmination. Taken together, these two book-length manuscripts make it possible to write a local history of citizenship using the words of at least some of the participants.

The author of *Menjaring Angin* wished to remain anonymous. At its conclusion, we read only a dateline: Ende (a day's drive south of Maumere across Flores), 7 December 1974. It is written by a self-confessed local participant: 'a protagonist who was once active in the situation and series of conflicts of the time.' One name that occurs in it frequently is that of E.P. da Gomez (1940–). He appears to have a lot of inside knowledge in the narrative, and I guessed he might have been its author. In 1974 he was a Catholic Party activist in his late 30s. Throughout his long life he has been a prolific writer under his own name. When I visited the man known as 'EP' in Maumere in 2010, he told me he had indeed written 'the first draft of it,' but that others had modified it since then. Clearly then, this document arose from within the new, small and largely bureaucratic middle class that had become established in Maumere by the late 1940s. All its members were intensely interested in politics, even in the middle of the authoritarian New Order in 1974.

When retyped from a faded photocopy 23 years after it was written, it ran to 130 pages. Two crucial pages are missing. The gap covers the crucial weeks around 1 October 1965. This suggests that they were deliber-

ately removed to protect certain individuals. Hopefully the missing pages will turn up somewhere. The book has never been published; it circulates among intellectuals in central Flores. Its present title *To reap the whirlwind* (*Menjaring Angin*) was added later—the original lacked one. The narrative starts just after Indonesia's declaration of independence in 1945. In Maumere that moment marked the beginning of a struggle to displace the 'feudal' system the colonial Dutch had left behind. It ends with bickering among local political party hacks in the early years of the New Order.

At its heart is the episode of fratricidal killing that raged through the town and its hinterland in early 1966. Djong is present throughout the manuscript. His name occurs 126 times. His murder is clearly the central dilemma in the text, even if the language is circumspect. The opening paragraph states the goal: '…to discover what lies behind the fog that covers the tensions in Maumere with their many contradictory facets…' Fog is an appropriate image since what the book describes reads almost like a local civil war. In countries with troubled decolonisation histories, the sleepy facades today of their small towns often hide a horrific theatre of past violence. The author of *Menjaring Angin* approaches the topic at an elevated historical and political level, hoping poignantly, moreover, to find some moral reorientation amid these contradictions. The search in this book, the author writes, concerns 'human beings, society, and their relations with the Creator… A search for something that, if seen clearly, might be best called meaning, which we can give to ourselves and to all of social life.'

The second source for the present book is a 33-page brochure by a German Catholic missionary to the rural area just outside Maumere. Religious change was sweeping through the Sikka area in step with political change. Heinrich Bollen, Societas Verbi Divini (SVD; Society of the Divine Word, a Roman Catholic religious order), then in his late 20s, wrote it for his southwest German church supporters during a furlough in Rome in 1966.[3] Its tone is militant rather than tragic. Its subject is ecclesiastical rather than party political. Djong plays a key role in this document, too. He is the embodiment of resistance to the Catholic mission. Bollen seems to have known nothing of nationalism. He described a contest for religious authority in which Djong was the chief antagonist. His is a story of the church eventually reigning victorious in a land that had been benighted by contentious and above all by secular politics. Unlike *Menjaring Angin*,

[3] His home town is Ramstein.

Bollen's booklet has a good eye for the telling anecdote, for facial expressions and for dress.

Read together, the two source documents portray a small town-and-hinterland society experiencing tremendous upheavals in politics, economy, and religion. Both address the issues of belonging, authority, values, and of institutions that are of central concern to anyone interested in citizenship. Both construct their narrative in relational terms. Given the small size of Maumere's political public, their respective casts of characters unsurprisingly overlap. They even agree broadly on who the good and the bad guys were. The overlaps between the two narratives strengthen my faith in the reliability of both.

If I say these texts are about citizenship, however, the language they use by no means conforms to conventional notions of citizenship discourse. The official term for citizen—*warga negara*, or simply *warga*—occurs a few times in *Menjaring Angin*, but refers mainly to the ethnic Chinese minority. (These people often had formal rights in the People's Republic of China and were therefore considered a problem in Indonesia.) The word 'right'—*hak* in the (Arab-influenced) Indonesian—occurs rarely. Bollen does not use it. *Menjaring Angin* uses it 11 times, mainly to describe the rules governing formal interactions among various parties in Maumere, including the 'right' of the local government to tax copra revenues. Only once does it apply to ordinary citizens: 'Aspirations for justice and equality of rights moved some leaders and non-Sikka ethnic groups to start a campaign of resistance to the feudal raja's government.' At the end of *Menjaring Angin* comes a fatalistic and depoliticising reference to the 'right' heaven has to take someone's life. 'Social justice' does occur in *Menjaring Angin* (seven times), but it always refers to justice for an ethnic group, not individual justice.

This does not mean citizenship is absent from the two texts. It is instead indicated by two other words. 'Society' (*masyarakat*) and 'politics' (*politik*) occur many dozens of times in both. They animate the text. They depict constant negotiation, using every conceivable tactic of persuasion including violence (mainly the threat of it), leading to inclusion and exclusion in the polity. These practices of negotiation are highly contentious. They are agonistic, from the Greek word *agon* for contest. Both texts are fascinated with the possibilities of building stronger coalitions in the face of conflicting interests when the rules are up for grabs and nobody enforces them anyway. The language, in short, is always political—remarkably close, in fact, to that of Aristotle's *Politics,* in which people only become

fully human when they sit in the city's ruling assembly to reason with their fellows about the good course of action. Aristotle would not have had any trouble recognising the Maumere story as a citizenship struggle.

The politics are always local. Jakarta barely figures in either narrative. People hardly ever travel beyond the Sikka arena of a couple of hundred square kilometres of hilly coconut gardens with the town at its centre. And they are personalised politics. They are narratives of personalities and their relationships. Institutions are there as vehicles for the big guys to ride.

The central problem in both texts is the crisis of authority that surrounds the decline of the raja of Sikka and the rise of the Republic of Indonesia. Both end their stories with the 1965–1966 murders that brought in the New Order. Both are passionate accounts written by survivors of, indeed in some sense collaborators with, those 1965–1966 pogroms. But while the cataclysm of 1965 resolved the crisis for them, neither gloats over the horrors. Instead, they look away from them in shame. The description of Djong's death in jail above comes not from them but from a letter of complaint written by a relative. The complaint was never acted on, but the family kept the letter as proof of the injustice done and gave me a copy. Yet both agree that Djong was the embodiment of Sikka's 20-year-long crisis of authority. Both are absorbed with the question of insurrection. For both it is Djong who symbolises it in this town. Neither approves of his practices. Both fit readily into the conservative turn that came over political discourse with the birth of the New Order in 1966. A language of obligatory religious observance that left no place for dissent quickly became *de rigueur*. *Menjaring Angin* on the one hand ascribes to him a Faustian arrogance that led him to deal even with the devil. It puts this statement of a 'political philosophy' into his mouth: 'If I have to cross a river and I receive no help from Saint Christopher [patron saint of travelers, who unknowingly ferried Christ across the water], then help from Satan will do.' Bollen on the other hand describes a wily operator, who will play chess with his adversary even while planning to kill him.

Even so, once we know the primary author of *Menjaring Angin* was E.P. da Gomez, we learn that the bloodshed had not left him cold. Afterwards, a sense of revulsion spread through the town. Recriminations followed. On a visit to Jakarta in early June 1966, da Gomez found himself accused by a group of Florinese students with powerful connections of complicity in the murders. They had heard, they told him, that Sikka townsfolk had taken advantage of the national anti-communist pogrom to

target villagers belonging to Djong's ethnic group, the Kanga'e. Locals had, in other words, turned a state-ideological war into a purely 'ethnic' one for reasons of their own. One of the students, named Paulus Weto, confronted da Gomez openly about it during a dinner party. Da Gomez's reply barely disguised the moral crisis the murders had created within his own conscience.

> Immediately after the very first time we met, Paulus Weto said: 'I have long wanted to know, and now I can ask it. Was the killing in Maumere piggy-backed by Sikka people?' EP da Gomez said: 'Ask Komop [the military-led apparatus in Maumere]!' 'What did Samador [the civilian Sikka district head] do all that time?' Paulus Weto asked. 'Why do you ask?' replied EP da Gomez, and added, 'Samador could not do anything, he also paid to save his life, so did I, so did the others. You heard correctly that we worked at Komop. But who would dare to question Komop? We were forced by circumstances to help the work of Komop. If we refused, our own life would have been in danger. You would have done the same.' Weto shot back, 'If I had been there I would have spoken up.' EP da Gomez shouted, 'Rubbish. You can talk, but if you had been there you would have shut your mouth. For sure.'

Weto's indictment did hit home. Upon his return to Maumere, da Gomez joined a small group prepared to express publicly their horror at the atrocities committed. He supported a movement that aimed to punish three of the most vociferous civilians among the killers by isolating them socially and depriving them of their official positions. The movement failed. Da Gomez found himself in jail for a month in 1967. The next year he was sentenced to a further 12 months in jail. At the time of writing, he probably thought his career was over. If, as seems likely, he wrote his book in this period; he wrote it in a spirit of generosity that he hoped would be redemptive at least for his own social relations. Enemies are praised for their idealism, perpetrators are blamed for cruelty even if they are friends, and the story marches forward with the slow tread of an Aeschylian tragedy in which all are implicated. Politics of a deadly serious kind are everything, even in this small town. The author clearly has access to archives—letters and minutes of meetings are quoted verbatim—and he writes with the restraint of a historian. Over 200 named actors appear in his story—overwhelmingly men, a few wives of powerful men. All of them we see only in their 'political' capacity, as members of the many boards and committees that drive the action. Everything else we have to imagine—

what the political players said when they were drunk, what the children joked about, how the streets looked in the rain, what people went to see at the movies, what emotions churned in everyone's hearts. The most important thing left unsaid is that, as my friend John Prior told me, nearly all of them were somehow related to each other. People on opposite sides of factional rivalries met each other frequently at large, convivial family gatherings, in the office, and at church. We know from other studies (e.g. Vidich and Bensman 2000 [1958]) that intimacy need be no barrier to vicious factionalism in a small town caught up in a historic transition. The little I know makes me suspect it would be possible to rewrite this entire story through the marriage alliances forged there. But one of our texts is by a priest sworn to celibacy, another by an ambitious male bureaucrat, and neither is interested in marriages. Also left unsaid are the personal failings of the various protagonists. The raja's 'feudalism' is mentioned in the abstract, but not his demand for women wherever he spent the night. The *droit de seigneur* was spoken of orally—I have heard it myself—but never written down. And it is a story almost entirely of men. Very occasionally, we glimpse a cameo appearance by the wife of one of the local big men. All the same, we must be grateful to have such inclusive, insightful, and more or less honest guides to small-town political life in these agitated times.

Neither text is unproblematic as a source for a local history of citizenship. Both were written early in the New Order from within the urban Catholic establishment that won the multiple contests of the preceding years. Both texts were cautious not to blatantly offend authoritarian New Order norms of public discourse, and both seemed ready to play by its rules. Bollen's booklet was published overseas in German, beyond the reach of Jakarta, but a stencilled Indonesian translation appeared in Jakarta in 1979 without problems. *Menjaring Angin* was never officially published, but it mentions so many names of still-living and politically active locals, while at the same time circulating freely as a photocopy within Maumere, that it too does not read like a document of opposition. For both, the contentions that filled the previous political order as exemplified by the Djong story are at best a painful memory and at worst a tragedy. Certainly they were no longer on the agenda at their time of writing. Djong is for both documents the outsider who lost a fight that was bound to be lost. Inasmuch as an insurrectionary citizenship was Djong's goal, that goal had died with him on 1 March 1966. To make sense of the struggles there portrayed today, we must read them against their grain.

Rather than celebrating citizenship, they admitted it only grudgingly. They did everything they could to make its claims look wild, irregular, unnatural, and anti-god. Fortunately, these two thoroughly New Order texts are rich enough to be read against the grain without too much need for invention.

Citizens in the Postcolony

If Aristotle would have recognised Maumere's story as a citizenship contest, most of today's texts on citizenship may not. What distinguishes citizenship from subjecthood in these latter texts is a strong concept of rights. Thus, Charles Tilly (1996: 8) defines citizenship as a 'certain kind of tie: a continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has *enforceable rights and obligations*' [my emphasis]. Hannah Arendt (1968: 296) famously wrote that the core of citizenship was 'the right to have rights.' The discussion then normally proceeds to ask whether those rights are won by citizens from below, or imposed by elites from above; whether they are intended to be practised mainly in the private sphere by individuals, or in public through mass demonstrations of participatory spirit (Turner 1990). But what if the state is unable or unwilling to guarantee those rights? That would be, in fact, in most of the world and would include Indonesia. Conventional citizenship theory is conceived in northwest Europe and North America. Most textbooks on citizenship assume a liberal, high-capacity state is able to guarantee rights as a matter of course. As a glance at any global set of governance indicators will show (such as Kaufmann et al. 2008), the low-income, low-capacity states that are historically postcolonial score low on 'rule of law.' If citizenship is predicated on a contract involving rights and obligations, then what is the meaning of citizenship in a state that cannot guarantee such rights?

This disjuncture between theory and reality led Partha Chatterjee in his provocative book on 'popular politics in most of the world' (2004: 34) to dismiss the notion of citizenship altogether:

> Citizens inhabit the domain of theory, populations the domain of policy … ideas of participatory citizenship that were so much a part of the Enlightenment notion of politics have fast retreated before the triumphant advance of governmental technologies.…

Chatterjee's argument is that what passes for civil society in countries such as India (where Chatterjee has done most of his work) is in reality a matter for a tiny bourgeoisie only. The poor majority engage in politics too, but they cannot do so on the basis of rights, for they have none. Squatters live in their urban slums illegally; they labour in an informal sector without law, while paying no tax. When they do make claims on the system, they do so not on the basis of their rights but along lines set out for them by the state. They appeal to a sense of human pity on the part of power-holders, rather than to one of respect for rights.

What Chatterjee is dismissing here, of course, is the *conventional* citizenship account. The clearest evidence that this standard western approach to citizenship was theoretically underpowered is that it consistently looked away from the postcolonial world. While surely the twentieth-century politics of postcolonial nations—from their decolonisation struggles to the Third Wave democratisation that followed—bear all the hallmarks of aspirations to citizenship, scholarship has been unable to recognise them as such because their participants do not conform to the idealised image of 'real' rights-claiming citizen.

As it happens, citizenship studies have grown a lot since Chatterjee evidently last read them. Changes in the global north have been more responsible for this rethinking than the typical global south problems he indicated, but the benefits are there for everybody. It began in the 1980s. Old certainties about the security of citizen rights were shaken on several fronts at once. The rise of the New Right under Reagan and Thatcher, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, both undermined the idea that the state was there to guarantee welfare rights. Globalisation shifted the relations between states and markets and turned state citizenship as the basis for political integration into a matter for debate. Labour in-migrations since the 1960s had by the 1980s triggered debates about multicultural citizenship. In the English-language book world, the frequency with which the term 'citizenship' occurs has shot up since the 1980s (as measured by the Google Books Ngram Viewer). Citizenship has taken an activist turn. Where Anthony Giddens (1998) once suggested taking the heat of citizenship debates by depoliticising them in favour of a consensual 'Third Way,' the rise of right-wing populist movements has led to calls for precisely the opposite. Chantal Mouffe (2005) argued that suppressing debate was tantamount to a policing approach to governance. She urged Europe rather to take the risk of embracing political passion and even open antagonism (provided it was done peacefully). In that regard the debate over

citizenship in the global north is looking more and more like the one that took place in Maumere throughout the 1950s.

The new 'critical' citizenship studies see citizenship not as the conditions for membership in a political club but as a political process across the boundaries of that club. Where once the focus tended to be on a person or group's legal status as member of a community, it has shifted to the political struggles that produce those categories (Isin and Nyers 2014). 'Ultimately,' writes the editor of the trend-setting *Journal of Citizenship Studies* (Nyers 2007: 3), 'citizenship should be studied because it is the prism through which to address the political.' This does not sound so different to the (perhaps rather more plaintive) search by the author of *Menjaring Angin*, for 'something that, if seen clearly, might be best called meaning, which we can give to ourselves and to all of social life.' Citizenship 'is the organizing principle of modern states,' states Nils Butenschøn in a pioneering volume on citizenship in the Middle East (2000: 11). Beyond state-centric politics, the practices and meanings of citizenship can be a theoretically simple bridge to span a wide array of global processes, from globalisation to multiculturalism, and from gender to indigenous peoples.

This inherently relational understanding of citizenship can be traced to the simple yet profound definition that the already-mentioned Aristotle gave for it. In Chapter 3 of his *Politics*, he wrote: 'A citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed.'[4] Governing is first and foremost a political activity. Aristotle's definition contrasts strikingly with legalistic or apolitical programmes of citizenship. The rediscovery and indeed celebration of 'the political' in recent scholarly discussion of citizenship began with Arendt. Her 'right to have rights' actually had in view the aspiration to rights more than their possession. Citizenship arose for her out of the politics of those stateless refugees, such as she herself in the United States, who, excluded from the polity, claim a right to participate in it. When Claude Lefort (1988) brought Arendt's insights to bear on the revitalised discussion of citizenship in the late 1980s, he highlighted the distinction she had made between the formal, institutional mode that she named 'politics,' on the one hand, and the sphere of norms and public discursive contestation that she named 'the political,' on the other. The agonistic passions unleashed in the realm of the political, far from endangering the polity as those claimed who worked towards an apolitical mode of governance, were unavoidable if the aim was still to uphold democracy. The

[4] The Greek for citizen is πολίτης, politis, one who belongs to the city (πόλις–polis).

alternative was to suppress the claims of outsiders entirely or to drive them underground. Mouffe powerfully made this last point part of her critique of the anti-political liberalism of the ever-cautious European Union. But it also speaks to Indonesia, where both the hope of salvation and the fear of chaos that surround 'the political' always loom even more intensely than they do in northwest Europe.

The most radically democratic intervention along these lines comes from Jacques Rancière (2001), who argued that citizenship turns the whole idea of 'politics' on its head. Far from being about 'the exercise of power,' the notion of politics is in Aristotle's statement redefined by turning attention to 'a specific kind of [political] subject' and 'a particular form of reason.' That subject unites in a single figure the one who governs (the ruler) and the one who is governed (the ruled). That turns politics into a 'paradoxical form of action,' at some remove from the traditional cause-and-effect mechanisms in political science. This type of political subject engenders a movement towards civic equality, in which rulers cannot only be those who are qualified to rule but must also include the outsider. Dissensus, political litigiousness, a kind of democratic 'anarchy,' constitutes politics in a democracy. Any politics short of this requires exclusion to achieve a sense of normality, and is thus 'the reduction of politics to the police.' Rancière's formulations have become influential among scholars studying human rights (Ingram 2008). The reduction of politics to the police is certainly an accurate description of what gave rise to Indonesia's New Order in late 1965.

So what questions should we ask of the Djong story if we want to bring to light the outlines of a history of citizenship in this postcolonial country? Many who have ventured into this territory have seen little but 'absences.' Just as they have seen failure elsewhere—government undermined by corruption, markets compromised by cronyism—so they have seen citizenship weakened by craven attitudes towards authority, uncivil behaviour towards minorities, and a readiness to deploy violence. But negativities never explain why things persistently happen the way they do. Understanding can come only from examining the positive energies that shape the human drama.

Fortunately, a few others have gone before us to clear a path through the negativity. Citizenship studies are for them an empirical science. Aspirations to citizenship have inspired millions around the world, but the normative proves a deceptive guide to research in most of the world. If citizenship describes the relations among citizens as well as between citizens

and the state anywhere in the world, then the empirical research question concerns the actual content of those relations. What particular conceptions and practices lie behind them? Then the question is equally applicable outside the western world. Engin Isin, one of the pioneers of critical citizenship studies, wrote that 'citizenship after orientalism' (2005) involves shedding the western assumption that the Orient cannot produce citizens due to some lack in their identity. Citizenship studies must be reflexive about their own assumptions and curious about the lives of others. Ethnographic questions about how a society deals with hierarchy are key, but so are questions about political economy and the history of state formation.

Africanists have made great strides in this quest (e.g. Chabal and Daloz 1999). Two discoveries in particular deserve highlighting. The first is that they have an answer to Chatterjee's doubt that the politics of the poor have anything to do with citizenship. This is surely a doubt we may rightly have about Djong's story too. These scholars observed that people behave in curiously mixed modes—now as independent citizens, now as dependent clients of powerful patrons. This is true particularly among the poor. Robins et al. (2008) noticed how far 'everyday political practices' of South African slum dwellers diverged from the deliberative practices prescribed by the normative citizenship theory developed in the west. The poverty these people have to endure, and the weakness of state institutions, robs them of their autonomy. They find themselves in hierarchical, clientelistic relations with wealthier and more influential patrons. Yet even in that space of 'negotiated authoritarianism,' Robins et al. write, the poor make claims to rights. Their rights-claiming movements are fluid, improvisational, and sometimes uncivil, rooted as they are in their immediate social structures. But they are those of citizens. Similar observations have been made in relation to Indian peasant movements (Chatterjee 2004), Philippine workers (Kerkvliet 1995), and Latin American slum dwellers (Auyero 2001; Holston 2009; Lazar 2004).

Mixed modes of political performativity fit Balibar's (1991) observation that people *always* play hybrid roles. They are both citizens and subjects at the same time. Western political theory has given these two figures such deeply conflicting properties that it seems a person must be either one or the other. They are either a subject *to* power (a client, a colonial subject, an abject, an inferior) or a subject *of* power (a patron, a ruler, a citizen, a master). Why are we not surprised that Balibar, too, turns to the ancient Greeks for light on the fraught relationship between 'citizen' and

'subject'? Aristotle, Balibar found, held the two figures to be inseparable. A ruler must also be subject to the rules that rulers have agreed upon. It is therefore historically more accurate, Balibar concluded, to speak of the citizen-subject, who combines properties of both in the same figure. Gyanendra Pandey (2010) called this hybrid figure the 'subaltern citizen.'

The second important discovery these pioneering scholars of postcolonial citizenship made is that citizenship relations are shaped by particular social contexts. The two key determinants, interlinked, are political economy and the trajectory of state formation (Cornwall et al. 2011). Obvious as this seems, these two are often overlooked. The 'city,' from which the word 'citizen' is derived, is a field within political economy. Demands to participate in governing and being governed first reached a crescendo in the Athens of Pericles. Urban sociology has long highlighted the more individualistic sociality that prevails in cities anywhere in the world. Agrarian rural relations, by contrast, tend to be marked by patron-client relations. Some of the classic twentieth-century studies on these types of dependency relations were done in rural and small-town Sicily (e.g. Boissevain 1974). Southeast Asia was still predominantly rural when the patron-client relation was found to be endemic there in the 1960s (e.g. Landé 1965). (American social scientists were in the 1960s rediscovering the patrimonial relation in their Max Weber, and then found it everywhere in the field; it was their answer to the failure of the modernisation thesis they had wanted to believe in so fervently.) Clientelism, weak forms of citizenship, and low levels of economic development go together (Bates 1981; Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2009; Berenschot 2018). It would not be surprising if there was lots of patron-client dependency in the little town of Maumere in the 1950s.

The state, meanwhile, is the object of citizen struggles. Whereas links of intentionality between citizens and economic development tend to be indirect, those between citizens and state formation are direct. State structures express power relations within society. Nearly everything about the state of which Maumere was a part in the 1940s and 1950s could only be understood in relation to the fraught history of colonialism that had just ended. That state had suddenly acquired a population it now called 'citizens'; yet as we noted above, it was hardly capable of ensuring their rights. It would be a mistake to regard the incapacitation of the postcolonial state as a 'natural' phenomenon, to be suffered like the weather till it passes in due time. In particular, the question whether a postcolonial state turns out to be centralised and effective or decentralised and ruled indirectly (and

ineffectively) by local notables was always a function of political contestation. The Africanist Mahmood Mamdani (1996) showed that colonial rulers preferred to maintain a 'traditional' system of indirect rule, not only because it was cheap but because that would help inoculate the largely rural population from modernity and thus prevent insurrection. African nationalists aiming to mobilise citizens for emancipatory projects, on the contrary, wanted a centralised state. Catherine Boone (2003) reconstructed the history of state formation in two African states in the mid-twentieth century. While agreeing with the intentionality Mamdani had highlighted, she demonstrated that the institutional outcome was a bit more contingent than he thought. Instead of depending only on central state elite intentions, it depended on the level of resistance shown by regional economic elites. Where they cooperated, central elites preferred to retain indirect forms of rule; where they did not, centralised rule was imposed.

It seems entirely plausible that processes such as those described by Mamdani and Boone were at work in Indonesia as well. We will not be able to reconstruct them in detail in this book—the research has in any case not yet been done—but we will touch on them repeatedly. Indeed, so crucial is the trajectory of state formation to a sound understanding of the 1966 murder in Maumere that our reconstruction of the case must start there.

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CHAPTER 2

Rajas Rule

Abstract The colonial Dutch preferred to rule the Indonesian archipelago indirectly, through "traditional" rajas. Indirect rule rooted local authority in customary deference to authoritarian kings and sultans. Religion played its part to buttress their myths of rule. But in the years leading up to World War II, republican ideas began to spread even among subject peoples in poor, rural subsistence areas. Even after independence in 1945, authoritarian regimes in Indonesia have periodically sought to idealise decentralised, traditional rule. But republican protests inspired by the 1945 Revolution have repeatedly erupted against such rule. They demanded a central, democratic, republican state to deliver them from local tyranny.

Keywords Colonialism • Dutch • Raja • Indirect rule • Decentralised despotism • Religion • Republicanism • Indonesia • Flores

How can monarchy be a fit thing, when the ruler can do what he wants with impunity?
Herodotus, Histories *3.80*

Why, in the mid-twentieth century, in the newly independent Republic of Indonesia, were there still 'kings' in some parts? Why was Jan Djong protesting against this one so energetically? Did that contest perhaps wreak itself on him 12 years later? This last question concerns the trajectory of

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state formation in Indonesia. It can be rephrased more cautiously: was there something about the way the state was embedded in local Sikka customary society that proved lethal for a protester like Djong? This book investigates the hypothesis that *Murder in Maumere* was the result of a struggle between two rival concepts of the state. A familiar, immanent, personalised vision of authority located in known leaders legitimated by custom clashed with redemptive hopes placed in a distant, impersonal, and virtually deterritorialised central state, reachable only through law and bottom-up political parties. A state governed through personalised relations and cultural hierarchy versus the one premised on principles of legality and equality. This chapter addresses these questions historically. Historicising the political trajectory of a system of rule helps us understand how, as Mahmood Mamdani put it (1999), 'power reproduces certain identities and erodes others.'

Djong was one of about half a million to die under the nationwide, military-backed pogroms of late 1965 and early 1966. Sikka had never experienced anything as bloody as it did in that *annus horribilis*. The same was true of many places around the archipelago. If we wish to account for this atrocity historically, how far back should we go? Most accounts of Indonesia's 1965 bloodletting stay in 1965. Central themes are economic chaos (hyper-inflation) and political tensions (president vs. armed forces). Both are thought to be typical of a developing country during the Cold War. *Menjaring Angin*, however, the main text underlying Djong's story, finds it necessary to go back much further. It starts with Djong's political debut just after the end of the Pacific War. Other sources even mention the grievances of his father under the late colonial Dutch. *Menjaring Angin* sees the murder as a matter of postcolonial governance. Let us follow the author of this text and see where this leads us.

On this bigger canvas, 1965 certainly does look like just the latest in a turbulent series of historical turning points going back to the beginning of the twentieth century. The intervening years in Sikka are taken up by foreign invasions (three times if we count the coming of the Republic from Java in late 1949), regime changes (five times),[1] and economic crises (arguably covering most of the period from the late 1920s onwards). This is not even to mention the repeated local government annexations that

[1] Indigenous to Dutch around 1912, Dutch to Japanese in 1942, Japanese to Dutch in 1945, Dutch to Indonesian in late 1949, and Sukarno's civilian to Suharto's militarised rule in 1965.

seemed to disturb politically interested Sikkanese more than anything else. Particularly the preceding two decades had seen endless instability. The period between 1945 and 1965 was the heart of a turbulent twentieth century, for Sikka as for the archipelago as a whole. Each hinge moment created opportunities for new citizenship struggles. Sikka's quiet coconut groves and the empty streets of Maumere are deceptive. Even the most rural parts of Indonesia experienced endless turmoil in the past century. It is easy to understand why, realising this, government officials both colonial and postcolonial were so preoccupied with social stability. At the same time, the events of this period provided ample ammunition to develop a new language of revolt. Djong's 1950s 'demonstrations' drew most directly on the revolutionary war of national liberation of 1945–1949. But he had never seen the revolution in Java with his own eyes. What might have spoken to him more vividly were local stories, still circulating half a century later, about protests against the colonial 'pacification' of the Sikka region. Thus, citizenship was born in Indonesia in the midst of agonistic upheaval.

Before launching on our historical inquiry, it will promote clarity if I sketch at the outset the argument to which I think the material presented below leads. It is that the system of rule with rajas had intentionality and an abiding logic to it of enforced societal stasis. By the early twentieth century, when that system crystallised also in Flores, the Dutch were strong enough to make their own choices about the system of rule they wanted. Out in the regions, they intentionally chose to build a state on a network of loyal strongmen, and not on impersonal principles of law. Their logic was that this was culturally more appropriate, and therefore politically more conducive to stability, than the alternative. Actually that choice married two logics—one, security as seen from above, and another, patrimonial authority as seen by provincial patrons. Even today, this odd combination of authoritarian and patrimonial thinking continues to find much support in Indonesian decentralisation talk. Conservative national elites are still spooked by what they think of as the 'chaos' of the democratic politics of the 1950s, the most republican period in Indonesia's history since independence. For them, decentralisation and democratisation were not a matter of improving accountability to the greater public, but of reaching a satisfactory power-sharing agreement between the centre and local actors (Horowitz 2013). Occupying armies adopt a similar logic when extending their rule over hostile territory. The state of Afghanistan, for example, is being rebuilt after the 2001 American invasion on the basis

of power-sharing deals with local strongmen, who must be neither too strong nor too weak to be useful to the centre (Mukhopadhya 2014). But while the logic of locally legitimate 'soft power' has a certain appeal, embedding administrative state structures in a local cultural milieu while neglecting accountability comes at a cost to the citizenry. Local strongmen enjoy the added executive powers of a modern state while having to submit to few of the legal, democratic controls of one. This tends to make their rule despotic—often more so than it had been in precolonial times. And from there to the shedding of blood is but a short step.

Sikka in History

Practically, all friendly social relations beyond the family in precolonial societies were patrimonial. Max Weber was the first to formally identify the patrimonial as a 'traditional' authority relation, in which the personal qualities of the patron mattered more than any legal rules. Lucy Mair (1961) saw the basic political relationship in early 1960s rural East Africa as that between the wandering strangers who attach themselves to a clan chief. In exchange for protection, the refugee client offers to serve the patron in whatever way they might require. She saw it as a benign institution based on mutual exchange. No patron could exercise power without followers bound to them. As power grows, so does clientage. Christopher Clapham (1985: 49) similarly wrote that, in Africa, the patron-client relationship represented the most common type of authority because it 'corresponds to the normal forms of social organisation in pre-colonial societies.' Anthony Reid (1988–1993: I, 29) saw in precolonial and early colonial Southeast Asian societies a hierarchy in which '[t]he majority of the population in rural areas should probably be categorised as dependants or bondsmen.' Patron-client relations were everywhere, he wrote, and the tie was debt. Labour on every conceivable project, from building a harbour to clearing forest, was carried out by clients, mobilised by noble patrons. All war was fought by clients recruited by aristocrats. Before the Europeans came, the Malay Archipelago was almost entirely ruled by nobles who controlled populations of clients living in small territories (Andaya 1992; Reid and Castles 1975). Their politics were dynastic. Rulers were also monopoly traders, particularly outside Java. They were assisted by a small cadre of aristocratic administrators related to them by marriage. Below them, and largely beyond their reach if they lived far from the centre, came the large mass of peasants, who were themselves bound to local village patrons operating within a

restricted radius of influence. There, too, relations were hierarchical—based on genealogy or charisma. Peasant clients were dependent on patrons to access land, forest, or river resources. Most societies in the archipelago knew slavery. Even after the Dutch officially banned it in the early nineteenth century, the caste-like category of slave was widely maintained.

A patrimonial milieu shaped rajaship in Sikka as well, but there the institution arose more from the outside than from within.[2] Rajaship was born out of the meeting between Florinese rurality and foreign predation. Java and Bali have known millennia of irrigated rice-farming, and this created its own political structures. But in the eastern archipelago most people were until recently subsistence farmers. The north coast of central Flores is a rather fertile part of this generally dry region. It has long attracted the eyes of outsiders. They found an essentially stateless clan society riven by fractious politics (Fig. 2.1). Makassarese boats from southern Sulawesi raided coastal villages for slaves. Portuguese traders and missionaries landed in the sixteenth century and named the island Flores, perhaps in astonishment at the 'flowers' of the coral reefs that surrounded it. To secure a minimum of peace for their own trading and missionary activities with their limited means, all the foreigners worked with local strongmen. Warlike men of prowess submitted to baptism and took on Portuguese names alongside their indigenous ones. These great men became powerful brokers connecting the Europeans with local villagers, who knew them as Topass or 'black Portuguese.' The Topass protected and promoted the Catholic religion, negotiated alliances between the Portuguese and local potentates, fought when necessary, profited from trade, and sometimes married Europeans.

The raja who suffered such indignities at the hands of Djong's peasant protégés in 1953 was most likely descended from a Topass. The 'Great House' of the da Silva royal family is centred on the village of Natar Sikka on the south coast of the narrow island of Flores. It still nurtures a genealogy that appears to go back to the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century. The stories testify to the family's sovereignty over territories in central Flores, a sovereignty legitimated by the Catholic religion. The original strongmen of the clan may have been mestizos (half-castes) from Malacca who were allied with the Portuguese. Claims of sovereignty may have been exaggerated. Just how much political control they

[2] I am grateful for painstaking historical work on Sikka by Dietrich (1989), Lewis (2010), Mandalangi and Pareira (2011), Metzner (1982), and Steenbrink (2003–2007).

Fig. 2.1 Customary chief (and 'landlord') known near Ende as *mosalaki* (undated, probably before World War II). (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

actually exercised beyond their home village before the Dutch arrived remains uncertain.

The Dutch first came to the archipelago looking for spices early in the seventeenth century. But they found their Portuguese rivals well-entrenched everywhere, and it took a long time to displace them. In 1851, they bought Flores from the Portuguese, leaving the latter just the eastern half of Timor, near Flores. As the Portuguese had done, they worked with local influentials. Indirect rule was initially a diffuse form of power-sharing. It resembled the tribute-paying relations that locals had long practised with powerful indigenous actors from elsewhere. Like the Iberians had done before them, the Dutch at first negotiated in much the same way as indigenous rulers. They, too, were forced to adopt the precolonial, clientelist indigenous system. But at a certain point in time, the status hierarchy was reversed. Bongenaar in his exhaustive study of the indirect rule system in

the Netherlands Indies says the tipping point came somewhere between 1885 and 1910. By the late nineteenth century, the indirect rule they maintained was no longer a form of power-sharing forced on them by necessity. It was a choice. While governance in the Netherlands had been transformed by a long nineteenth century of industrialisation and democratisation, in the East the incentive structure produced a different outcome. The colonial Dutch were there simply to make a profit from a coercive form of tropical agraria. They wanted to keep down non-essential costs, while suppressing dissent. Indirect rule offered low-cost governance. Minimal budget outlays could be recouped through local taxation. Protest could be minimised by entrusting most governance to local strongmen. The Dutch defended it all by saying it was 'traditional' and would have low impact on the population.

They now set about regularising the territories they recognised as 'self-ruled.' This involved merging multiple little units into sizeable chunks and looking for local prominents with at least a minimum of 'traditional' legitimacy to act as ruler. For central Flores, the da Silvas seemed to fit the bill. In late 1885, the *Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch Indië* tells us, the clan's leading man, Don Andrez Ximenes da Silva, found himself acknowledged raja of Sikka. He continued to live in his ancestral village of Sikka on the south coast. Not till the mid-1920s did the raja—by then Don Thomas Ximenes da Silva—move to a new palace in Maumere. The town had been officially declared a government centre in 1912. His village had given its name to his kingdom. He continued to honour it as the ritual centre of the realm, but it would no longer do to live there.

Today Maumere rivals Ende on the south coast for the title of largest town on this mountainous island (Figs. 2.2 and 2.3). In the mid-nineteenth century, it had been not a single town but three tiny settlements. On the western side lay a village of Chinese traders that is today called Kota Uneng; further along lay an indigenous Florinese village now known as Kampung Kabor (meaning copra); and along the coast to the east was a village of Muslims originally from South Sulawesi (Da Gomez et al. 2003: 60–67). European Catholic missionaries had arrived in the 1860s. The newly arrived foreigners built on 'neutral' territory between the Chinese and indigenous settlements. Today's huge St Joseph's cathedral stands on this site (Fig. 3.5). Within a few years of 1912, a new town had arisen. Its centre was that plot of foreign-run 'neutral' land between the Chinese and the Florinese. Buildings of a type never seen before soon conveyed an imposing weight of alien symbolism. The church, run by European priests



Fig. 2.2 Indonesian archipelago. Flores is in the chain of islands trending east of Java. Central Flores (Sikka) is coloured black (see Fig. 2.3). (Courtesy of KITLV)

Fig. 2.3 Central Flores, showing some places mentioned in the text (after Bollen 1966)

and nuns, represented a religion that was now no longer for the aristocratic few but for everyone. Schools and clinics spread out from that central church to the hills in the hinterland. The army barracks represented unprecedented capacity to see everything and strike hard at will. To the east lay a palace for the raja. He wore traditional robes, but everyone knew he could call on the foreigners if anyone should wish to cross him. A junior European administrator (*controleur*) kept an eye on him (though the turnover of administrators was high in this boring little backwater). If local Florinese thought of these three centres—church, raja, and government—as the symbols of one undivided power, who could blame them?

The next two generations saw revolutionary changes coming over Sikka. The region's subsistence economy initially produced no taxable surplus. To pay for the bare minimum of services the Dutch supplied, the Dutch determined within a decade of decisively moving in that copra was the answer. Precolonial rajas around the archipelago had had to tread carefully and watch their backs, but now the guarantee of colonial backing transformed them into genuine autocrats. The raja of Sikka began forcing villagers to plant coconuts. He then taxed them on the produce, and the Dutch spent the money on roads and new settlements. European missionaries, too, needed the raja's support to build a network of new schools.

Aristocratic families sent their children to these schools, but they were also open to peasant families.

The extent of upheaval unleashed by the introduction of even rudimentary elements of a modern state and capital was to surprise even the colonisers themselves. The new system was far more authoritarian than the constantly renegotiated arrangement that preceded it. Warfare between rival territories had been endemic, but it was ritualistic and would today be classified as 'low level.' Now, though, a raja could feel himself invincible vis-à-vis his always-maligned neighbours. He enjoyed unheard-of taxation powers and had the Dutch army watching his back. At first some rajas, overjoyed with these extra powers, used them to harass their neighbours with fresh zeal (not realising the Pax Neerlandica was intended to eliminate such strife). So the raja of Larantuka, to the east of Sikka, regularly sent men into Sikka territory to demand taxes for himself. Complicating the situation was the complete disenfranchisement of lesser rulers, with whom the Dutch did not want to be bothered but who did have populations of their own. In the buffer zone between Sikka and Larantuka lay several smaller principalities that the Dutch, for convenience, had arbitrarily allocated to one or the other side. One of these, called Kanga'e, held Muslim Bajau fisherfolk who had settled along the coastline. They had never felt excessive loyalty to either raja and certainly did nothing to help the new raja of Sikka to consolidate his rule.

In 1900, fighting broke out between Sikka and Kanga'e. At first the Dutch chose to withhold the iron fist they had at their disposal and to appease instead. The resident in January 1903 raised the status of Kanga'e's ruler Na'e to that of raja. He had his seat in the coastal settlement of Waipare (Kewapante), ten kilometres east of Maumere. At the end of 1902, two Sikka rajas succumbed in quick succession to a cholera outbreak, leaving the kingdom in some disarray. The Kanga'e seized this opportunity to attack. A warrior named Mo'ang Teka began raiding Sikka territory, ostensibly in protest against tributes Sikka was still demanding. The stakes were now higher than they had been under 'traditional' warfare, and the savagery was proportionately greater. The melee turned into a veritable civil war, in which many villages in the interior were burned to the ground. Teka's weapons were supplied by the raja of Larantuka, conveyed through the Muslim Bajau particularly at Geliting, Waipare's neighbour a few hundred metres further east. On 20 May 1904, Teka and 90 of his troops, armed with rifles, entered Maumere. Once the Dutch had re-established order in town, they sent Captain Christoffel and his men,

notorious for his 'pacification' campaigns around the archipelago at this time, into the hills to put down the revolt at its root. Thus, the new colonial order was founded less in mythical legitimacy than in blood. Long after independence, Teka's adventure created legends of anti-colonial resistance in the Sikka region. There are today two heroic statues of him in Maumere. But as late as 1953, as we shall see in a moment, the violence he had committed against ordinary villagers was by no means forgotten. You could say the new colonial regime, for all its irenic traditional justification, had greatly expanded the possibilities for violence. It had done this by introducing new techniques of policing, while eliminating existing modes of legitimate conflict resolution.

An Ignorant and Idle People

At first sight, the Dutch decision to adopt a regime of indirect rule may simply look like a recognition of an existing mode of rule. But in reality it was taken quite late. By that time 'existing' modes of rule had been thoroughly destabilised by the Dutch interventions, and it was within their power to make choices. They debated those choices intensively among themselves. Little of the debate took place in public, but within the bowels of the bureaucracy it was at times fierce. Now the traditionalists led, now the modernisers. The debate first emerged in the early nineteenth century. The Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC)—an armed multinational with quasi-governmental powers—had been in the archipelago for two centuries. When the mercantilist VOC went bankrupt in 1799 and the Dutch decided to build a modern state in the Indies, their first impulse was to work with the humanist principles made salient by the French Revolution. In the last years of the eighteenth century the colonial functionary Dirk van Hogendorp had been the first to think of the colony in terms of governing them rather than simply trading with them. Governors-General Herman Willem Daendels (1808–1811) and Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811–1815) both had ideas about reforming the administration 'for the good of the natives.' Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, younger brother to Dirk and Governor-General (G-G) between 1815 and 1830, was a liberal ideologue who held 'a complex of ideas deriving from Adam Smith and Bentham, Voltaire and Rousseau through the French Revolution' (Furnivall 1944: 81). However, his successor, the old soldier Johannes van den Bosch (G-G 1830–1840), who built the planned plantation economy in Java known as the Cultivation System, adopted a view

that was to prove more enduring. 'No one believes more firmly than I do in a Liberal policy adapted to their character and institutions,' he wrote (Furnivall 1944: 110), 'but to apply to an ignorant and idle people the Liberal institutions of an enlightened age is as impossible as to introduce religious toleration among blind fanatics.'

The question of what kind of colonial state to build became more pressing as colonial government capacities grew. The first penal code was enacted in 1866. It was for Europeans only. One for natives followed in 1872. From this point on the Netherlands Indies was what Mamdani called a 'bifurcated state.' One side of it rested on a 'civilised' urban settler society practising direct rule, and the other one on a rural 'native' society ruled indirectly in authoritarian ways. The history of South African apartheid shows that, once established, bifurcation creates political trajectories that project violence far into the future. The twentieth-century bureaucratic debate in Batavia pitted modernisers against neo-traditionalists. It concerned relations between the state and its denizens and was therefore a citizenship debate. Curiously, conservatives and progressives were found on both sides of it. The modernisers had little time for traditional rulers. Conservatives among them thought in terms of efficient bureaucratic control. Progressives thought modern governance could improve lives by bringing health, education, irrigation, agricultural credit, legal certainty, and (later) democracy to the archipelago. Neo-traditionalists, on the contrary, feared that modernity in general might be destructive. Local communities, to them, offered protection against the penetration of modern capital and administration. This was a progressive idea at the time, strengthened by the prevailing cultural pessimism following the horrors of World War I. At the same time, conservatives hoped that keeping people as much as possible within protected 'traditional' communities might insulate them from emancipatory nationalist movements (Figs. 2.4 and 2.5).

Modernist bureaucrats had the initial advantage. Proposals to gradually dissolve the self-governing lands had been circulating since 1883. Emboldened by the modernising Ethical Policy of 1901 (whose missionary spirit had been foreshadowed in the 1881 novel *Max Havelaar*), they wrote reports in the years 1904–1909 condemning the 'extortionate practices' of various sultans. Seeing the possibilities for greater bureaucratic control, the imperialist Governor-General J.B. van Heutsz wrote a secret policy document in 1906 proposing closer regulation of the self-governing lands. Government advisor Hendrikus Colijn wrote a long modernising

Fig. 2.4 Mbaki Mbani, raja of Ndona, near Ende (undated, before World War II). (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

'nota' in the same spirit in 1907–1909 that also envisaged their gradual disappearance. The self-rule regulations (*Zelfbestuursregeling*) of 1919 simplified and standardised administration in those territories and placed more matters beyond the ruler's jurisdiction on the 'negative list.' Meanwhile, a progressive Dutch academic working group under J. Oppenheim wrote a report in 1922 expressing the belief that self-rule ought to disappear in the interests of popular democracy. As late as 1929 an internal government commission (*Extraterritorialiteitcommissie*) still wrote approvingly that the self-governing lands should be allowed to disappear gradually and that once the traditional self-rulers were gone local democracy would flourish.

However, the tide was turning against the modernisers. This latest commission's report was kept secret. The new director of the bureaucratic corps (*Binnenlands Bestuur*), A. Mühlenfeld, disliked the notion of democracy emerging in place of traditional self-rule. From this time on, neo-traditionalists promoted self-rule as a useful safeguard against democracy.

Fig. 2.5 Women related to Pius Rasi Wangge, raja of Lio. Photo taken at Wololele, southwest of Maumere near the south coast (undated, before World War II). (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

Their trump card in a time of world economic crisis was that self-governing lands were cheap. This led the colonial government to even restore a number of self-governing lands—in Bali and South Sulawesi—that had previously been dissolved.

The restoration movement had support from both capitalists and intellectuals and would have gone further if World War II had not intervened. Plantation owners and miners also leaned towards self-rule, which they saw as a way of escaping greatly increased legal supervision from a modern bureaucratic state. They were always opposed to the modernising Ethical Policy, with its expensive programme of state welfare penetrating every corner of society. Leiden law professor C. van Vollenhoven was among the major neo-traditionalist progressives. Earlier, Ritsema van Eck (1919) had proposed a strictly dual, apartheid-like system of government in which a strong central Dutch bureaucracy managed the entire archipelago while indigenous communities developed separately and 'organically.' The 'organic' idea was core to a much-quoted proto-fascist booklet

at the time by Jacob Biemond (1922). This rejected as outmoded the idea of individual democratic franchise and idealised an image of society as a collective organism, in which each part unquestioningly played its assigned role. It was applied most passionately to the future of Indonesia in a visionary book by A.D.A. de Kat Angelino. He foresaw an indigenous middle class arising in the colony that would explicitly not promote a western kind of democracy. Such a democracy he dismissed (following Biemond) as 'anarchic' and 'individualistic.' Instead, the new middle class would engage in 'corporative Eastern democracy.' The colonial state would encourage it in this direction. The collaboration would stimulate values of 'loyalty and obedience' (De Kat Angelino and Renier 1931 I: 328, 438). All this could not possibly arise from within indigenous society by itself, 'simply because in the East there is no society in the modern sense but only an agglomeration of tens of thousands of small and isolated genealogical, territorial, or functional communities.... The state is thus engaged in calling into existence its unborn mother, the society that fits it.... The construction of Oriental society under the aegis of colonial policy is, in the Dutch East Indies too, mainly a process of cementing of gigantic proportions' (De Kat Angelino and Renier 1931 II: 266).

Sikka's Sacred Canopy

Against the backdrop of these elevated if distinctly mixed ideological developments, Dutch administrators in the eastern archipelago had by the early 1920s begun to raise their ambitions. Having successfully incorporated the region into the colonial state, they now turned their attention to managing the population as a whole. Economic development increasingly produced social dislocation, and this in turn required new governance arrangements. All three symbolic centres in Maumere shared an authoritarian instinct when it came to thinking about rule. Dutch administrators began to question their earlier policy of appeasement, which had led to them supporting many fractious little rajas. They wanted a raja who was energetic and decisive, autocratic towards his people, and loyal towards the centre. They found exactly the figure they needed in Don Thomas Ximenes da Silva (1895–1954) (Fig. 2.6). He was a mission boy, educated to grade five in the Catholic school at Lela, equipped with metalworking skills. In his youth he fished, and then caused an outcry when he stole the family's ivory to sell in Bajawa. At the age of 17 he was taken on as a jail guard in Maumere, and then as a tax clerk. The priests who taught him in Lela liked his attitude and presented him to the governor-general in

Fig. 2.6 Raja Don Thomas Ximenes da Silva in formal Portuguese-legacy dress, with his wife (undated). (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

Batavia as a rightful heir to the throne. He became acting ruler (*Bestuurder*) of Sikka in 1921. Two years later he was confirmed amidst splendid festivities involving the bishop and other rajas, and an acclamation in Portuguese. He was aged just 28. He did indeed prove himself to be a good learner, diligently reading newspapers from the city and later listening to the radio. They now forced him to reorganise his kingdom and appoint resident administrators named kapitan in five (later seven) districts within the kingdom. In other kingdoms where political loyalty appeared to be a problem, meanwhile, the Dutch reduced the raja's autonomy. They suspected as much among the many Muslims in Kanga'e, and therefore relieved the raja of Kanga'e of his job for 'incompetence' at the end of 1925. In 1929, Kanga'e was reabsorbed into Sikka. A little earlier the Dutch had also dissolved another little kingdom called Nita, just south of Maumere. The rajas' subjects were naturally not consulted. Safe in the knowledge the Dutch would back him against protest, the raja of Sikka appointed equally autocratic heads in his villages to collect tax.

To ensure loyalty, most were relatives. Kapitan was a new institution in Flores. Their powers to exact forced labour (*heerendiensten*) quickly made them unpopular, but did produce lots of infrastructure in the interior—roads, bridges, wells, markets, clinics, schools, and so on. The kapitan in turn appointed village heads.

Djong's father was one of those village heads. Djong was born in the hamlet of Hewokloang, on a green mountain ridge in Iwang Gete, which had previously been part of the Kanga'e kingdom. Hewokloang is the originating village for the entire Iwang Gete region. When Heinrich Bollen first saw it in the early 1960s, he felt he had never seen a more beautiful village in Flores. Each clan had a substantial house with decorated bamboo walls and thatched roofs (Fig. 2.7). Megaliths for the ancestors stood in the space before the verandas. Next to them were set sacrificial stones. Though less than 20 kilometres from Maumere, and connected by a narrow, unsealed colonial road, motorised vehicles could only reach it in the dry season. Locals walked or carried their produce to

Fig. 2.7 Customary house in Hewokloang today. This one belongs to the Lepo Musidoleh clan. (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

the coastal market on mountain ponies. When Bollen first arrived in the area on his German motorcycle, he found waist-high grass on the road after the wet season. Djong's father was a descendant of Raja Na'e, the first king of Kanga'e recognised by the Dutch, who came from Hewokloang. He had combined subsistence farming with the prestigious position of kampong head. When Hewokloang was brought under the raja of Sikka in the consolidation the Dutch carried through in the late 1920s, he had lost his job, presumably to a relative of the raja. This was the beginning of the grudge the family held against the raja.

The raja of Sikka implemented a coconut intensification programme designed to produce a taxable surplus. Copra production generated cash that supplemented subsistence. It brought considerable prosperity to the region. But the tree crop took land away from subsistence agriculture and required substantial labour to harvest and process. As reliance on cash increased, world price fluctuations caused hardship at times. Copra was taxed at around 8%. Kanga'e was and remains the most densely populated rural area in central Flores, and its farming families on average own more land here than elsewhere. Unlike in other parts of subsistence eastern Indonesia, land here had long been individually owned.

Maumere was also the base for Catholic missionaries to reach the interior, where they built schools and chapels (Fig. 2.8). Unlike the secular schools that brought renewal to students in Java, religious schools in Flores taught a closed and backward-looking mythology of rajas, framed in an autocratic Catholic theology. The missionaries relied mainly on the Sikka raja to gain access to the countryside. He enforced attendance at school and church and generally helped create a 'top-down' system of communication. The sociologist of religion, Peter Berger (1969), had a name for protective mythologies like this: the 'sacred canopy.'

Photographs we have of Raja Thomas Ximenes da Silva in the postwar period show no signs that the sacred canopy was about to crack in Sikka. Yet just as republican alternatives began to threaten it like storm clouds on the horizon, the 50ish raja ordered a compendium to be written of the history, laws, and customs of the Sikka kingdom. His ministers produced three manuscripts. Only one survives today. It begins with the legendary life of Alesu, the first great raja in the da Silva clan. Its precise historicity cannot be established, but its tales of travel do seem to bear historical echoes. They probably play out in the glorious days of Portuguese suzerainty in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The historian Douglas Lewis (1998: 57), who translated it, extracted

Fig. 2.8 Church in Riangwulu, East Flores (undated, probably the 1930s). (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

from it the following core message: 'Catholicism is at the root of Sikka's claim to legitimate rule in eastern Flores. Alesu is the figure who brought Catholicism to Sikka, who converted the people, and who thereby secured Sikkanese hegemony over the whole of east central Flores.' The language Don Thomas' ministers used in their account was inspired by a defiantly reactionary programme of religion and tradition. Why did he want them to write it precisely in the late 1940s? He may have been contemplating his own death. But a bigger threat to his legacy was the secular, republican modernity that had arrived in nearby Ende and was staring him down. The end of an era was nigh. In fact Raja Thomas became a pious Catholic only late in his life. But the mission had depended on him for much longer to expand its presence into the Sikka countryside since before the war. It had built him into its own 'from darkness to light' myths. Now he needed that myth more than ever.

When Sikka joined the Republic of Indonesia at the end of 1949, the authoritarian order resting on Maumere's three symbolic centres came

into question. The Republic was secular and democratic. Resistance became possible again. What was to stop emancipatory ideas from flooding in? Coconut farmers in Kanga'e, for example, soon wanted to know how the copra taxes the raja was collecting from them were being spent. Ultimately, such resistance was bound to run into a power much bigger than the person of Don Thomas. It confronted the monolithic power of raja and church, still seated in the town. V.B. 'Sentis' da Costa was Djong's closest friend in the heady early 1950s when that resistance first broke out. When I spoke with him in 2010, he lived in Jakarta, an ageing ex-parliamentarian. He told me what Djong was up against (Fig. 2.9):

> Anyone with an education did what the priest said. All the teachers and the ex-seminarians joined the Catholic Party. Everyone else only had three years of village schooling. Even the customary associations (*adat*) were controlled by the priest…. Flores was like Ireland. The priests were not used to political pluralism. It was isolated from the world to keep it pure for the Catholic faith. That was their model.

Fig. 2.9 'Flores was like Ireland. It was isolated from the world.' Father Mertens and Brother Gallus van Lith (undated, probably before World War II). (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

Republican Challenge

Shortly before the Pacific War, the British scholar Rupert Emerson (1979 [1937]) wrote a study on Dutch and British practices of indirect rule in the Malay Archipelago. It remains a classic. Legally, the Dutch did distinguish between directly and indirectly ruled territories within the Netherlands Indies, but in the minds of the colonial rulers the ideal was to maintain indigenous rule wherever possible. By the late 1930s, that principle was beginning to rub up against reality. Java particularly, densely populated, economically important, and long brought under modern government, could no longer be managed by reinvented rajas. But Flores still looked unproblematic. It was economically peripheral, its overwhelmingly rural population appeared happy with their rajas. And nowhere did the Dutch feel impelled to move fast on democracy for the indigenous population. Emerson was not ideologically unsympathetic to the idea of politics run on indigenous principles, even if that meant the Dutch were contradicting their earlier 'ethical' commitments to modern governance. But by the late 1930s he was no longer convinced that indigenous society itself remained receptive to such principles. He wrote of 'this extraordinarily difficult task of bringing back to life communities which shall still have the semblance of growing from the soil.' The difficulty lay in the inherently repressive character of a state intent unilaterally on freezing a set of hierarchical social relations it regards as ideal. De Kat Angelino's utopian 'corporative Eastern democracy' makes no appearance in Emerson's prognosis. Instead, he feared a 'violent and bloody trial of strength [was] … inevitable' (436, 493):

> Yet for the British and the Dutch indirect rule has been so sharply associated with the maintenance of the prestige and the fiction of the power of the traditional chiefs and rulers that it is difficult to see how the new society can break through the artificially petrified crust of the old traditions without violent conflict. (518–9)

And violent the conflict was when finally it broke out in 1945. While the Republic of Indonesia soon controlled most of Java and parts of Sumatra, the Dutch re-established control in the outer islands. Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus van Mook built a federation based on numerous royal principalities. Over a hundred thousand deaths later, when the Dutch were finally forced to concede defeat, an independent

Indonesia emerged that was still a federation. The Republic of the United States of Indonesia awkwardly combined the revolutionary republic with the federated principalities. Even when that was dissolved in favour of a unitary republic on 17 August 1950, rajas continued to exist in many areas. All these areas saw political parties and republican administrators mobilise on popular 'anti-feudal' feelings. One after another the rajas 'voluntarily' dissolved their kingdoms and took a state pension.

Even after that, however, the idea of traditional rule 'growing from the soil' retained considerable appeal. Where political parties failed to emerge, such as in South Sulawesi during the bloody Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s and early 1960s, aristocrats maintained their influence even into the New Order. The military allied itself with these aristocrats so effectively in 1965 that the latter thought they were experiencing a 'revival of elements of Van Mook's Federal rule: strong demands by the regional indigenous rulers to be Governors and Regents, protection of the rights of minorities, and the demand for *kemajuan* and *pembangunan* [progress and development]' (Magenda 1989: 10). Golkar, the New Order's political vehicle for winning votes and rewarding loyalists, provided them with a safe home.

In the 1990s, the idea of traditional rule experienced a revival in an unexpected quarter. Partly inspired by the worldwide environmental and indigenous peoples movements, customary local rule became an inspiring model to young people protesting *against* the New Order. When mass demonstrations brought the New Order to an end in 1998, one element in the protests that surprised cosmopolitan observers was a nativist 'sons of the soil' movement in the provinces. Its adherents curiously combined colonial discursive elements with anti-colonial, emancipatory with conservative. They demanded self-rule on the basis of customary principles. They promoted 'legal pluralism' as a defence against the central state. Land rights, for example, should no longer be subject to national law but should belong once more to the 'local community' (Henley and Davidson 2007). Decentralisation was intended in large part to respond to this localist movement.

Had Djong been alive in 1998, he would probably have found these demands puzzling. I can almost hear him asking: has the Republic then lost so much of its sheen 53 years after that magical moment when independence was proclaimed in August 1945, the moment known simply as *Proklamasi*? His own activism had been driven by the idea that such nativism—at least inasmuch as it contains rajas—points to an oppressive

reality. He and many others sought to escape from its daily reality by aspiring to citizenship in a new republic. But what did the republic really mean to them? To recover the idea of citizenship in that little town in the 1950s, we must finally zoom right into the life story of our protagonist.

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CHAPTER 3

Postcolonial Citizens

Abstract Jan Djong emerged from the conservative small-town milieu of church and rajaship to become the district's republican rebel shortly after World War II. His repertoire was hybrid. It lacked most connection with the institutions of civic deliberation. Instead, he combined modern republican tropes of protest (the "demonstration") with indigenous ones (tribal warfare). His campaign against the local raja's dynasty brought together white collar urban republicanism with rural peasant demands for recognition. Although often infused by rough-and-tumble violence, the campaign acted inclusively. It was rewarded with success. At least temporarily.

Keywords Republicanism • Revolution • Central state • Democracy • Citizenship • Peasant movements • Provincial towns • Informality • Global south

> *It is not always the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen.*
> *Aristotle,* Nicomachean Ethics

Jan Djong's 1953 *demonstrasi* made a big impression on Maumere. Fifteen years later the local literati were still talking about these defiant village people and their matted coconut-leaf posters. But if the demonstrators' slogans of 'Regnat Populus' and 'Democracy + raja = nearly 0' were citizenship claims for the new republic, what was their idea of citizenship, really? In this chapter we follow the grain of our two texts. We do not find

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there a static set of civil behavioural norms. Rather than a cerebral construction, we find ideas coming alive in stories. Citizenship is action. It is easy to imagine Djong being like the Indochinese rebel whom Frantz Fanon described at exactly the same time, who revolted against the French because '"quite simply" it was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for him to breathe' (Fanon 1986 [1952]: 226). Scattered throughout the accounts of little Maumere's fierce social struggles are answers to questions about inclusion and exclusion. Did Maumere's first postcolonial citizens aim at expanding the local political community, or at constraining it? Were they open to the kind of dissensus that, according to Rancière (2001), constitutes politics in a democracy, or opposed to it? What did they think about the rival models of rule that occupied the nation as a whole in that period—a rule-based republic versus a politics 'growing from the soil'?

Birth of a Rebel

All agitation starts with a rebel. Both my Sikka source documents agree the district's arch-rebel would have to be Johanes ('Jan') Djong (1917–1966). When he fired up a crowd, he undermined the administrative authority of the local government head and the spiritual authority of the priest. His admiring enemy Heinrich Bollen wrote years later (Sommer 1993: 35, 71) that Djong had been:

> [a] bright, educated man, expressive and lively in his speech and movements, in his gestures… He felt himself to be the keeper of the old values and customs with which people in this island had lived long long ago… He thought it was up to him to be the liberator, to bring freedom from need and poverty, from foreign rule, and he fought against exploitation by the powerful and the rich. Yes, he could certainly sweep one along, this Jan Djong….
>
> Who was Jan Djong? A rebel? A revolutionary? He was the one who took up the struggle against the influential and powerful royal dynasty of the Rajas of Sikka and drove them out of Sikka, the one who fought against injustice, exploitation and inequality. Was he not a dreamer, this Jan Djong, a veritable world improver?

Djong was born, as we saw, the son of a former village head-cum-subsistence farmer in the beautiful hillside village of Hewokloang, south-east of Maumere. He was of small stature. At the primary school in

Watublapi, his Catholic teachers found him bright and quick of tongue. His older brother, an illiterate village head, introduced him to a Dutch priest at Lela on the south coast, who got him into the island's finest school, the new Mataloko seminary in Ngada district far to the southwest of his home village (Fig. 3.1). It had first opened in 1926 in the iconic village of Sikka, but moved to this spacious campus in 1930, probably in the very year Djong started. They were looking for young talent to take forward their big plans for Flores. Hundreds like him all over the archipelago, children of traditional chiefs at schools like this, were learning to become members of a new bureaucratic elite (Sutherland 1979). Reading Cicero supposedly taught him the art of public speaking.

To all appearances, he lived in a world where society, order, and hierarchy came first. The anarchy and individualism that A.D.A. de Kat Angelino had feared in his 1931 book on the future of the Netherlands Indies (see previous chapter) still looked far away. The 'corporative' and the 'Eastern' (though certainly not the 'democratic') seemed to be guaranteed by the imposing figure of Raja Don Thomas of Sikka, descendant of the most Catholic Raja Alesu. In Louis Dumont's memorable expression, people



Fig. 3.1 Seminary on Mataloko Plateau. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)



Fig. 3.2 Jan Djong at the new Mataloko seminary, probably 1930, aged about 13. (Photo permission of Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

living in such a traditional rural world were *homo hierarchicus*, social beings who deferred to their natural superiors rather than individuals with ideas about how they should be ruled (Dumont 1980 [1966]). Dumont's image discounts the rebel who demands personal autonomy. Yet when Djong emerged into adulthood at Flores' Mataloko, the turbulent twentieth century had penetrated even there (Figs. 3.2 and 3.3).

A remarkable surviving photograph seems to depict a caring, even intimate, environment at the boarding school. The student Djong is standing by the desk of a priest, who is helping him with his homework. The warmly lit priest is the Dutchman Frans Cornelissen, director of the school (Fig. 3.4). Yet the memories of school that he later shared with his friends



Fig. 3.3 Mataloko. Jan Djong, at centre, next to Father Meyer. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

Fig. 3.4 Jan Djong with Father Cornelissen at Mataloko. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

were not of such generous mentorship. He spoke to them of harsh beatings. So bad were these that they left him permanently embittered against the church. Not long afterwards, he eloped with a young woman. The priests disapproved. This deepened the grudge he held against them. We cannot now fathom the precise circumstances. But the result was that a school built to reproduce *homo hierarchicus* in Flores had turned him into an instrument of its subversion. Djong had become Sikka's rebel.

Towns

Once Djong graduated from school, all his activism centred on the little town of Maumere, where an indigenous middle class was emerging. Before the 1920s a middle class hardly existed in the colonial Netherlands Indies, beyond a couple of cities like Medan and Batavia. But as the overwhelmingly rural archipelago slowly urbanised, it also began to appear in sleepy towns like Maumere. Its floral-frocked and white-shirted members began to shape themselves into a new collective actor, with their own language, identity, and material interests. The town was their space. Here, partly dislocated from the villages whence most of them had come, they lived by cash rather than by land; they became ambitious rather than resigned; they grew excited about this world rather than piously awaiting the one to come. They developed a new 'state of mind,' as Daniel Lerner wrote (1964), marked by an expectation of progress and a readiness to adapt oneself.

Most indigenous middle-class members in colonial Indonesian provincial towns worked for the state. They started turning up the volume of political chatter in the 1930s, in their underfunded but avidly read little local news broadsheets, and at public meetings in Chinese-owned movie theatres. A good number of mainly ethnic Chinese private entrepreneurs belonged to the middle class too, also in Maumere, but they largely kept their politics to themselves. A few Europeans—mainly administrators, priests, and nuns—made up the top layer in town before the war. The clergy stayed on in Maumere after it. To get a picture of Maumere's make-up in the early 1940s, we must project backwards from the first urban planning reports appearing in the late 1970s (PUTL 1977; DPU 1981). About 20,000 people then lived within its municipal boundaries. But the real town was much smaller, because the formal boundaries extended well beyond the town proper. Only one-third of the workers within those boundaries were neither farmers nor fishers, so the town proper would have held about 7000 people (Fig. 3.5). No demographic growth figures



Fig. 3.5 Maumere in 1976. In the 1950s and 1960s the town was even smaller. (After Metzner 1982)

are available for the 1940s and 1950s, but if the town grew as quickly as did nearby Kupang in the same period, it would have had an urban population just before World War II of less than 2000. They lived in a strip about three kilometres long along the coast.

In the 1970s, half of those non-agrarian workers in the town proper were in trade and small industries that mainly served the town's agrarian hinterland. The biggest industry was coconut oil processing. The other half were military and civil servants. The latter group had grown dramatically over the preceding couple of decades. Civil administrators came after 1949 as the new republic sought to cover the map with a bureaucratic presence. Soldiers only increased markedly in number towards the late

1950s and will be discussed in the next chapter. By the time of the *demonstrasi* in 1953, there were simply too few soldiers in town to matter much.

Hundreds of such little towns lie scattered around Indonesia. We know little about them, yet they were vital links in the chains of communication that spread goods and ideas around the country. It was their activism—mainly by talking, sometimes by fighting—that turned Indonesia into an independent nation in the late 1940s. And it is still they that hold the country together today, as I have shown elsewhere (Klinken 2014). A new middle class of school teachers, policemen, nurses, and agricultural officers throughout the 1950s reached out to poorer urban and rural folk in the town's vicinity to create new political parties and unions. Inclusive citizenship movements started with them in the exciting early years of independence. At the same time, the kind of intimate political violence that was to occur in Maumere in 1966 was also disproportionately found in such small towns, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Opportunity

Tumultuous times favour outsiders. Djong's rebelliousness caught on with others, at least for a while, because in an 'open opportunity structure' the odds are stacked against incumbents. Even before the Pacific War, some colonial conservatives had begun to realise that the capitalism they themselves were bringing to the marketplace was breaking down traditional solidarities. The past still had a hold in many places, wrote the sociologist B.O. Schrieke in his secret government report on the 1926–1927 communist uprisings (Schrieke 1966). But he did see 'individualism' spreading, as it were along the railway lines. As yet few members of this 'sulky group of malcontents' had appeared in Maumere even 20 years later. Djong was the first.

It was the Japanese, invading in March 1942, who put the stability of this social world to its first severe test. Unlike in Java, the Japanese in Flores did not mobilise the population to feats of heroic sacrifice. But during the three years between 1942 and 1945 that their military occupied the archipelago, even their most mundane measures helped undermine respect for local aristocrats. They ordered the raja of Sikka to build a military airfield next to Maumere using forced labour. The Japanese, I heard during one of my visits to Maumere, used to chop the fingers off any of the raja's workers who were too slow. This did little to enhance popular respect for the raja. Not long after it was finished, the airfield attracted

savage Allied bombing raids. Bombs also fell on the town's harbour—which the Japanese had expanded—and on the town itself, whose population evacuated to the hills. The raja's own palace was obliterated in July 1944. War also eroded his monopoly on dispensing bureaucratic career opportunities. The occupiers preferred to offer the most essential jobs to educated indigenous non-aristocrats. These ambitious young people responded enthusiastically to the vague Japanese offers, growing louder as their war faltered, to bring full-fledged independence to Indonesia. Djong was one of them.

From 1938 he had worked as a clerk in Maumere, first as a trainee in the Dutch *controleur's* office, then in charge of the Maumere post office. The Japanese now had him appointed kapitan in Iwang Gete (Djong 1961), his ancestral region centred on Hewokloang. It was his first taste of executive authority. It ended with the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945.

In Java, in the confused transition that followed the Japanese capitulation, such newly promoted educated young non-aristocrats then helped lead a revolution. With Allied forces still some days away, senior Indonesian political figures in Jakarta unilaterally proclaimed the independent Republic of Indonesia. First to arrive were British Allied forces, and then the colonial Dutch, the latter in a fighting mood. A revolutionary war of national liberation ensued that lasted for over four years and claimed many tens of thousands of lives (Reid 1974). Republicans held sway in most of Java and parts of Sumatra, with significant pockets in Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The Dutch reasserted control over the rest of the large archipelago—including Flores. That island saw no revolution. Instead of seizing the chance to democratise indirect rule, the Dutch condemned the republican Indonesians who had worked with the Japanese as 'collaborators.' Particularly in the outer islands they turned back to the rajas, giving them greater responsibilities and thus deepening the anachronistic contradictions of indirect rule. In Sikka, the raja felt emboldened to restore his relatives to all administrative positions in the kingdom. He dismissed Djong under the guise of 'denipponisation.' Out of work and now adding a new grudge to the old one he nursed on behalf of his father, an angry Djong began to agitate.

The Dutch in Flores never feared serious outbreaks of militancy, but rumours of agonistic politics elsewhere in the archipelago did leave their mark. In events that remain unclear, he and a man named P.J. Bapa led villagers in a rowdy protest against the raja of Sikka on 3 May 1948 over

the 'nepotistic' appointment that replaced him in Iwang Gete. The crowd burned the wooden bridge across a dry stream on the eastern outskirts of Maumere. Policemen fired shots to regain control. Someone was hit in the leg. Under the indirect rule, the raja was also a judge. Raja Don Thomas had no trouble interpreting the affair as a flare-up of a fight involving Djong's father that had lain dormant since the 1920s. He detained Bapa for a few days, and later jailed ring-leader Djong for six months for this episode. Several others went to jail too.

By the end of 1949, the Dutch had to concede to the Republic. Their military had had endless trouble with the poorly equipped but popular revolutionary guerrilla fighters in Java. Their diplomats had been unable to persuade their anti-colonial and powerful American allies that what they were doing in Indonesia was right. They officially lowered the Dutch flag of sovereignty at the governor-general's palace on 27 December 1949 and saluted the Indonesian red-and-white flag as it rose up the pole to thunderous popular applause. (Only Papua remained outside the Republic. It took another 14 years before they ceded that as well.)

Colonial subjects now instantly became under law what they had already declared themselves to be through action—citizens of a republic. But law hardly captured social reality. The war-weary Republic lacked resources to build a presence everywhere at once. Local power-holders found ways of hanging on—also in Flores. Meanwhile, the young and the dissatisfied continued to press their 'right to be political.' It had won them a republic in Jakarta, now they wanted one in their own home town. Years of transformative contestation ensued even in those provinces that had not been part of the revolution. Everywhere, people seized on the language of revolution and translated it into the idiom of their own local struggles.

The republican arrival in the eastern archipelago triggered fresh attacks on the rajas' privileges. Sukarno had spoken against monarchy in his famous 'Pancasila' speech at the constitutional assembly just before the end of the Pacific War:

> Also, as far as the State Leadership is concerned, frankly, I do not prefer a monarchy. Why? Because monarchy presupposes hereditariness, it is based on heredity. I am a Muslim. I am a democrat because I am a Muslim, I prefer consensus, so I request that the Head of State be elected. Does not Islam teach us that the people should elect all heads of state, be they caliphs or *Amirul mu'minin* [Commander of the Faithful]? (Hellwig and Tagliacozzo 2009: 306)

The Demonstration

On the ground around the archipelago, however, the Republic remained more an idea than an institutional reality. It had a risible budget, a bureaucracy depleted by war, an ill-equipped army made up of disparate militia factions, and a patchwork quilt of representative assemblies each following its own insight. Many people in areas the Dutch had controlled saw the Republic as suspiciously revolutionary, Javanese, and (particularly in the predominantly Christian East) Islamic. Its young republican officials were seen as upstarts. Lacking the political capital to force the pace of change, the Republic maintained the rajas for the time being. This set the stage for several years of conflict (Fig. 3.6).

In Flores, the Republic established itself initially only in the multicultural southern harbour town of Ende. It set up a parliament and an executive government there to run the entire island. The liberal SVD priest

Fig. 3.6 Sikka in political transition, about 1951. Left to right: Josep Siwe Mole (Raja Ngada), Mgr. Gabriel Manek, Thomas da Silva (raja of Sikka and head of Flores), L.E. Manteiro (deputy head of Flores). (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

A.A. Conterius (Fig. 3.7) chaired the legislative assembly. Raja Don Thomas was appointed the first head of the (seriously underfunded) Flores island district government, leaving his brother in charge in Maumere. In December 1951, he was asked to hand over to his deputy, the idealistic former school teacher L.E. Manteiro (1915–2003), 20 years his junior. Manteiro was now officially in charge of the rajas. But, back in Maumere, Raja Don Thomas of Sikka in particular was unimpressed. A vigorous

Fig. 3.7 Adrianus Conterius addresses the Flores assembly. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

shouting match developed between a proud but bankrupt, ageing, and publicly abused raja in Maumere and idealistic, young, but effectively powerless republicans in Ende, a day's drive away. The discord invited a chorus of irreverent talk from others both in Ende and throughout the Sikka district.

In Ende, young members of the new class of white-shirted bureaucrats began to fantasise excitedly about 'Revolt.' Assemblyman and cleric Adrianus Conterius (1914–1984) started a news magazine there called *Bentara*, and became its founding editor. Its pages were filled with respectable advice for living like a good Catholic, but it also favoured modern republican democracy. Illustrations of portraits of Mao Tse Tung and Nehru appeared. Immediately after the transfer of sovereignty it editorialised sensibly: 'Development and the idea of democracy should be constructed from the bottom up; this will form a strong foundation upon which to build progress. [But] if there are no rules and regulations from the top none of this can be carried through to the villages.' In 1951, the magazine began protesting against 'landlords' (*tuan-tuan tanah*). Landlords were a village institution in Flores, where they had the authority to allocate subsistence farming land to villagers. Though a far cry from the medieval European institution, their powers did derive from the raja. The discourse against them quickly became part of a modernising 'anti-feudalism' popular in the towns. It was to be heard throughout the 1950s. Conterius urged the 'democratisation' of 'feudal' rule. One youthful author wrote impatiently that the famous Jakarta law professor Supomo had long been writing against landlords, and the central government was trying to get rid of them, yet they still retained the right to allocate land in Flores. And they too often kept the land for themselves. 'Perhaps it can only be changed by a revolt,' he expostulated. 'Clever young people who understand a little bit about progress towards a new order must organise common action against the old guard whose "smell" still gets up our noses.'

National leaders only vaguely encouraged this revolt. When Sukarno, the colonial agitator and now republican president, made his first visit to Flores on 30 October and 1 November 1950, 'revolt' was no longer part of his message (Fig. 3.8). He spoke about political unity and offered fatherly advice against the traditional vices of gambling, high bride prices, and cohabitation without marrying (this latter concern was no doubt conveyed to him in whispers by the priests). Vice President Mohammad Hatta made similarly moderate modernising remarks during a flying visit to the region in late April 1952. Becoming 'Indonesian' rather than 'Florinese'

Fig. 3.8 President Sukarno (centre, black cap) visits Flores, 31 October 1950. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

involved a social transformation towards welfare, he said. In the interior (at Mbay, west of Ende) he was confronted with the shocking sight of emaciated children. His first response was to urge a modern corporatist work ethic. Hard work combined with cooperatives was the solution, he told his white-shirted audience. Look at the Japanese, he said (remarkably soon after the war). By working together they became rich in a land that was not rich. However, at his next stop in Lombok he did say something controversial. He criticised the traditional power structure that also applied in Flores. Landlords, he said, were 'the chief obstacle to progress in this country.' This was music in the ears of the young urban middle-class intellectuals in Ende. For them, 'landlords' was code for 'feudalism,' which in turn was code for the rajas. The clerks were stretching things a bit in making these connections, but the raja certainly stood at the head of this customary hierarchy. The raja's prerogatives had been severely curtailed by republican measures taken in Ende since 1950. Raja Don Thomas in particular persisted in exercising them, but recurrent protests caused his tax receipts to dwindle. 'Get rid of this ancient custom of landlords!' one letter-writer shouted in the pages of Ende's *Bentara* with delicious defiance. In September 1952, this newspaper invited readers to debate the

'landlords' question. Indignant letters poured in for over a year. Rajas were 'the source of all chaos,' who demanded big bribes to release land to ordinary farmers. Only force could make them give up. 'Eliminate feudalism in Flores!' wrote the young Catholic Party chairman in Ende; it was incompatible with democracy. Perhaps under some pressure not to neglect 'Catholic' respect to authority, the *Bentara* editor also placed some milder pieces. One described landlords as really nothing more than leaders exercising their conflict-prevention functions by negotiating access to land.

Local representatives of the central government continued to aggravate the rajas, while realising they lacked the resources to displace them immediately. Manteiro was a passionate moderniser. Behind him stood the socialist provincial governor in Bali, Sarimin Reksodihardjo. In Maumere Manteiro had a representative named Messakh. Manteiro's frequently inflammatory pronouncements against the raja were unfortunately not backed by any significant administrative power. It all came to a head at a meeting in Ende between Manteiro and several of the island's rajas on 29 April 1953. Manteiro reminded them that all the self-ruling lands in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi had already been liquidated. 'I regret it that we here do not want to see this reality,' he told them. He then turned to the biggest raja of them all. The Sikka raja never attended official meetings, Manteiro said. He conspired with the raja of Larantuka to undermine central government. But the worst was that he had not paid his dues to the central government for two years and did not submit his financial accounts. Yet he was not paying his village heads properly either, despite extensive subsidies from the centre. The raja replied that his own salary was low, that on the contrary the central government owed *him* money for the Maumere water supply, and that consultation was always better than unpleasant confrontation. As tensions rose, the feisty young Manteiro slapped a travel ban on the raja outside his district and threatened to have him arrested.

Scorched Earth

So far, these were hardly a politics of citizenship. The young guns writing of 'revolt' in *Bentara* belonged to a small group of highly educated moderns in Ende who mostly worked for the government. Their politics were bureaucratic. They played out among rival factions within the government, which was a hybrid composition of colonial rajas and white-shirted republican administrators (Fig. 3.9). Those 'being ruled' had barely yet

Fig. 3.9 The new elite: local assembly chairs meet in Kupang, 1952. (Photo courtesy of Dra. Heny A. Nitbani-Markus)

been heard. Djong himself belonged to this circle of (semi-)educated rulers too. He was at that moment a member of the raja's advisory council (Fig. 3.10). But he was the first to stir up a wider circle. Encouraged by Manteiro's spirited words, and angered by the raja's habitually nepotistic appointments in the villages, he began to mobilise ordinary country dwellers and not just clerks. He deliberately expanded 'the political' from the newspaper article to the streets of Maumere. This no one had done before him. Most members of Sikka's little establishment circles were stunned. Shock then turned to fear and finally to complete rejection. The author of *Menjaring Angin* is often generous to Djong. He delicately does not mention his 1948 jail sentence for violence (nor another sentence that followed later). But he finds this mobilisation of the poor with a language of revolt entirely objectionable. He is particularly disturbed when the target of attack expands from the office of the raja to the entire complex of authority emanating from the town of Maumere. It was 'Machiavellian,'

Fig. 3.10 Advisory cabinet for the Sikka district head (Badan Pemerintah Harian, BPH). Left to right: Yan Radjalewa (representing Kanga'e), Filipus Muda Meak (Nita), Jan Djong (Kanga'e), Djuang da Costa (Paga). Taken in a Denpasar studio during a somewhat militarised training session in the provincial capital, 1950. (Courtesy of Siprianus da Silva, son of Filipus Muda Meak)

he wrote, and 'anticlerical,' to undermine the establishment Catholic Party with 'the fire of tribalism… [until] their eyes became blinded and they could no longer distinguish religion from the political party.'

Fresh out of jail but undeterred, Djong was ready to mobilise beyond the pen-pushing class. He was a natural master of a hybrid form of political theatre. He combined wild tropes of rebellion, which drew on the heroic deeds of the ancestors, with modern assertions of legality. That combination gave it a unique power. On the one hand, he deployed a performative repertoire of anarchy. It drew on the heroic legend of Mo'ang Teka. It linked righteous anger over taxes with violent means any subsistence farmer had ready to hand: the machete, and fire, that weapon of choice in all rural Southeast Asian warfare. It made eyes sparkle among rural men squatting under a midday tree in the heat as they spat red streams of betel

nut juice. On the other hand, he drew on the modern, lawful but at that time still new repertoire of the demonstration. Young people who had heard of the revolution in Java found this exciting. Both had the effect of energising supporters and intimidating rivals. A riotous episode of unruly action followed that looked almost like a social movement from below—semi-organised at best, genuinely anarchic at worst—to overthrow Maumere privilege. This was the peasant's idea of a revolution that had fed the communist uprisings in West Java late in 1926 and West Sumatra early 1927. Lenin managed to ride it to power in Russia in 1917. It was worlds away from the international ideologies of socialism, liberalism, nationalism, or world religion that the Indonesian intellectuals had in mind as they tried to manage the revolution of 1945–1949. Instead, theirs was an inchoate indigenous cry of 'popular sovereignty' (Alers 1956).

Jan Djong was engaged in shaping public opinion. Social scientists call this 'framing.' The framing work Jan Djong did caught on in the hills and coasts beyond the town. As the intra-government dispute over sovereignty grew more intense, lawlessness in the raja's territories increased. Farming folk from far beyond the urban clamour began resorting to direct action. More and more of them refused to pay the raja's coconut taxes, leaving him desperately short of money. The inhabitants of several villages along the coast east of Maumere began to physically threaten anyone who came from Maumere to demand tax. This was Djong's stamping ground. He may well have encouraged it. Soon *any* official who came from town to work in the rural area found themselves threatened. The spectre of anarchy loomed as fire lit up the sky. Houses of people regarded as supporters of 'Maumere' were set alight. The village school and teacher's house that the raja had built at Watublapi went up in flames. So did those in Kloangrotat, in the mountains further east. The house of Nita village chief Ph. M. da Silva suffered the same fate. A band led by a certain Leo Djoa took to thieving in Gereja Koting in the hills south of Maumere and elsewhere in the years 1950–1952. For several years few townsfolk with government or ecclesiastical authority dared to set foot in a region regarded as 'revolutionary.'

The Teka repertoire of torch-wielding melees seemed to Djong's rural circles entirely natural. For all its poverty, its political uncertainty, its unfulfilled promise, the provincial 1950s might make us reread with fresh appreciation the nineteenth-century French anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1970 [orig Fr 1840]). 'I build no system,' he wrote. 'I ask an end to privilege, the abolition of slavery, equality of rights, and the reign

of law. Justice, nothing else; that is the alpha and omega of my argument: to others I leave the business of governing the world.'

However, Djong had been educated at Mataloko. He knew the Teka language alone was too raw for the new urban class who were taking over the state. If he was to win allies among them, he needed a more modern, more dialogical, and less violent message. Where could he learn it? Djong had never travelled beyond Flores. His first trip to the big cities of Java, the seductive home of the Republic, was to be a private visit in the late 1950s. The only Indonesian in Maumere who knew anything about the 1945 revolution was a 25-year-old student named V.B. (Sentis) da Costa, who was home on holidays from his legal studies at the law school in Makassar. Da Costa himself had first heard of the revolution in 1947, even before going to Makassar, from a Javanese medical doctor named Sutomo, in Larantuka, a day's drive east of Maumere. Sutomo was the only person in the region known to receive a newspaper from Java. He read the (otherwise quite stodgy) Catholic paper *Penabur*. He once invited da Costa to join his 'study circle,' where they read the paper and discussed ideas of freedom (*merdeka*) and democracy. Thus prepared, Makassar became for him an eye-opener. He saw there the possibilities of modern politics. He financed his own studies and was in no need of church patronage. Da Costa liked Djong's defiance and felt sorry that he had no one to talk with. As any middle-class intellectual would do, he worried about the anarchic burning and shooting that was derailing the protests. In the hands of these two men, the 'demonstration' became the central repertoire of shocking action. This key ritual was what the Danish scholar of postcolonial citizenship Christian Lund (2006) would have called a 'twilight institution.' These are new postcolonial state institutions claiming public authority but without ever being definitively formed. They operate in the twilight between state and society, between public and private. The appeal of the demonstration lay in its being both like and yet unlike the revolt of Teka of 1904. Like that earlier outburst it expressed righteous anger. Today no less than two heroic statues of Teka grace the town of Maumere. One flailing warrior on the eastern outskirts charges (ahistorically) towards the east, away from the town and back towards his home village (Fig. 3.11). Another, astride a rearing bronze horse, stands in a dried-up fountain near the Maumere police station. Bas relief tableaux around its base justify his burning and shooting tactics as anti-colonial violence (Figs. 3.12 and 3.13). But Maumere in the early 1950s still remembered Teka as a dangerous rebel. It feared a repeat of the anarchy of half a century earlier. Da

Fig. 3.11 Mo'ang Teka charges his enemies. (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

Costa told Jan Djong they should organise 'a proper demonstration, like in Makassar.' Unlike Teka's mayhem, he explained, demonstrations were the non-violent expression of people's sovereignty, legitimate in a law-abiding democracy. He echoed its nineteenth-century inventor, the Irish

Fig. 3.12 Mo'ang Teka on his horse. (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

Liberator Daniel O'Connell. The younger man offered the older a contemporary language of protest that he had learned in the big city, a couple of days sailing to the northwest. It was a republican language, which in the eastern archipelago mainly meant 'anti-feudal' rather than anti-colonial.

Fig. 3.13 Base of Mo'ang Teka horse statue. (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

This new linguistic repertoire trickled into the region from the cities, mainly from Java, by means of personal contacts.

'I was young. It was a fantasy,' the still remarkably vital octogenarian da Costa told me in 2010. He laughed ironically as he told me this, but it struck me as a confession. Apparently, it had been but a fantasy to imagine that the basic notions of democracy taught at Indonesian law school, to which Indonesia subscribes at the United Nations, were applicable in reality. Or did the fantasy lie in having imagined that people in Sikka could distinguish a peaceful demonstration from tribal warfare? That it had been a fantasy, ultimately, to think that the violence of 1965 came only from the central state and not from within local society? After all, perpetrators of the mass murders in Sikka in 1965 could say with some justice that Djong had started it in 1948. In a communal society, vengeance remains legitimate, even many years later. Perhaps the cycle had even started much earlier. Djong had, it was said by his opponents, acted in vengeance for the defeat of Teka.

Seen in this light, today's Teka statues simply confirm the normality of violence in Indonesian political struggle. It is part of the standard reper-

toire in local political dramaturgy, a strategic resource that nobody disavows. Indonesia has had no Mahatma Gandhi, urging non-violence and civil disobedience. In such an arena, a reasoned, civil, cosmopolitan, inclusive citizenship discourse can hardly flourish. When the central state, instead of acting to stop it, also adopted this ancient resource, all hope of creating one evaporated. Violence goes to the heart of Indonesia's history of agonistic citizenship.

Yet it would go too far to conclude that we are dealing with a 'culture of violence'—as if killing was of little moment. It is altogether too easy to dismiss popular movements as legitimate citizenship actions simply because they involve violence. Most movements for greater participation throughout history have run towards violence. Indonesia's 1945 revolution was violent but also transformative. The violence is a problem, and there is a connection with that horrible moment in 1966, but the connection is not straightforward.

The Ethnic Organisation

To achieve his goals, da Costa went on, Djong needed an organisation. Effectiveness depended on harnessing the inchoate anti-Maumere anger to a disciplined organisational structure. Today we find it difficult to recover the sense of wonder that provincials experienced when first witnessing the sheer power of organisation to unleash political spectacle. The first Indonesians to feel it were Islamic traders living in Solo in 1911 when they invented the Sarekat Islam. Organisation set 'the age in motion' (Shiraishi 1990). But it was not till 'the political' ignited passions after 1945 that organisations were set up in provincial towns everywhere. The idea of deliberately mobilising large numbers of people through an organisation first came to Maumere with da Costa's 'Kanilima' organisation in 1953. Its form was new, but so was its stated identity, which was 'ethnic.' Like democracy and republicanism, ethnicity was a modern idea. In Djong's mind it had an emancipatory ring. It represented inclusive village solidarity directed against the ruling establishment. Communalism became a part of a bourgeois ideology of modernisation in many newly decolonised countries, as observers in Africa noted years ago (Melson and Wolpe 1971). That it made universal citizenship impossible, since no one can reason about ethnicity, did not become an issue until much later. The condemnation of 'primordialism' after the establishment of the New Order in 1966 was part of a depoliticising discourse to reduce popular

involvement in politics, not part of a more cosmopolitan citizenship discourse.

All politics are embedded in social networks. They are not conducted by free and autonomous individual citizens, but by people bound to each other through family, village, market, church, and the new central state. Djong's ethnic organisation seized on the rural village whence he came. It represented a rural challenge to urban privilege. It built on urban clichés about the village. For town people in Maumere, the very name Iwang Gete of Djong's home region signified rural ignorance and violence. During the violent years 1965–1966, they used it often, always as a term of abuse and fear. Those who lived there were unknowns, undomesticated by incorporation into the urban network of relations. Kanilima was an acronym from the names of three late colonial territories (*landschappen*) in the hills around Maumere that, the two men alleged, had lost their autonomy to the raja of Sikka in the 1920s. They were Kanga'e, Nita, and Lio-Maumere. Kanga'e was Djong's home territory; Lio-Maumere was da Costa's. The latter actually belonged to Ende, with an outlier in Sikka, so the historical grievance was rather artificial. Kanilima was a modern organisation. Its identity embraced all those living in the territories it represented, not some aristocratic family claiming historical rights. Its leaders were (aspiring) middle-class officials. Their complaint, too, was modern. They wanted more education for their children. Raja Don Thomas had used copra taxes to build the first junior high school in Maumere. He also financed students from poorer families to attend. This was a wonderful thing, but, Kanilima villagers felt, not enough places were going to their own children.

Da Costa suspected privately some of the school money was being diverted for the raja's personal use. A subterfuge nearly allowed him to prove it. He used to visit the raja at home. Maumere was a small town; the raja had cold beer and two beautiful daughters. During one of those visits he managed to sneak off with the account books. But before he could peruse them, the local policeman had persuaded him to hand them back.

Djong brought together the first mass meeting to explain Kanilima's demands to a broad public on 1 June 1952. They met in Geliting, the very village associated with the Teka rebellion a short lifetime ago. He was assisted by republican government representative J. Messakh. The meeting was loud and effective. The raja agreed to institute an elected advisory council called the Dewan Pemerintah Swapradja (DPS), with a representative from each of the four old kingdoms—Lio, Sikka, Nita, and Kanga'e.

The idea for such a council drawn from colonial-era kingdoms was contained in a national transition law from 1950 (UU 44/1950). But Raja Thomas had resisted having one in Sikka. We thus have the peculiar phenomenon of an anti-aristocrat beating an aristocrat over the head with a republican law designed to appease holdover aristocrats. Djong sat on it to represent Kanga'e. Despite its lineage of colonial-era self-ruling lands, the council allied itself to Manteiro's confrontation with the raja. In April 1953, the Maumere DPS activists invited a delegation from the republican district government and parliament of Flores to come over from Ende. Overriding the objections of the raja's kapitan in charge of Maumere, the delegation was warmly received at a public meeting attended by—according to *Bentara*—'thousands of citizens' (*rakyat*). Djong produced a 'Motion' that da Costa had written for him. The Djong family still proudly retain the minutes of that meeting and gave me a copy. I thought the Motion's colourful prose had stirred Catholic imagery with nationalist and socialist into an agit-prop marvel:

> Even though the Unitary Republic of Indonesia is a democratic State, and one of the five principles in the national ideology of Pancasila is POPULAR DEMOCRACY, yet until now the ARK of the Sikka self-ruling lands still floats on the ocean of dictatorship and the soul of the People is still oppressed by the hammer of feudalism.

On 19 June 1953, it was time for the first real demonstration. It was about the junior high school that Raja Thomas had built in Maumere in 1949—initially in his palace grounds—through a special tax on copra. He had named it after himself—the Thomas Education Fund high school (Yayasan Pendidikan Thomas, Yapenthom). It was one of only two such schools on the whole island. Its prestige as a training school for the elite was huge. The dispute was over the raja's right to use copra taxes for a school run by him. They wanted him to separate the public from the private—a practice that, they had recently heard from law student da Costa, was much to be desired. The republican government in Ende had in any case ruled the tax illegal. At the old markets just east of the Maumere town centre they bought cheap coconut-leaf mats, cut them in two, and painted their slogans on them. These gaily linked the raja to colonialism, to slavery, and to chaos. The Latin ('regnat populus') and the maths ('Democracy + raja = nearly 0') could once more only have come from da

Costa.[1] The language of precise legality represented a new normative order, a realm far surpassing in its all-encompassing prestige that singular person whose mystique of blood and soil had hitherto comprised the tree in whose shadow Sikka lived. The school organised a counter-demonstration. Raja Thomas defiantly told a meeting: 'Thomas can stop being Raja, can step down from the throne of the Kingdom, can even go to jail, but Yapenthom and the high school belong to the people, they have to keep going' (Da Gomez et al. 2003: 48). However, the counter-demonstration fizzled, and Djong's *demonstrasi* eventually bore fruit. After a suitable lapse of time, several Kanilima members were given a place on the Yapenthom board. Djong was chair.

This very first demonstration in Maumere had parallels elsewhere in the region. The town of Kupang in nearby Timor saw its first demonstrations in November and December of the same year. Students poured onto the streets banging pots and plates, demanding affordable rice. But Kupang was big enough to sustain its own internal politics, whereas Maumere at 2000 inhabitants was only a sixth the size. Its politics

[1] Text of Jan Djong's notification to police of a planned 'demonstration' to be held in Maumere on 19 June 1953 (courtesy of Dion Djong, son of Jan Djong).

In order to realise the desire of these People of KANILIMA, which desire is certainly well-known in Maumere, KANILIMA plans to hold a demonstration

on date	: 19 June 1953,
at place	: Maumere Town
participating	: approximately 10,000 people

Posters that will be carried:

1. Motto: Regnat Populus (= the People rule).
2. Eliminate the raja.
3. Where there is a raja = there is colonialism.
4. Where there is a raja = there is slavery.
5. Democracy + raja = ½ nearly 0
6. Maumere – Kanilima = 1/5
7. Where there is a raja = chaos.
8. Choose: Raja and KANILIMA.
9. There is no longer place for a raja …
10. Raja + DPS (Dewan Pemerintah Swapradja, elected advisory council) =?
11. DPS – raja = a mirror of Kanilima.
12. Kanilima always supports the government's efforts to dispose of the raja.

Names of streets the group is to pass along will follow before this coming 19 June.

crowded in on it from the surrounding countryside. Mass mobilisation of any kind was a shocking and at the same time exhilarating event in a deeply religious society that had seen no revolutionary agitation. Even the Japanese occupation had not seen such a spectacle. Hundreds of peasant and student demonstrators gathered in front of the government offices. Da Costa addressed the crowd. He steered a middle course between the Liberator Daniel O'Connell and the insurgent Teka. 'Be peaceful,' he told them. 'You can punch people, but don't kill them.' The town trembled. Residents shut their doors and stayed inside. Raja Thomas decided Djong was no liberator but simply a new Teka. He was convinced the demo was a plot to murder him. He escaped to sea in a dugout canoe for the day. Demonstrators entered his house, only to find Father Conterius—priest, politician, and editor of *Bentara* magazine—sitting on the raja's throne. That was the end of the demonstration. But a genie had been let out of the bottle. Roving bands continued to burn and rob for several years. This later came to be known as the 'scorched earth' period, in reference to the revolutionary tactics used on Java after 1945.

The following September, Manteiro in Ende pensioned off Don Thomas as raja, reinstated him as head of Sikka district, but made him rule along with an elected council of four notables (Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah Swapradja, DPDS). An electoral college from the 17 villages (*haminte*) in the district met and chose a representative from each of the four former kingdoms, now known as 'ethnic' groups. Kanga'e got three places for its troubles. Djong took one, P.J. Bapa another—the two instigators of the demonstration the previous year—and the third was taken by D.J. Palle. With their simultaneous seats on the Yapenthom school board, their rural coalition also won control over the copra-funded school. The novel idea that public matters such as finance and education should be run by elected assemblies had been widely accepted as superior to an aristocrat's prerogative. Kanilima's argument that the natural units for such representation should be the former kingdoms, now redefined as ethnic units, was generally considered just. The republican tussle with Don Thomas finally ended when nature intervened. On 18 May 1954, as he was waiting in an Ende hotel room for the arrival of President Sukarno, he suffered a massive heart attack. It was an anti-climactic resolution (Fig. 3.14).

Fig. 3.14 Raja Don Thomas died in 1954. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

Inclusion Works

The citizenship actions led by Djong in the mid-1950s resulted in new, more inclusive local rights to participate. They illustrate the dynamic character of citizenship described by Balibar (2015: 124–5):

> There is therefore no status quo when it comes to citizenship: either it "advances," which is to say, it articulates *new fundamental rights*, which are both "rights of man" and "rights of the citizen," and develops them with varying degrees of speed into institutions (such as social security, the right to work, citizenship for foreigners, etc.), or it "regresses," which means that it loses the rights it had acquired (including the "rights of man"), or that these rights are transformed into their opposites, via different "anti-political" modalities, be they authoritarian, bureaucratic, discriminatory, or paternalistic.

The 'scorched earth' practices within Djong's Kanilima movement sit strangely with the civic, open, and democratic negotiations citizens are conventionally supposed to engage in. Yet the citizens of Sikka *did* negotiate with each other and with power. Even the raja, shortly before his sudden death, did accommodate those who had vituperated him on the streets ('Democracy + raja = nearly 0'). The protests did cease once everyone felt their voice was being heard. Certainly there was no evidence at this stage of some sclerotic traditional hierarchy in Sikka striking back at the rebels from the hills.

All this took place because the Republic of Indonesia had come to Sikka. Its message was one of freedom from colonialism and 'feudalism.' Yet in institutional terms that republic was little more than a rumour of emancipation and popular sovereignty. It was hardly in a position to impose new rules. Yes, it had hemmed in the raja with some funding restrictions and had set up some new institutions in Ende with nominally greater powers than he. But Ende was a day's drive away; those new institutions were financially hamstrung as well and nobody could call on the military to take sides in a dispute. The central state sent almost no new money to Sikka. Citizens negotiated over the money that came from their own taxes, namely the copra fund. That kept local state authorities responsive to their citizens. An endless round of committees reinforced a culture of negotiation that constituted a kind of Kropotkinian citizenship in Sikka.[2]

Citizenship constituted a kind of agonistic republicanism, at work in the provinces of a poor postcolonial nation. Local and supralocal narratives framing any collective action always diverge, as Kalyvas (2003) has shown convincingly for civil wars throughout the world. A national 'independence' frame might contrast with a local frame around bureaucratic employment opportunities. Yet the disjunction was far from complete. Local political struggles in Maumere resounded with the noise of national controversies, without being wholly determined by them. The 1953 demonstration took place as new republican institutions were beginning to take root in Flores. Subsequent struggles throughout most of the 1950s took on unexpectedly ethnic forms. These local social movements are hardly legible as national movements for the left or the right. They played out within local trust networks, each with their own material interests and their geographical turf of

[2] The Russian anarchist Pyotr Alexeyevich Kropotkin (1842–1921) promoted a decentralised communist society in which communities and enterprises were run democratically by their members.

village or town. Yet amidst the diversity of practices and agonistic contention, the challenger movement exhibited an inclusive instinct. Its intention was to expand the circle of those with the 'right to be political.'

The social movement for the recognition of rural people's right to representation had deployed rituals in the twilight zone between the formal state and traditional social norms. Was the demonstration simply that, or was it tribal warfare? Was Kanilima an ethnic organisation or a revived local hierarchy based on clientelistic loyalties? Such 'informal institutions' are often blamed for undermining formal ones that lead to democracy. But a closer look reveals that sometimes the informal might converge with the formal (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). This is what seems to have occurred here. At a time when the formal state was developing quickly, they gave strategic shape to that broad arena between the new republic, based in Jakarta, and everyday politics in the small towns and villages of central Flores. Informal institutions helped create mutual recognition between state and society. They established a kind of public authority that was more open and accessible to ordinary citizens than before. Of course violence was a problem. But in principle neither the demonstration nor the ethnic organisation was a violent institution. They were more inclusive than exclusive. Anyone could participate in a demonstration. Everyone from the hill country was entitled to feel represented by Kanilima.

For all its dubious qualities, this had been a bottom-up, agonistic movement for citizenship. Its aim had been to widen the circle of people benefiting from the new central state. And it had been successful. Peace returned to the Sikka region, for a while.

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CHAPTER 4

Factions and Faith

Abstract In the mid-1950s, the record goes silent for about five years. When Jan Djong reemerges, he is diminished. No longer an agitator for rural citizenship rights, he is a client to powerful local bosses, who dispense government patronage. Urban elites have regrouped and are running a factional game fueled by state resources they control. Elite patrons have captured local judicial institutions. They have also captured all the political parties that should connect ordinary people to an impersonal central state, except the communist party.

Since the French Revolution, people all over the world have believed in the modern state as the ultimate repository of their rights. But when patrons undermine rights, or when states allow that to happen, they betray that belief. Rights do not exist when the state is embedded in society.

Yet local factional tensions are by themselves not a powder keg of violence. By the end of the chapter, Jan Djong has lost his last factional fight, and is isolated and alone in his village.

Keywords Patron-client relations • Rent-seeking • Patronage • Factionalism • Corruption • Religion • Catholicism • Global south • Indonesia

> *The Athenians called their clients thetes or "hirelings," because they served for hire.… But Romulus [made] the connection between them a bond of kindness befitting fellow citizens.*
> *Dionysius,* Roman Antiquities *II.9*

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The previous chapter retraced a push by village folk for participation in the business of ruling that normally took place within Maumere. They were ill-qualified to rule and had rejected the religion of the town, but they believed that their citizenship rights did not depend on such things. They had been inspired by the district's entry to the Indonesian republic in late 1949. Sikka was fully part of the Republic of Indonesia in which they had so forcefully placed their hopes. To them, the republic was a place where the familiar local hierarchies had lost their oppressive power. There were no kings, no priests, and no privileges for townsfolk. Some of that had indeed gone for good. Raja Don Thomas died in 1954; he was nominally replaced by his younger brother, till the raja institution died altogether in 1958. And yet many hierarchies had reasserted themselves. Ten years later, Jan Djong, the district's most republican of republicans, far from resting on his laurels, was a social outcast. He was living, in fear of death, back in his home village. How and why did that happen? This chapter reconstructs the techniques a small-town establishment successfully deployed to counter the republican levelling push. The pushback formed the prelude to the horrors that came in early 1966.

Not long after the dust settled following The Demonstration, our two sources go largely silent for about five years. Only two incidents are recorded, or rather alluded to obliquely, in those otherwise silent years, and they are both telling ones. The first was another 'demonstration' led by Djong. A different source tells us a bit more. It took place at Geliting, on the coast in his home territory, on 24 February 1956. Its target was the local office of the communist party PKI. It was strictly speaking a counter-demonstration, responding to a PKI mass rally at Geliting. Apparently, his followers then threw stones at the PKI office, until troops were called to bring those inside out safely.[1] The activists whose passions he fired up that day belonged to the Catholic Party, the establishment party in Flores at the time. Nearly all political players in Maumere belonged to it. Catholic Party leaders had been appalled at the success the PKI had achieved in the two-stage national elec-

[1] 'Pidato Kawan Th. P. Rissi (Sekretaris CDB PKI Nusa Tenggara Timur)', Bintang Merah Nomor Special Jilid II, Dokumen-Dokumen Kongres Nasional Ke-VI Partai Komunis Indonesia, 7–14 September 1959. Yayasan Pembaruan, Jakarta 1960 (available https://www.marxists.org/indonesia/indones/KongresPKIke6/PidatoRissi.htm, accessed 08 February 2015). The incident was confirmed to me during interviews in Maumere, May 2017. I suspect the anti-PKI demonstration took place in the run-up to the military-backed Permesta revolt, which affected many outer island regions in late 1956 and early 1957 (Harvey 1977).

tions the previous September and December. For all his earlier dislike of the Catholic Party establishment, Djong now seems to have been taking orders from them. It looked as if he had been reduced to their gun-for-hire, a client upon whom the bigger boys in town could call if they needed rowdiness on the street in the name of the popular will.

The second incident took place a year later. In 1957, the Ende District Court sentenced Djong to three years in jail (again!). The reason was his role in the 'scorched earth' campaign against the raja's administration in the early 1950s.[2]

When the pace of the narrative picks up again in 1959, the tone of politics is different. Maumere's cast of leading political characters has become more professional. The range of issues that consumes the town's small political class has become more conservative. Instead of 'popular sovereignty,' the talk is now all about religion. Instead of social outsiders mobilising malcontents, people with good establishment connections mobilise clients. The central state has more money. Successful players find themselves linked more closely to national elites than they were in the early 1950s, and more often at odds with their less privileged local neighbours. Bureaucratic jobism and patronage drive the political economy behind their contests.

Over the next few years, this professional, Catholic small-town elite reassert their control over politics in the Sikka district. Within the bureaucracy, the struggle for control was fought along personalised patron-client lines. Rather than being restrained by legal rules, legality became a resource, a weapon in the hand of one faction against another in their slow-moving contestation. The campaign for control also drew in groups from beyond the bureaucracy. Out in the hills around Hewokloang, where aspiring citizens had once expressed themselves anarchically against the town's 'feudalism,' the campaign took on religious dimensions.

In Search of a Patron

It is not easy for a rebel to stay a rebel in a rural society if they have no real organisation to carry them. Playing alone is not a choice. One must seek out a patron. Patron-client relations have long been seen as key to the way

[2] Djong reports the sentence in an autobiographical document datelined Maumere, 16 November 1961. Bollen reports this second prison sentence too, and links it to the scorched earth banditry. My interviews in Maumere in 2014 confirmed the sentence but could not say what the reason was. *Menjaring Angin* is silent about it.

Southeast Asian societies function. Other terms that social scientists use to describe these unequal exchange relations are patrimonialism (or its 'neo'-patrimonial variant), patronage relations, bossism, or clientelism. Patrons and clients in Indonesia often describe each other with the word 'friend,' *teman*. But theirs is an unequal friendship. It is a mode of domination in which the patron dispenses patronage (money, jobs, protection) to clients who adopt a posture of dependent loyalty. The relation is personal in character, not ideological or legal. Patron-client links were as pervasive in Indonesia at this time as elsewhere in the postcolonial world.

One commonly cited definition of clientelism in politics runs as follows:

> [A] more or less personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships. (Lemarchand and Legg 1972: 151–2)

Where modern government institutions are weak, and where the economy is undifferentiated, informal clientelistic exchanges trump formal rules. Particularly in the small town, where informal institutions of clan, religion, or home village are rooted in 'strong ties,' competitive clientelism produced the kind of implacable factionalism that Vidich and Bensman (2000 [1958]) also found in the small 1950s American town of Springdale. Competitive clientelism is endemic in sub-Saharan politics today—especially where they are democratic (Booth 2012). By personalising governance at every level, they undermine the rule of law. They are not *only* destructive. For example, they can be the conduit for at least minimal government services when more hostile relations might have blocked them. But clients who feel badly treated by their patron usually do not pursue justice through the courts, where the patron also has 'friends.' The patron-client relation is justified in cultural terms, and this makes it look 'natural.' But in reality it always involves an element of coercion. The patron restricts access to certain resources that should be public goods. The patron-client relation can therefore best be understood as a mechanism of class control imposed from above (Flynn 1974). At the same time, not everything that happens in a political arena is clientelist. While people sometimes feel compelled to behave like clients, at other times they resist their patrons in order to demand their rights (Kerkvliet 1995). Since the French Revolution, people all over the world have believed in the modern

state as the ultimate repository of such rights. When patrons undermine rights, or when states allow that to happen, they betray that belief.

Fortunately, Djong did find a patron prepared to stand by him. His name was Laurensius ('Laurens') Say (1924–2007), and he came from the same mountainous area as Djong. It was probably Say who, in 1959, organised a presidential pardon for Djong. At that time, Laurens Say was one of less than a handful of people with higher education in Sikka district. He was born in the village of Uma Uta-Bola, on the lower slopes of volcanic Mount Egon, southeast of Maumere. His father was a well-to-do coconut farmer, who sent him to school in Java. He spent the Pacific War there, afterwards joining a revolutionary republican battalion. He studied agriculture in Makassar in the early 1950s and then won a short trip to England for further study on copra economics. He worked at the Copra Foundation in Makassar afterwards and then led the Copra Foundation and its successor organisation in Ende between 1956 and 1959. Quite likely this is when he came to know his fellow Sikka politician Djong, seven years older and equally famous, but in jail. Say, too, was an agitator. In gratitude for the support Say had given him, Djong later told the priest Heinrich Bollen, he would do anything Say asked him to do.

Copra had become the major cash crop in the eastern archipelago. Just before the Pacific War the Dutch had established the Copra Fund (Copra Fonds), aiming to regulate the market in favour of both farmers and government revenue. After independence this was continued as the Copra Foundation (Yayasan Kopra). It played the key role in this part of Indonesia in a central government programme to 'Indonesianise' the national economy. *Indonesianisasi* was intended to redistribute wealth and create indigenous employment. The economy was to be partly collectivised, large Dutch-owned corporations nationalised, and indigenous businesses subsidised to compete with the ethnic Chinese who dominated the middle levels of the economy (Sutter 1959; Mackie 1971; Lindblad 2008). Say's activism was thus part of the first burst of economic activism by the newly independent central state in Jakarta. He was Yayasan Kopra's provincial secretary for the new province of East Nusa Tenggara.

Say was based in Ende. After martial law was declared in 1957 in response to the regional revolts, the military greatly increased its participation in the agrarian economy. In 1958, the foundation was reorganised as a decentralised federation of cooperatives eventually called Gabungan Koperasi Kopra, under the martial law administrator. Say travelled around Flores setting up cooperatives. He moved his provincial headquarters to

Maumere. Hundreds of clerks staffed the Maumere office and its subsidiaries. It was the central economic institution in the highly managed economy of Flores. Besides holding a monopoly on copra purchases, it distributed basic commodities such as rice, sugar, flour, kerosene, textile, and cotton thread, all at fixed prices. It even distributed soap, produced in a little factory in Maumere called Nusa Bunga. It had a fleet of trucks that carried both copra and many passengers. Motor vehicles were very scarce. The only individuals in Maumere with access to their own vehicle were five officials.

The money circulating in this quasi-socialist copra economy was highly interesting to political elites. In the absence of constitutional checks and balances, *Indonesianisasi* turned its implementers into powerful patrons. Webs of interlinked, government-controlled cooperatives and corporations became one of the twilight institutions of the era. Say became one of the biggest patrons in the district. The Copra Fund had given him invaluable experience in dispensing patronage in exchange for political support. All the cooperative committees were filled with Catholic Party hacks. 'Undeniably,' wrote E.P. da Gomez, 'ethnic politics and regional sentiments also took possession of the Copra Cooperative' (Gomez 2017). The three main factions were as follows: an 'ethnic' Sikka group led by P.S. da Cunha and based in Maumere, a non-Sikka group based at Nita south of Maumere, and another non-Sikka group at Geliting east of the town. 'They nearly always were of a different opinion,' wrote da Gomez. Copra-fed factional fights thus defined political emotions in Sikka and prepared the ground for the denouement of 1965–1966.

When Say moved to Maumere, he teamed up with his distant relative P.S. da Cunha. Together they reportedly hatched a plan to take over leadership of the district. Paulus Samador da Cunha (1924–1970) was one of the few other well-educated individuals interested in politics in the district. He was born in the sacred village of Sikka and studied government administration at a senior high school for legal studies in Makassar in the early 1950s (the same one where Sentis da Costa studied). In 1955, he was elected to the national constitutional assembly, which required travel to Jakarta and lent him great prestige. Say was related to da Cunha through his mother's family. They had been friends since their college days in Makassar.

The two had agreed in Ende that da Cunha would take over government matters while Say would run the state-owned economy. To get there, da Cunha first had to do his part by getting himself appointed as Sikka

district head. The district head was the ultimate arbiter on the allocation of state resources. The venue for this was the district assembly. In 1959, the main business on the district assembly's agenda was to recommend a candidate to the interior minister in Jakarta, who would make the appointment. He had a good chance. The spread of government services put a premium on expertise.

This assembly was a result of the enlightened conviction in Jakarta that local autonomy and democracy were the twin answers to the regional revolts that had plagued the country in 1956 and 1957. The Sikka kingdom had been dissolved in favour of an administrative district (still named Sikka, against some objections) within the new province of East Nusa Tenggara. While awaiting fresh elections, the assembly was tentatively filled on the basis of the 1955 national election results. Every member belonged to the Catholic Party, but seats were distributed on the basis of 'ethnic' region.

Djong had gone to jail as a member of the Sikka kingdom's assembly. He now came out still a member, albeit of a transformed assembly. A jail sentence, then as now, was no hindrance to a political career. Djong was one of four 'Kanga'e' representatives. His mission was still to preserve access to the resources of the state for his rural constituency. He soon led the assembly as acting speaker.

Djong lacked the education to become district head, but thought he had the numbers to nominate his village-friendly but ungraduated comrade V.B. da Costa. However, da Cunha and Say managed to entice a key member of Djong's anti-Maumere Kanilima coalition to join their camp with offers of a piece of the copra economy.[3] Da Costa still received one vote more than da Cunha, but the interior minister eventually preferred the more experienced man. To make sure the firebrand Djong would not sulk, he was put in charge of celebrations to inaugurate the new district head. A few months later the speaker's chair of the assembly passed to the district head (the separation of powers being unheard of in 1959), and Djong was reduced to an ordinary member. The assembly also elected a four-member advisory cabinet for the head—Badan Pemerintah Harian (BPH). It was once more filled along 'ethnic' lines in order to 'keep the peace' (i.e. to keep Djong from rebelling). But below the BPH, almost all offices in

[3] Felix Moa Hekopung represented Nita, one of the three ex-kingdoms united against Sikka. Da Cunha and Say had met him in Ende in 1958 to discuss—together with the military—ways of 'improving copra production.'

Fig. 4.1 Sikka district head Samador da Cunha and his wife. (Courtesy of Sabina Fernandez, daughter-in-law of Samador da Cunha)

town—from departmental heads to church organisations—remained in the hands of better educated Sikka people from town. Da Cunha remained district head until 1967 (Fig. 4.1), when Say replaced him.

Da Cunha and Say now became major patrons—da Cunha within the bureaucracy, and Say within the state-owned business sector. Say's powers of patronage were the biggest. Everyone interested in business had to deal with him. He quickly became the master of *Indonesianisasi* in this part of Flores, the spider in a web of semi-government organisations rebuilding the economy. He offered his clients more access to the state than they had ever had before–they became citizens of a kind. *Indonesianisasi* created an entirely new political public. Among them were two of Maumere's larger entrepreneurs, the ethnic Chinese Liem Kim Ming and the ethnic Buginese Haji Paturusi Hamid. This was top-down citizenship—the terms were set by the patrons, and its membership was limited to those within the middle and lower middle classes who were willing to accept the protection of a patron. But that membership did come with a seat at the table when it concerned their interests.

Various state bodies were also interested in the state-run economy. They too had to deal with Say, who occupied a long list of official appointments, from the national to the local level, ranging from cooperatives to civil-military coordination and beyond. The military was increasingly interested in building a civilian following in the provinces in order to counter communist influence (Fig. 4.2). *Indonesianisasi* patronage gave them valuable political leverage. They had acquired a lot of companies when the government nationalised most remaining Dutch businesses in 1957, but few people who could run them. The East Nusa Tenggara military commander now asked Say to direct the local branch of an ex-Dutch company called NV Moluksche Handelsvennootschap, renamed PN Aduma Niaga. It dealt in the distribution of government-subsidised textiles and foodstuffs. He also led a cooperative called Gapenim, to which all small traders in Flores were encouraged to subscribe in exchange for the right to distribute subsidised food from PN Aduma Niaga. Say's wife led a women's sewing cooperative called Sandang that distributed subsidised foodstuffs from the same source to its members. Laurens Say was also a director in a state-owned building company called Wiradharma. The air force, as keen as the army to broaden its footprint, asked Wiradharma to build them new facilities at the Maumere airport that served as their base.

It was in copra, however, that Say was really big. Coconuts provided practically the only source of revenue in Flores. The money that flowed through the Copra Cooperatives created an entirely new provincial middle

Fig. 4.2 Captain Suratman, military commander in Ende, addresses notables in town. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

class, feeding off the enormous profits made by charging too much for the monopoly imports into the region and paying too little for the copra bought from farmers. Local committees of this corporation soon acquired a double function—a formal one as managers of a development fund and an informal one as cash dispensers of a slush fund. Formally speaking, the Copra Cooperative was part of the Jakarta government's affirmative action plan to provide economic opportunities for indigenous Indonesians. Nationalisation and the state-owned corporation were the two central elements in that strategy. It was run democratically through a host of layered committees. The proceeds were used to improve education and other good things. At the same time, informally, it became a kitty that every local politician had to get their hands on. Local bosses used it to buy loyalty and support.

Djong dabbled in copra politics too. Together with his rural Kanga'e allies and supported by their energetic patron Say, he started a copra-funded schooling venture in August 1961. All the private junior high schools in Sikka's rural areas were brought under a single copra-funded umbrella called Yapenusra. Inspired by the promise of modernity, and by Raja Thomas' first school, rural folk had built high schools in many vil-

lages. The dreams were all terribly underfunded. This venture too came to nothing. There were not enough good teachers to run them, and all the managers had too much else to do. But Djong's revived alliance with Say stood.

Factional Fights

As he grew in stature, Say began to push his ally da Cunha on certain official appointments. Whereas the capable official da Cunha wanted 'the right man in the right place,' the swashbuckling patron Say needed loyal supporters and was more in favour of 'ethnic representation.' The friendship began to fray. More damaging still was the fact that Say refused to give da Cunha access to the disguised copra taxes he was collecting. Integral to these factional fights between rival patrons was the politically motivated corruption allegation. Corruption scandals began to erupt as each clique tried to eliminate their rivals. Associates of da Cunha began to grumble, using the modern term 'accountability' (*pertanggungjawaban*). They noted that Say had awarded himself free shares in the Wiradharma construction company, while Liem Kim Ming, Haji Paturusi Hamid, and other local entrepreneurs had dutifully paid for their shares.

Say needed bodies for his clientelistic battles. He revived the friendship with Djong. They talked about old times in the kampong in Kanga'e, and about the help Say had given to Djong and his family during the Ende jail episode. Together they began to openly criticise da Cunha, for a start, over his failure to finish construction of the Maumere sports stadium in time for the April 1961 Flores sports festival. The most pressing factional issue of the moment, however, was the allocation of seats in the next, permanent district assembly. Membership was essential for access to government goodies. Djong was no longer an assembly speaker, but he did control the biggest 'ethnic' coalition. He now could not afford defectors. To preempt a da Cunha first strike, Djong manipulated the law. The most devastating consequence of the descent of Sikka public politics into clientelist factionalism was the destruction of any notion of legality. In November 1961, Sikka's district public prosecutor ordered the arrest for corruption of two senior officials-cum-politicians in the Maumere copra bureaucracy. Both detainees were former Djong allies who had defected to da Cunha's side. Djong knew the public prosecutor in Maumere well through the secular nationalist party PNI or Partai Nasional Indonesia, which both frequented (though Djong was not a member). The two men had indeed been cor-

rupt. They had sold subsidised rice and over-invoiced textile distributed through state channels. Yet so normal were such practices that no one doubted that these had been political arrests.[4] Djong and his powerful ally Say were widely believed to have been behind them. Thus, the impersonal state that outsiders from Hewokloang had hoped for when they demonstrated against the raja in 1953 was undermined by the personalisation of the state eight years later. And Djong was as complicit in it as anyone else.

Da Cunha soon exacted revenge. He used his dual powers as both district chief and assembly speaker (remember, no separation of powers) to alter the composition of the assembly in his favour. Following a central government directive he added 'functional' seats to it for the military, police, youth, women, labour, and many more. This reduced the proportion of 'ethnic' seats. Djong did make it back into the assembly, still as an ethnic Kanga'e representative. Say even tried to have him appointed deputy speaker. But da Cunha had better access to the resources of the town, including the military. The deputy speaker's job went to the Maumere military commander (Buterpra), I.N. Sardja Udaya. In any case, Djong's assembly membership did not last long. In August 1962, district head da Cunha appointed him subdistrict head (*camat*), in Djong's home region of Kewapante. He was its first incumbent after the subdivision of Sikka into subdistricts that year. Da Cunha now did enforce the separation of powers and ruled that, as a civil servant, Djong had to step out of the assembly. Although *camat* was then a prestigious position, da Cunha unsubtly reminded Djong in his installation speech how far he (Djong) had fallen: where once he had been speaker of the district assembly, engaged in 'active democracy,' now he was merely an 'extension of the district chief's hand,' permitted only 'passive democracy.'

More surprising was that Say, too, was losing influence. This further exposed Djong to predation by his waning patron's rival da Cunha. In January 1962, Say did manage to 'refresh' the Maumere copra cooperative by putting a Kanga'e man in charge of it and stacking it with an extra Kanga'e member for good measure. But in mid-1963, he was summoned to Jakarta by cabinet minister Frans Seda (also from Flores) and then sent to Manila by the central government. With a clear factional winner in con-

[4] Hekopung was the Kanilima cofounder who went over to da Cunha's side during the struggle for district leadership. In 1963, he was sentenced to nine months in jail. M.K. Parera was a powerful local copra administrator who seems to have abandoned Say for da Cunha over the Yapenusra affair.

trol in Maumere, Seda wanted to remove what he saw as the main sources of the constant politicking—Say and his client Djong. When Say handed over his financial affairs to others in preparation for leaving, his rivals were quick to expose the loose ends in them. In December 1963, the biennial conference of the Maumere copra cooperative appointed a new executive. Although a Djong ally once more won the speaker's chair, the conference appointed a secretary who, over the following year, turned the organisation the other way. At a series of local meetings, branch executives were put in place who favoured da Cunha. The same secretary (yes, it was E.P. da Gomez himself!) also paid da Cunha the copra tax money he had long demanded.

The republican history of Maumere had demonstrated more continuity with than change from its colonial era. As the colonial aristocrats finally declined, non-aristocratic patrons emerged—officials, businesspersons, politicians, and religious figures. They also began building followings on the basis of often material exchanges. Such socially embedded politics entrench inequalities. Politicised bureaucracies are probably inherently clientelistic. The money flows from top to bottom. When not controlled by civil society outside the civil service, that money becomes *patronage* in power plays. In the early 1950s, political mobilisation had run to a broad cross-section of society. The modern bureaucracy had been too embryonic to be a force. But by the late 1950s the reverse was true. In Maumere, practically the entire indigenous middle class lived somehow on government money. Even the ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, otherwise politics-averse, benefited by supplying state-run cooperatives with credit and goods.

The new middle class in town had a lot to do. There were more clerks and teachers than ever before, and more soldiers. The Catholic church committed to a new mission effort to (re)claim peasants in the surrounding district for the faith. Party politics were by no means dead. The district assembly was to be elected, and there was talk of another national election once the regional revolts had been resolved. All these formal institutions were of great interest to the little middle-class elite in and around Maumere. Who was to control the access to jobs—and, not least, access to local copra revenues—unleashed arcane factional rivalries. Gradually an educated 'ethnic' Sikka bloc of bureaucrats emerged, based in town and close to the Catholic church. The raja was long gone—he was not replaced after the last one died—the town no longer wanted a raja. Rivalling this Sikka bloc was a loose coalition of semi-educated village-based elites from out of town. Its leader was Djong. However, over time, his rural constitu-

ency could put less and less weight into the scales of local politics. His last lifeline ran to those national left-wing political associations still promising political citizenship rights to non-elites. But the tide in Jakarta was turning against this idea too, and by the end of 1965 it was doomed.

A New Authority

How much authority did these elite Maumere factions have in society? This was as yet an unanswered question. It would be posed in the early years of the 1960s. National elections were in the air. This was a chance for ordinary citizens to make their voices heard. It was one last opportunity for the rebel Djong to see if 'the flaming spirit of freedom' still lived in Sikka. The phrase comes from *Menjaring Angin*, in a paragraph seeking to explain the origins of anti-clericalism in the district:

> The feudal government of the Sikka Kingdom has since its inception been fully supported by Catholic missionaries wanting to speed up the mission and expand the number of believers, with great success as we can see today. But the flaming spirit of freedom opposed to colonialism and feudalism spread and infiltrated to every corner of the Indonesian Motherland. The authority of the Raja and the Sikka Kingdom also came under attack, due to the national Indonesian spirit of struggle, but also because that spirit was the occasion for the rise of mass action that no longer wished to live under the thumb of their own people, under a feudalistic, monarchic government.

Military bossism and money politics had years earlier doused the 'flaming spirit' among the local elites. Now was the moment of truth for the effect this might have on their standing in the wider community. In the early 1960s a new phase of popular mobilisation grew to exceed that of a decade earlier. In Jakarta, in February 1963, the PKI leadership felt confident enough to call for elections 'at the earliest possible date.' It repeated the call that September. 'By late 1963,' wrote PKI historian Rex Mortimer (2006 [orig. 1974]: 204), 'the party leaders felt more secure and capable of taking political initiatives.' Non-communist parties feared they might lose these elections. Catholic Party leaders, more internationally aware than most, were especially nervous. The military intensified its programme of rolling out garrison units to lower levels of the state organisation. In Sikka the Catholic establishment felt the time was ripe to reconquer the countryside. The Catholic Party had hitherto been absent in the villages of

Sikka. Now its leaders suddenly realised secular parties had a foothold in Catholic Flores and had gotten to the villages before them. A few branches of the communist party PKI had been established, under the young district leader S. Tartonain da Silva, alias Tin. Communist-affiliated organisations such as the Motor Vehicle Drivers Union (Serikat Buruh Kendaraan Bermotor, SBKB), had also come to town. Branches of the secular nationalist party PNI had been formed in about 1961. Reportedly Djong had talked a number of Catholic Party activists into defecting to set it up, though he himself did not join. It was led by the somewhat uninspiring Bernardus Bura. While elsewhere PNI was the party of bureaucrats, here government officers overwhelmingly belonged to the Catholic Party. But some non-Florinese government people did favour the PNI, including the military commander in Maumere. Local leaders saw the party mainly as an anti-clerical protest vehicle, an alternative Kanilima.

When the young German priest Heinrich Bollen arrived in Kanga'e in March 1962 (he had been in Indonesia since 1959), he found a population that had abandoned the church. His predecessor had left seven months earlier, having lost five horses to nocturnal stabbings. Church schools and chapels had been burned down. Bollen described the villagers' beliefs as 'a nihilistic heathendom.' Of the 9000 officially registered parishioners, over 1000 had not had their marriages blessed; children had gone unbaptised. People openly called themselves 'heathen' (*kafir*). Just five old women had come to say goodbye to the previous priest, who left in despair after less than a year. Bollen perceptively observed that this was not a traditional rejection of Catholic religion rooted in customary law, but 'new heathenism' (*kekafiran baru*). It was only 12 years old and had to do with political sentiment 'against Sikka and against the Church.' What the author of *Menjaring Angin* called 'the flaming spirit of freedom,' Bollen found an anarchic lack of respect for authority. Indeed, anthropologists observing subsistence culture in Southeast Asia generally have written about their 'anarchic solidarity' (Gibson and Sillander 2011). They meant by this a mode of sociality that maximises personal autonomy, political egalitarianism, and inclusive forms of social solidarity. This is exactly what the Catholic missionary drive confronted among the subsistence and coconut farmers of the Kanga'e region when it kicked off its campaign in 1962. Bollen was ready to rise to a challenge by which he might make his name as missionary. He settled in the parish of Watublapi, 18 kilometres southeast of Maumere, high in the mountains and on the road to Djong's village of Hewokloang. The two places were visible to each other across a deep val-

ley. Watublapi was a symbolic place. As the gateway to the mountains, it had (according to Metzner 1982: 105) been the centre for conducting traditional warfare. Bollen does not mention it in his pamphlet, and locals today have forgotten it, but if true, the Melanesian significance of this place would have suited a spiritual pacification campaign well (Fig. 4.3).

Djong was stuck in his home village. His house still stands. It is small, with a neat row of flower pots in the yard and some wooden furniture on the veranda. He who had once been speaker of the district assembly was now a bureaucratic subordinate to his political nemesis da Cunha. A *camat* had status—about 50,000 people lived in his territory. He had a higher standing than his village head father had had. But in reality he was just a bureaucrat near the bottom of the patronage chain. He had to follow orders and had no resources to order others around. The winners of the contest he had lost were technocrats. They knew how to manipulate the levers of bureaucratic and state-economic power and were bringing development to Maumere without stirring up the crowds. Elite politics in Maumere were now riddled with clientelism.

Fig. 4.3 Heinrich Bollen's Watublapi church, seen across the valley from Jan Djong's Hewokloang. (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

Yet he still had his talent for mobilising people. For the final throw of the dice, he turned that talent against the church. The 'scorched earth' violence of the early 1950s for which he had been jailed in 1957 seems to have been directed as much at representatives of the church as of the tax-collecting raja. In the rural areas of Sikka, these symbols of power emanating from Maumere looked thoroughly intertwined. Breaking with the church had simply been part of the new bottom-up movement against the 'feudalism' of the raja in the years after the Pacific War.

Even after the ringleaders had been arrested and jailed, anti-clerical-cum-anti-feudal unrest continued to make life impossible for priests who tried to live here throughout the 1950s. They woke up to find their horse had been stabbed to death. They then had to pass the day while being studiously ignored by nearly everyone. One after another had left disillusioned. At the heart of Sikka's contentious citizenship politics lay the question of religion for non-elites. This was a question of power. Each claimant in this contest could only build their power associatively, by persuading and mobilising villagers. They had to establish new forms of public authority, in the process building new institutions and rituals to bear it out. The contest for hearts and minds was fought in the villages where Djong had long been the decisive force.

The campaign became highly personal. It was between Heinrich Bollen and Djong. Bollen knew that Djong was against the church for the reason that it represented an urban Sikka affair. So Djong became for Bollen the great source of 'resistance to the catholic church,' of hostility to 'catholic government,' indeed, of opposition 'to me and the church,' as he put it in his brochure. To counter Djong's influence in Kanga'e, Bollen wrote afterwards, 'a new authority must be established within society, because nearly all the village heads are followers of Jan Djong. Maybe something can be done with the youth.' His pamphlet is a narrative of escalating 'tests of strength' with Djong. At one point he likened their relationship to that between the Italian priest Don Camillo and the communist mayor Peppone, rivals who grudgingly admired each other in Giovannino Guareschi's popular books of that time. Like Peppone, Djong continued to attend Sunday mass at Watublapi across the valley. Afterwards, he and Bollen met at the latter's home, over a game of chess, and talked about 'christianising' local customs. Djong was a passionate and skilled chess player. But the Italian comparison was much too light-hearted. Bollen was not so much the bumbling Don Camillo to Djong's feisty Peppone as he was the harsh Padre Dámaso to Djong's Crisóstomo Ibarra in a story

much closer to home. Its author José Rizal is the great Ilustrado hero of Philippine resistance against the colonial Spanish. He wrote his stirring novel *Noli Me Tángere* in 1887. The well-connected and cruel priest Dámaso does everything possible to frustrate the love life and political mission of the ardent nationalist Crisóstomo, scorning him as a heathen and a native. Djong, too, was a nationalist. Bollen hardly spoke the local language, yet behaved as if the national revolution had no place in Flores. Bollen increasingly labelled the republican nationalists in his vicinity 'communists' for wanting to separate church and state. A resurgent Catholic mission sought aggressively to turn the tide.

In the hedge-betting, conspiratorial style typical of the town's politics, Djong joined no party while maintaining friendships in all. Increasingly shut out from the Catholic Maumere establishment, however, he leaned more and more towards the left wing of the PNI. He felt only this party could represent the interests of all groups. But, while it had some powerful friends in the local military, police, and judiciary, and while it disliked da Cunha, PNI was a cadre party without grassroots. In the village, the PNI could do Djong little good. Where the communist-affiliated peasants union BTI started concrete solidarity projects among marginal rural populations, Djong relied merely on PNI rhetoric of state-led economic development. He reminded his listeners of the nationalist fervour that had inspired his own revolt against the raja 15 years earlier. Neither the promise nor the history moved the peasants greatly. They knew the state was too poor to realise his promises (as recorded by Bollen) of improved fishing and weaving technology from Moscow if they would support the PNI, the party of government. And they could see with their own eyes that he was fast losing personal control over the local twilight institution of the copra funds. Perhaps the poor did not even want to be citizens with rights; they were just happy to get services even if it meant being clients to someone they disliked (as Chatterjee [2004] would have it).

Rubbing salt in the wounds of these failures were the foreign priests (for Bollen was not alone), whose western money *did* allow them to deliver on their promises (Fig. 4.4). Bollen bought support for the Catholic Party by handing out scholarships for Florinese students to Java and by selling second hand clothes from Germany cheaply. He also had good relations with businesses in Maumere, which gave him credit for a flow of goods to the village. Each time Djong tried to undermine the infuriating authority of moneyed white priests with nationalist fervour he failed. When in desperation he took to warning parents that sending their children to the

Fig. 4.4 Opening new land with church tractor (undated, probably the 1950s). (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

Catholic school might cause another of their children to die, Bollen's students began to criticise him openly, saying he was 'just as feudal as the Raja of Sikka had been.' When Bollen outmanoeuvred him in recruiting villagers against Djong's will to build a school in Hewokloang, Djong was seen sitting on one of the large sacrificial stones in the centre of the village, grimly silent and looking at the ground. Some said he was planning revenge with black magic, others said they feared 'war.' He used his influence in PNI-friendly official circles to harass Bollen's henchmen. He had the swaggering public prosecutor in Maumere, A.B. Simatupang, who was a personal friend, send one of them named Kapitan Djagong to jail for six months for some offence. Djagong had been a Djong loyalist who defected. In February 1963, he sent a letter to various government authorities protesting against the 'illegality' of the 'foreigner' Anton Schöppfer, SVD, founding a branch of the Catholic Party in his (Djong's) home area of Kewapante. The next month a group of PNI activists in Maumere took another priest, Arnold Groot, to court in Ende for 'insulting' the PNI in a Sunday sermon. Neither of these ventures was successful, however. The

deeply conservative archbishop of Ende, Gabriel Manek, took revenge by excommunicating the three activists concerned.

Tests of Strength

As each side in this ideological contest began to mobilise bodies, an undertone of Mo'ang Teka-like violence crept into the repertoire. In the middle of that tense year 1963, Archbishop Manek appointed Bollen as 'spiritual advisor' to the Pancasila Farmers Union (Ikatan Petani Pancasila, IPP), explicit rival to the communist farmers union BTI. For a month, Bollen held meetings all over Flores, addressing thousands. He had money from his German backers to build water tanks and roads that the impoverished local government should have been building. German trucks appeared in the mountains. He subsidised cocoa-planting projects through the IPP. He recruited young people by inviting them to his village house to play chess or ping pong or the guitar. This is how he found his lieutenant. Josef Doing was a taciturn teacher from Hewokloang whose house Djong's thugs had burned down during the troubles of the early 1950s. Thus the Catholic mobilisation built on the violence of yesterday. As the political temperature rose, his loyal group of youths kept upping the ante against the subdistrict head. Behind the tests of strength rippled real muscle.

If Bollen had his Doing, Djong's strongman was Alo Fernandez, known as 'Crazy Alo.' Fernandez had been in jail with Djong for the burnings of the early 1950s. He sported the same thin goatee beard as the handsome African martyr Patrice Lumumba had done. Photographs of Lumumba were prominent in left-wing newspapers in Indonesia. Even in faraway Hewokloang, the romance of Congolese resistance to white Catholics had generated new meanings. Crazy Alo liked to make a display of his 'communist' books and slogans. Djong had had him appointed the head of his home village of Hewokloang, with 1200 residents.

Halfway through his pamphlet, Bollen began to express worries that the escalation he was pursuing might lead to bloodshed. Bollen's first significant victory came when Crazy Alo made a public show of having recovered his Catholic faith. He had his marriage blessed, openly burned his 'communist' books, and vowed he would give up his thieving and instead turn to beating thieves himself. But Fernandez disappeared from Hewokloang after this. Rumours began to circulate that he had been 'beheaded on some island' for his treachery to Djong. Yet Bollen pushed on regardless of the risks.

Each side could call on bodies elsewhere. Djong, on the one hand, had some support at the air force base. The dual civilian-military airport lay within his territory just east of Maumere. Djong had played a role in the expansion of various military services during his tenure in the district assembly. The air force was keen to inject itself into the local political arena as a 'third force' besides the civilian and army bureaucracies. The alliance gave Djong access to a useful gang of young thugs hanging out at the airport. Bollen, on the other hand, was close to the Maumere establishment that ran the Catholic Party. District head da Cunha was chosen Maumere branch president in July 1963. It had managed to wrest control over the shadowy but lucrative copra funds. Almost everything was paid for with copra funds.

From existing on paper only, the Catholic Party was making a big push to recruit real members in the villages. Both sides began claiming fantastic numbers of youths enrolled in their militant organisations. Bollen claimed he had enrolled 17,000 young Sikka Catholics in the IPP. Sikka PNI claimed 13,000 members. Catholic young people organised splashy 'shows of force' (as they called their political theatre themselves). In July 1963, they launched an aggressive door-knock campaign in the villages to win members. This unauthorised initiative was a direct challenge to Djong's authority as subdistrict head. There was little he could do, except threaten to bring a terrifying mass combined PNI and PKI demonstration to Maumere to demand the sacking of district head da Cunha. When he realised that he had lost so much standing in his own village that he could no longer muster the numbers to carry out even this threat, he cried out in a moment of weakness to Bollen: 'You want to kill me!'

The tests of strength escalated dangerously. Even though the promised election date had not yet materialised, the mobilisation for one continued. When Djong in April and May 1965 ordered his men to seize the Catholic membership cards the opposition had distributed in his subdistrict, Bollen's men took the matter to the police. Djong also went to the police, and then to the governor in Kupang. Bollen's men organised an anti-Djong demonstration at Watublapi with 1500 participants. This made it to the provincial radio news bulletin. In June 1965, Djong tried mobilising the provincial land reform committee to come from Maumere, but Bollen's youths prevented the committee from reaching the mountainous interior by blocking the road. The climax was a set of rival demonstrations on 17 July 1965 at the Maumere airport—Djong's territory—for the occasion of a flying visit by the minister of the interior. Where Djong's

1953 demonstration had 'punched up' to the raja, these demonstrations were mere factional displays of power, punching sideways rather than upwards. As the minister walked from his plane, Djong's youths shouted against da Cunha in the bizarrely technocratic language of the day: 'Retool Samador!' Bollen's youths shouted back: 'Retool Jan Djong!' This was too much for the authorities. They could excuse the Catholic youths' behaviour as appropriate to democracy activists, but unseemly behaviour by clients of a supposedly apolitical subdistrict chief was beyond the pale. The next day Radio Republic Indonesia in Kupang read out an official radiogram that the provincial governor had sacked Djong. Djong appointees were removed as village heads and replaced with Catholic Party sympathisers. It was nearly game over for Djong. In desperation he began to resort to terror. His men once again started burning houses of Catholic Party opponents, stealing and stabbing horses. Bollen, who now only dared to ride his motorcycle with a military escort as pillion, one night discovered men sneaking around his house with a can of petrol. He reported Djong to the police. A few months later, in November 1965, he took the advice to leave the country on 'holidays.'

Bosses Rule

Where the bottom-up, anti-establishment ideology to which Djong professed to adhere in the early 1950s had been about expanding the political community with talk of popular sovereignty (and ethnicity), that of the establishment counter-movements of the early 1960s was about reducing popular participation in public affairs. Expertise—'the right person in the right place,' as one of its key protagonists liked to say—was now the key qualification for participation. Administrative expertise in government, religious expertise in the church. This act of drawing in the boundaries of citizenship did much to intensify the ever-present undertone of violence, the more so as the military began to support the same idea.

In name, the villagers of Hewokloang in Sikka had all become citizens in the new republic on 27 December 1949. But 15 years later, their voice still counted for little. Without a political party to represent them to the centre, they were at the mercy of local patrons. In Sikka, as in so much of Indonesia, the state as an impersonal system for allocating rights was a fiction. Rights do not exist when the state is embedded in society. The structures to guarantee those rights were there—a representative district assembly, a public prosecutor—but they had been captured by elite patrons

who used slush funds to drive their factional politics. Within the hierarchical culture that was hegemonic within Sikka, every claim to rights was now seen as a personal attack on a socially superior individual or group. It was read as disrespect for seniority and religion, and it justified such violence in response as if the entire social order was at stake.

Change in Maumere was subtle at first. The town's informal wheeling and dealing to some extent decoupled it from Jakarta. However, the district's formal institutions increasingly fell under the control of educated urban elites who valued their links with Jakarta. The town's growing factionalism began to look like a slow chess game, in which elite connections rather than popular support proved to be the decisive resource. The moment of horror arrived when those higher elites called in their debts.

By the middle of 1965, resistance had become muted. All of Flores was now intensely Catholic; money politics ruled; elites were kept on a leash with patronage, and they had lost their taste for demonstrative politics to widen the circle of participation in the republic. The anger in village Flores for their exclusion from the affairs of town remained unresolved. Sporadic violence lay not far below the surface. Yet no genocide was looming as the end of 1965 approached. Despite bitter rivalries and merciless intrigue, the factional fights tended to see-saw inconclusively. Eventually Djong would have retired to his ancestral farm in the hills to nurse his past glories. The fatal transformation of factionalism into a murderous programme did not come from these informal institutions of local society. It arose from the formal institutions of the central state. When at last powerful conservative patrons in Jakarta called in their debts, the die was cast for a chilling pogrom against erstwhile local challengers to local authority, and for a redefinition of citizenship in top-down terms. This fatal rapprochement between anti-democratic central state elites and nervous provincial patrons is the subject of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 5

That Chilling Moment

Abstract Political factions in the little town of Maumere seek out powerful patrons with connections at the centre. Towards the mid-1960s, the dominant groups in town—religious and localist in character—have formed a loose, ad hoc alliance with the military. They all fear losing privileges to a popular movement promoted by the communist party. Theirs is a top-down, limited form of citizenship. When developments in far-away Jakarta lead military brass to commence the violent elimination of the entire communist party, local military officers call in their factional debts. In Maumere, allied civilian groups, shocked but compliant, assist the military in carrying out genocidal violence against their factional enemies.

Jan Djong is among hundreds to die. The existing elites in town are beneficiaries of a genocide.

Keywords Military • 1965 • New order • Genocide • Anti-communism • Violence • Communism • Religion • Factionalism • Flores • Indonesia

And when in their wake nothing remains but a desert, they call that peace.
Tacitus, Agricola

One evening in mid-February 1966, Major Soemarno, the Javanese chief of staff at the district military garrison command, summoned Maumere's non-communist political party leaders to his official residence behind the Kodim

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office. All belonged to an ad hoc local military-civilian organisation called into life after 1 October 1965 called Komop, for Komando Operasi. Soemarno was also the head of Komop. Similar organisations existed in most district and provincial towns in Indonesia at that time. As they filed in, each signed an attendance register. E.P. da Gomez, the presumed author of *Menjaring Angin* where this story is told in harrowing detail, was there representing Catholic youth in Maumere. Soemarno asked his assistant, Lieutenant Suradji Diphowirjo, to chair the meeting. Diphowirjo said he had received 'instructions' that 'all the PKI leaders and sympathisers involved with the G30S adventure' (referring to events in Jakarta to be described below) should be 'secured.' The civilians looked at each other and at the officer under the lamplight. One of them, PNI representative Th. M. Sogo (whose boss Bernardus Bura was among those detained), asked: 'What does secured mean? Does it mean they must be killed?' The officer nodded in agreement. He said all PKI leaders and sympathisers had to be killed and every political party would have a quota to fulfil while carrying out this instruction. The group stood in stunned silence. This is not what they had in mind for their factional enemies. Nobody dared to ask if they could read the instruction, or know what level of the military hierarchy had issued it—Jakarta, Bali, Kupang, or perhaps the Komop chief of staff himself. The meeting ended after military officers had explained that all the political parties were required to assist the armed forces in carrying out this task, mentioning in particular 'the supply of vehicles, personnel, digging holes, and so forth.'

Now we come to the heart of the matter. Who was responsible for the deaths that were about to occur? Clearly it was Soemarno and his superiors in green who had issued those unthinkable 'instructions.' Without them, there would have been no pogrom. At the same time, those party leaders who were about to sign off on the death warrants of their fellow citizens eventually did their jobs rather conscientiously. Similar stories of civilian-military collaboration leading to mass murder have been told for many other places around Indonesia (Kammen and McGregor 2012). Afterwards the same civilian leaders did little to protest what had happened and much to maintain the taboo on public discussion of it. What does this murderous complicity tell us about the nature of the citizenship and the state in Indonesia at this time? In this chapter we trace the events that produced a

new social contract—what we might call a new 'citizenship regime'—in our little town.[1]

At the risk of running ahead of the narrative, but for the sake of clarity, the picture that will emerge is as follows. In the course of 1963–1965, anti-democratic forces within the central state built strategic alliances with provincial clientelist hierarchies such as those that we explored in the previous chapter. The immediate intention from above was to destroy the only organised link between citizens and the central state that had survived till that moment, namely the communist party. Local elites, for their part, welcomed military backing for their own hopes of removing factional rivals and silencing unwelcome criticism from below (while being unprepared for the violence that would follow). The military strategy of instrumentalising local factionalism by sharply escalating it came at the cost of extreme violence. More fundamentally, it involved shattering the social contract the republic had made with its citizens in 1945, in which direct citizen links with the state through political parties promised to emancipate that poor majority for whom local patrimonialism was oppressive.

Communists in Sikka

If the preceding pages leave the impression that citizenship in Sikka had been entirely reduced to patron-client relations, then that would be the wrong conclusion to draw. In the poor, weakly institutionalised Southeast Asia of the 1950s and 1960s, not everything was clientelistic. Yes, patronage determined much of intra-bureaucratic politics within the region and shaped elections and parliamentary decisions. That also was the case in Maumere, as the account in the previous chapter has confirmed. But there were still movements based on citizens' own ideas and interests as well. Philippinist Ben Kerkvliet (1995) once complained that social scientists' fascination with clientelism after the phenomenon was rediscovered in the 1960s amounted to an obsession. 'My central objection is that the pcf [patron-client, factional] framework minimizes, even dismisses values and ideas, bases for organization and cooperation, and cleavages and frictions except those of a personal, familial, patron-client nature.' Radical move-

[1] A 'citizenship regime' is the complex agreement among citizens, and between citizens and the state, comprising the complete range of prevailing rights and duties (written and unwritten), ideologies, and laws, as well as the daily practices in which those things are supported, evaded, or (rarely) contested (Isin and Nyers 2014: 151).

ments associated with Southeast Asian communist parties were proof to him that class was also a powerful factor in efforts to improve economic, political, and social conditions in the countryside.

The PKI in fact continued to grow in Sikka after Jan Djong's Catholic Party demonstration against it in 1956. By the late 1950s only the PKI still persisted with the national project of mobilising ordinary folk for a programme of social reform. Its Indonesian Farmers Union (BTI) encouraged 'small but successful' farmer initiatives to wean them off their dependence on village chiefs or landlords (Huizer 1974: 100–1). Speeches deployed a modernising language opposed to 'feudalism' and 'tradition' and promoted concrete plans for structural reform. Democratically run local cooperatives shared cheap seeds and agricultural tools. The PKI was building a fee-paying grassroots membership explicitly aimed at breaking clientelist dependence on patrons. The BTI was campaigning on land rights for all. The communist women's movement Gerwani was advocating for women's rights. No other party came anywhere near these lofty achievements. Land reform followed in the early 1960s. All of eastern Indonesia suffered a severe drought in 1964–1965 and BTI was the main organisation offering any kind of help. If broad, bottom-up citizen rights were being claimed anywhere in Indonesia at this time, it was through the BTI cooperatives and the other communist-affiliated organisations—ranging from Gerwani for women to Lekra for artists. By 1964, every province or major island and 93% of all districts and major towns in the country had communist organisations with fee-paying members drawn largely from beyond the circles of local middle-class elites (Pauker 1964: 37). The PKI welcomed elections, and long followed the Soviet line of the united front with other parties. According to military statistics from 1963 (Tari 1972: I, 263), Sikka district had 1987 BTI members, in 26 neighbourhood groups. Every district in the province of East Nusa Tenggara had them. Some had many more than this, some fewer—Sikka was about halfway down the list. A couple of years later this number would have increased as the PKI ramped up its mobilisation, but we know little about it. Indeed, we cannot now be sure how the military defined 'membership' in this case, and the PKI's own records are gone. Its leaders did not belong to the long-standing political elite in Maumere—at least their names do not appear in *Menjaring Angin* before about 1962. The Sikka district PKI leader, Tartonain da Silva, was a full-time activist in his early 20s. He was from Larantuka but had lived in Maumere since attending the Raja Thomas junior high school. Like Djong, he had reportedly turned against

the church after being beaten harshly by the dormitory head for talking back. At the same time, *Menjaring Angin* is no doubt right when it stated that PKI membership in Sikka was always 'very small.' The priest Bollen said the PKI achieved 'astounding success' only in some villages near the coastal plain below Watublapi (he mentioned Moro, Piring, Baubatung). An old retired soldier named Sareng had inspired them to be independent, he wrote, and the party had promised fishermen that Moscow would send a machine to blow the sea away leaving the fish stranded.

Djong was a waverer. He stood with one foot in the world of clientelistic politics in Maumere and with another in the political party PNI that might lift him out of it. The worse he fared in one, the more attractive the other seemed. But the PNI was for him not merely a practical lifeline; it was also a matter of conviction. The PNI had a left wing that identified with the PKI, and a right that resisted it. He (and perhaps the whole Maumere PNI branch) identified with the left. He once told Bollen:

> Only the communists possess the power and the strength with their membership of three million to lead Indonesians out of their poverty and to give the landless a secure livelihood by means of a just distribution of land. Only they have the capacity to lead this young archipelagic nation towards a future-oriented, progressive and better world. (Sommer 1993: 56)

Military Politics

Battles had been fought within the central state ever since the 1945 revolution over the way in which citizens should be mobilised for rule. Scholars long failed to understand these battles. They saw danger in the left-wing populism of those times. Herbert Feith, in his magisterial book on Indonesian politics of the 1950s (2007 [1962]), made a distinction between 'administrators' and 'solidarity makers.' Solidarity makers thought that it was most important to mobilise people directly to participate in political struggles. President Sukarno was the archetypical solidarity maker, and the PKI the ultimate solidarity makers party. They looked for personal integrative values in politics, urging perpetual revolution rather than constitutional democracy. Administrators, on the contrary, were concerned with building an effective government machinery. They included democrats like Vice President Mohammad Hatta, a Dutch-educated economist who regretted the chaos of the revolution and worked

to build a sober, rule-based state with human rights guarantees and democratic representation. But the solidarity maker-administrator distinction, common in functionalist theory in the 1950s, was deeply misleading. The decisive citizenship struggle in Indonesian politics did indeed involve the populism of Sukarno and PKI at one pole. But the other pole was not the rule-based constitutional democracy of Hatta, who resigned disillusioned from the vice-presidency in December 1956. Rather it was the military. Huntington still commended 'the soldier' as 'institution-builder' (1968: 237). But the soldiers were increasingly led by deeply anti-democratic officers, and they prevailed in October 1965. Their New Order was to last till 1998. They embodied, as Feith himself acknowledged (p. 554), the dominant central state elite conviction after about 1957 that money and bureaucratic influence win political contests, not popular choices. Politics was no longer seen as the fair regulation of a conflict of interests; rather they were about building or blocking direct bonds between the state and the people.

Elite politics over the two decades between the onset of the revolution in 1945 and the denouement of 1965 were byzantine and do not lend themselves well to simplification. Feith needed over 600 densely written pages to cover only a part of the period. It is even too simple to say the military was the only reason for the collapse into authoritarianism following the bloodbath of 1965–1966. The armed forces were born in the revolution out of numerous popular militias, and the officer corps always had many factions. Some admired the revolutionary professional armies of Red China or the Soviet Union, which submitted to legitimate political party control. But more rejected civilian 'interference' and believed only the army embodied the republic's sovereignty. Most saw the communist party as their greatest rival. Yet even the hardliners realised they would in practice have to engage in politics like anybody else if they wished to lead. Attempts to go it alone had invariably gone wrong. Coup attempts in 1952, 1955, and again in 1956, all backfired. The martial law from which they profited in 1957 made them unpopular with the political public, and in May 1963, they were forced to agree on lifting it.

Military activism after 1957 aimed to build an ever-tighter grid of garrison bases all over the country. Each unit should then build political alliances with local civilian groups. The initial aim was not to rouse the coalition into opposing the immensely popular PKI but to build capacities and wait. Around the country, district capitals in 1960 acquired a military district command (Kodim), each with about 100 associated territorial

troops. Subdistrict military commands (Koramil) followed in 1962, also with troops and with militarised civil guards (Hansip). Maumere at first fell under Ende's Kodim but acquired a Kodim of its own in 1963. Its first commander was Lieutenant-Colonel Gatot Soeherman, sent out from Java. He was sociable and made a well-read impression. Like his predecessor (in the previous structure) Sardja Udaya, he took an interest in local politics without trying to dictate terms.

Confusingly, army activism was not everywhere anti-communist. Soeherman's boss two levels up, the military area commander in Bali, Brig-Gen Sjafiuddin, was loyal to President Sukarno and supportive of the PKI. He made deals with leading figures from PNI and PKI. Soeherman evidently felt the same way. In March 1964, not long after his arrival, he was even said to have 'encouraged' a PNI/PKI demonstration against district chief da Cunha, apparently as part of a plan to displace him. A few months later the same PNI/PKI combination was free to hold a lavish 'show of force' PNI anniversary celebration in Maumere. They chose for it the ruins of the Raja of Sikka's palace. The palace had been bombed during the Pacific War and not rebuilt. Many enthusiastic supporters came to town from the hills towards the southeast to be there. The message, according to *Menjaring Angin*, was clear: 'that on the ruins of the raja and the kingdom of Sikka, the people who are now free, equal (*marhaen*), nationalist and filled with progressive-revolutionary spirit are joyfully struggling for "the common good" in order to be freed from feudalism, colonialism, and imperialism.' Catholic Party activists in Maumere, meanwhile, felt the slur of 'feudalism' was directed at them.

The air force had its own finger in the local political pie. An air force detachment was based at the Japanese-built airport (the best in Flores as it runs along nearly the only piece of flat ground on this mountainous island). Djong's many friends here permitted him in June 1965 to demonstrate against the district chief (see previous chapter).

Whether army or air force, each military unit routinely built a bewildering range of ad hoc joint civil-military 'forums' and 'fronts,' all justified by real and imagined threats. Throughout the 1950s, civilian militias had been recruited to help defend villages against the Darul Islam rebellion in parts of Java and Sulawesi. From the early 1960s, volunteers were being trained to take part in the campaign to recover West Irian (Dutch New Guinea, now variously called Papua or West Papua) from the Dutch. From 1964 more volunteers were recruited to engage in 'Konfrontasi' with Malaysia in Borneo over Malaysia's national consolidation. The more fun-

damental aim of these 'joint' efforts, however, was to bind civilians to the military. This was a kind of citizenship tie too, but one that diverged sharply from the one prevailing in the democratic early 1950s. These were no longer aspirational ties that directly bound citizens to the central state via the political party, but protective patron-client ties at the local level. The PKI had said of itself: 'we are the men who are modernizing life in the villages; we are the men introducing the twentieth century' (Mortimer 2006 [orig. 1974]: 409). But one reason that the PKI never won many members in the outer islands of Indonesia—also not in Flores—is that the social structure of patron-client links remained more intact there than it did in Java with its industry and its revolution. The irony of the military strategy was that they—the one organisation in Indonesia most outspokenly dedicated to the preservation of national unity, for which its members had shed their blood in the 1945 revolution—were now building alliances with small-town elites interested primarily in protecting their own local standing. Both sides in this partnership were interested in limiting citizenship rights.

As the bureaucracy grew in the late 1950s, and with it the rents available to those in control of it, the risk of dissatisfaction among those excluded from those rents grew. Elsewhere, I have described these emerging class dynamics in a history of nearby Kupang (Klinken 2014). In Maumere the PKI was far less significant than in Kupang, but Djong based his appeal on the same sense of indignation. By 1965 it was clear that a proportion of the political public in Maumere was prepared to accept a 'citizenship from above' deal. The town's bureaucratic class was increasingly tied to Jakarta by strings of money and political loyalty. The military chose to focus on mobilising them by stimulating fears that horizontal ties of solidarity were dangerous for the nation and for religion. The town's coalition with the devil had been building over several years by 1966. The locals derived from it some kind of insurance against a popular revolution, against dissent getting out of hand, against class forces undermining the rents they were enjoying.

In faraway Java, meanwhile, a brewing contest between President Sukarno and the armed forces began to emerge into the open from late 1963 onwards. The president drew his enduring popularity on a kind of left-wing populism that made the PKI a natural ally. A series of events too complicated to relate in this short compass (but see Klinken in press [2019]) first saw politics move to the left. In a moment of over-reaching confidence, the communist party secretary general then lent his clandes-

tine support to a putsch against some right-wing generals. The plotters group called itself the 30 September Movement, G30S in Indonesian. The failure of this putsch in turn allowed the armed forces to deploy its nationwide civil-military network to launch a bloody crack-down on 'G30S/PKI.'

The Thin Wet Sheet

The historian John Smail (1968: 132) once memorably described the military in another Indonesian province in the late 1950s as 'laid over this society like a thin wet sheet over a body, picking up a perfect imprint of the complexities of its shape.' When they spread to the regions of a large country like Indonesia, those military institutions lost some of their autonomy. They became colonised by local elites, absorbed into the local power structure. And it made locals think they could manipulate most things that the army command might try to push through. The limits of that assumption were about to become painfully clear.

On 1 October 1965, the G30S event quickly led to regime change. The plotters' ill-considered plan to kidnap right-wing generals went wrong, and in the backlash the anti-communist General Suharto seized power. He immediately launched a crack-down on the entire communist party. It became one of the major pogroms of the twentieth century (Roosa 2006). The military needed local civilian allies to identify and bring in the victims. This meant exploiting small-town factionalisms like those in Maumere, deepening them immeasurably: a highly exclusionary strategy.

At first, however, the locals—civilian and military—did not see the moves as anything out of the ordinary pattern of mutual manipulation in a clientelistic atmosphere. For months after that decisive moment in Jakarta, the political public in Maumere felt little had changed. Catholic Party activists and the clique around district chief da Cunha were excited to hear on the radio that the PKI 'coup d'etat' in Jakarta had failed. But Soeherman saw no particular reason to go beyond the usual factional manoeuvring. He had long regarded the Catholic Party as a somewhat sectarian group of localists. Catholic activists had been urging for months that the government should do something about the PKI they hated so much. Chief agitator was the ardent Florinese Kanis Pari, a relative of Conterius. His broadcasts on Kupang state radio were popular in Catholic Flores. Soeherman reacted to this militancy by personally protecting PKI leader Tartonain da Silva at his home. When the coast was clear, he let him leave for Larantuka in an army jeep.

On 2 December 1965, Catholic Party activists met at the home of E.P. da Gomez, where they decided to try to force Soeherman's hand. A few days later hundreds of posters appeared around Maumere urging the authorities to arrest local PKI leaders 'as well as those who protect them.' Emboldened by what they had heard Catholic Party youth were doing in Kupang, the Maumere group, calling itself Garuda Youth, seized three PKI leaders in Maumere. J. Lobo Pa was beaten horribly in this operation.[2] More were seized over the next six days, and PKI signboards were removed. They presented the detainees to a 'G30S Investigation Team' that had been established since mid-October under the public prosecutor in Maumere, A.B. Simatupang.

Soeherman's first reaction was correct—anger that the religious activists had taken the law into their own hands. But the violent, unconstitutional signals emerging from Jakarta unsettled him. A few days later he travelled to Kupang for further instructions. His superior there had recently been replaced for not having complied with the new repressive line against the PKI. The new man now told Soeherman to get cracking too. On 14 December 1965—a full two and a half months after G30S—a chastened Soeherman told an eager political meeting in Maumere dominated by the Catholic Party that Jakarta had set up a special military institution to deal with the 'G30S adventure.' He said it was called the Operation to Restore Security and Order. (He was nearly right, it was actually the Command to Restore Security and Order, Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, abbreviated Kopkamtib. Suharto had set up this extrajudicial institution directly under his control on 10 October 1965.) The revelation that the military was on-side satisfied the anti-communist crowd.

Even so, nobody seemed in a hurry to proceed to further repression. In consideration of the Christmas season, the public prosecutor permitted the PKI leaders already in detention—37 of them—to go home. In mid-January 1966, a judge in Maumere, presented with the Maumere branch PKI leader da Silva (back from Larantuka), gave him only a one-month sentence, for what crime we do not know. Afterwards da Silva had coffee with prosecutor Simatupang before being taken off to jail. By contrast, the commander of Garuda Youth, Remy, was sentenced that same month to three years in jail on an older corruption case.

[2] The other two were Markus Robot and Rofinus Noeng.

Djong himself at this point had reason to think he had enough factional friends in town to protect him too. The previous June (1965) he had hosted a meeting with PNI and PKI activists from the hill country around there to discuss plans of 'overthrowing' district chief da Cunha. It was held at Botang, a short distance from Watublapi and Hewokloang. The meeting proposed that da Cunha and his team should be replaced with Laurens Say, Soeherman, and public prosecutor Simatupang. According to *Menjaring Angin*, the talk involved another 'scorched earth.' The idea went nowhere—the real players realised Djong no longer had much to offer—but the list shows that Djong thought of all three as good people. Simatupang (whose name suggests he came from Sumatra) was a personal friend. Afterwards, the anti-communist faction said this meeting had been treasonous, reason enough to condemn its participants to death. In fact it had been simply another of the many factional strategy meetings everyone seemed to be busy with in those polarising times.

One Wrong Turn

Finally, senior military command forced through changes in the regional hierarchy, and this led to decisive action by the Maumere command too. Soeherman's superior in Kupang, Lt Col Soetarmadji, had been removed from his post in mid-October and subsequently (we do not know when) arrested for being 'involved' in G30S. The murders that followed in Kupang were coordinated by his replacement, Lt. Col. Abdul Djalal. In Maumere, the key role in the repression was played by Soeherman's chief of staff, Major Soemarno, another Javanese, who had arrived in November from Kupang. He effectively bypassed his boss Soeherman, who became invisible but retained his position until he was promoted to Kupang the following May. Soemarno began on 21 January 1966 by arresting prosecutor Simatupang for possessing PKI documents (sic!) and for releasing the PKI detainees. He rearrested the 37 PKI leaders and also took in some PNI leaders for having 'cooperative relations' with the Maumere PKI. Djong was among them. He replaced Simatupang on the G30S investigation team with a more cooperative junior prosecutor named Karel Elkel, beefed up the team with several anti-communist political party representatives, and renamed it Operations Command (Komando Operasi, Komop). His choice of accommodation for Komop was symbolic. It was the office of the Copra Cooperative, the twilight institution *par excellence* in Maumere and under military control since 1957.

And then he called in his factional debts. This was at the meeting at his home with which this chapter began, where he revealed his 'instructions' and said everyone would have a 'quota.' (The latter was redolent of the arbitrary killing quotas set during the Great Purge in Stalin's Soviet Union, 1937; see Snyder 2010.) The civilians did not then give their formal approval—that was to follow a week later—but the military went ahead anyway. Over the next few days da Gomez witnessed instructions come down the Catholic Party hierarchy (via local chairman J.P. Meak) to be diligent in obeying the 'securing' instructions, 'for the sake of the national ideology Pancasila.' He was sure, he wrote later, that similar instructions were passed to all branches of the other non-communist parties in town. During the day on 20 February 1966, labourers the military had recruited at the Maumere harbour dug three large mass graves at Wairita Beach. This lay about 15 kilometres drive east of Maumere along the coastal road. Picks and shovels had been supplied by the Maumere garrison command. The military had commandeered a truck with driver from the ethnic Chinese owner of a store named Jasmine Aroma in Maumere. This same truck—one of just three or four in town—later turned up in many places all over Sikka to transport prisoners as well as their killers. Meanwhile, four priests counselled the condemned men at the Maumere jail. Accounts vary about their numbers—it was between 15 and 36. Among them was Maumere's PKI chairman da Silva, nicknamed 'Tin.' Another was Bernardus Bura, the local PNI chairman. He and Tin had been district chief da Cunha's most vocal opponents. Around midnight the first group was driven to Wairita Beach in the truck. Activists from the Catholic, Protestant, and Islamic (Nahdlatul Ulama) parties were waiting for them there. They had been told to wear red bandanas. The prisoners' feet and hands were tied with rope. Bystanders saw they were bruised and limp from beatings. They were dropped onto the edge of the hole, where the harbour labourers beheaded them using long machetes. Each executioner had a quota of ten. If trauma weakened his knees ('blood drunkenness,' they recalled later), another had to take over. Soldiers holding firearms at the ready stood guard at the edge. The truck returned with new prisoners several times through the night. Those present were then ordered to close the holes. The holes were 3 metres deep and 5 × 5 metres wide, full of corpses. It took until dawn to cover them with soil. In 2017, 51 years later, coastal abrasion exposed the bones from one of these mass graves to view (Figs. 5.1 and 5.2).

Fig. 5.1 Execution site at Wairita Beach. One of the executioners (white shirt) explains what happened. GPS coordinates: −8.6181230, 122.3406450. (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

A few days later more were executed in the same way at a location closer to town. Wolomarang, also known as 'Kilometer 2,' lies on the mangrove coast north of Maumere. People dried seawater for salt there. The same harbour workers were told to dig holes and execute prisoners in the same way. This time the victims were senior subdistrict party leaders from around Sikka, allegedly 48 of them. Among them was Lukas Laroh, PKI leader from Bola subdistrict towards the south coast.[3]

Angst gripped communities around Sikka as news of the executions spread. A Komop indoctrination team that travelled into the hills south of Maumere to 'explain the tasks around the operation to restore stability

[3] The account in *Menjaring Angin* is confirmed and expanded in a 2012 report by the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (2012: 66–7, 118–22), with additional details in "Pengakuan Algojo 1965 [Confessions of a 1965 Executioner]," *Tempo*, 1–7 October 2012, and Ahmad Yunus, "Senandung Bisu 1965 [the Silent Humming of 1965]," *IndoProgress*, 2010. These accounts I cross-checked by means of interviews with executioners and witnesses, as well as field visits to some mass grave sites, in May 2017.

Fig. 5.2 Human bones emerge at Wairita Beach execution site. Visitors have left cigarette offerings (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

after G30S' was outwardly welcomed like liberators. Inwardly, *Menjaring Angin* noted, people felt terrified that any of them might be next.

Having thus demonstrated that nothing stood in the way of his murderous intentions, military commander Soemarno was ready to demand complete capitulation from his senior civilian allies. On the afternoon of 27 February, he again called party representatives to a meeting, and this time at the assembly chambers in Maumere. All Djong's enemies were there in one room. Leading the meeting was public prosecutor Elkel, who also headed the G30S Investigation Team. He said more executions were coming, and asked them what they thought. In particular, he wanted to know who should be 'secured' next. This time one of them—da Gomez himself—demurred. He felt such decisions were properly made by the institutions authorised to do so. This correct response left the prosecutor struggling for an answer, and the meeting ended indecisively. However, later that night Soemarno compelled everyone to gather once more, this time at his official residence again. He said everyone had to 'take responsibility.' Then he had the names and misdemeanours of 24 further suspects read out one by one. They were all PKI and PNI members from the hills south and southeast of Maumere—eight each from Lela, Nita, and Koting. 'The

atmosphere in the meeting was terrifying, enough to make the hairs stand up,' writes *Menjaring Angin*, 'because all the soldiers there had their weapon ready in their hands.' They long remained silent. Then PNI representative Th. M. Sogo, who had the most to lose if he should be seen as too close to the PKI, said: 'We have to wipe out all those G30S/PKI people down to their roots, no one should be forgiven.' That very night those named were executed.

Menjaring Angin then names all those who were at that fateful meeting. The author was among them. It adds this searingly honest verdict:

> This night of 27 February 1966 was the moment that Catholic leaders started losing their grip, or to put it more strongly they had already abandoned Catholic principles. The leaders did not have the courage to raise their voices to fight for justice and truth because they were afraid of the guns in their face, afraid of the threat of death for defending truth and justice. And from this one wrong turn arose the long and complex series of problems in the political chess game that have afflicted Sikka district ever since.

Two days later the town heard that Djong had died in jail due to maltreatment. Everyone had seen with their own eyes the ritual humiliation to which the half-naked and bleeding politician had been repeatedly subjected over the previous days. Murdered with him was his ally, former prosecutor A.B. Simatupang. He had inspired fear in jail personnel who, when called into his office, found him sitting behind his desk with his feet up and a pistol beside them. Now these men had taken their revenge by jumping on his body until long after he was dead.

The killings now moved into high gear. Komop instructed every subdistrict police office to prepare a burial hole.[4] Once it was clear who was really in charge, village and subdistrict officials around the district began sending in lists of people they considered to have PKI links. The military spread 'intelligence information' that the PKI had planned to kill priests, and this had the desired effect of raising a sense of outrage among local

[4] A priest told *Tempo* there are now thought to be 30 mass graves in Sikka district, including in the following subdistricts: Talibura, Waigete, Kewa, Bola, Alok, Maumere, Nita, Lela, Lekebai, and Paga. An executioner gave *Tempo* a list of locations where he killed people (these locations probably fall in the subdistricts mentioned above): Waidoko, the Catholic mission coconut plantation in Maumere town (now behind the Sikka district chief's office), Watulemang, Koting, Nila, Pauparangbeda, Rane, Detung, Higetegefa, Baungparat, and Pigang.

officials (at the PKI, not the military). They let it be known that failure to cooperate would be taken as a sign of communist sympathy. Komop's secretariat was flooded with names. Without any form of cross-checking, and in the face of unrestrained arbitrary terror, lists of all kinds became fatally incriminating evidence: an attendance list from some past meeting, a list of volunteers who had helped rebuild a school, a list of recipients of food and kerosene aid during the severe drought that year. Bigamy, disapproved of by Catholics but not uncommon in the mountains, condemned others. People with anti-social or rebellious reputations were accused. Most were simple subsistence farmers. In the mountainous southern subdistrict of Bola, the young, ambitious, and panicky subdistrict chief Paulus Mo'a, told by the military to deliver, sent dozens, perhaps hundreds, to their deaths. Victims were fetched from their homes by civilian security guards (Organisasi Pertahanan Rakyat, OPR) and marched to the Cooperative office in the Bola township. From there they were quickly dispatched at killing fields just outside town (Fig. 5.3), in the mountains (at Wojong), or down at the beach (Pantai Neblo). Some villagers fled to the forests as if it was war. But it did not save them.

The more important detainees were trucked to Maumere in groups and held in the jail, where they were registered. Soemarno kept a close eye on

Fig. 5.3 Unmarked mass grave, identified by locals, behind Watukrus Catholic Junior High School, Bola. GPS coordinates −8.744444, 122.298333. (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

proceedings there. Finally, handcuffed and supplied with a letter from acting Sikka district chief Dakunya that this person should be 'secured,' they were taken to their deaths, often back in their own subdistrict. Some executions were public spectacles. At the Geliting police station—a place of intractable social resistance from Mo'ang Teka to Djong—police would ask victims if they were PKI. If they answered 'no,' the officers would throw a knife at them. If they said 'yes,' they would be immediately killed. Bystanders—party representatives and ordinary residents—were expected to laugh and cheer, at the risk of being considered PKI sympathisers themselves. Wherever the killings took place, Soemarno apparently kept exact records of them (do they still lie in a cupboard somewhere?).

On 29 April 1966, the 'securing' was considered nearly complete. A customary ceremony named *eba-goit* was held in front of the Sikka district office, to shield the community from the spirits of those who had been 'secured.' An estimated 800–1500 people had died. The men who had acted as executioners were each paid substantial gratuities of 150,000 rupiahs (US$640 at the time), and 50 kilograms of rice for 'carrying out state duties for several months.' At a meeting with Komop staff in early May, ahead of an inspection by his military superior from Kupang into the 'securing operation' of the preceding months, Soeherman said all actions undertaken by Komop fell under his command responsibility. He said Komop staff should take care of women and children of the victims in view of the 'grudge' they might bear. When his superiors did arrive and heard his account, they were satisfied (Fig. 5.4).

Fig. 5.4 Sign for Jan Djong (1990) at the house where he was born, now occupied by his first cousin Laurensius Belalang, in Hewokloang. (Photo taken in 2017 by author)

Aftermath

If the murders of 1965 and 1966 had been a purely external intervention, the memories of it would have been very different from those that did circulate afterwards in Sikka. They would have recorded the horror in the minds of a hapless rural and small-town population as an uncomprehending, alien force imposes its violent will on them. Instead, they are remembered as a Sikka story. Both Bollen and *Menjaring Angin* sought the explanation within their own society.

The awkward truth is, however, that the murders brought very little change to the elite line-up in Maumere. Instead, they seemed to confirm an order that had crystallised through the long chess game of small-town factional politics preceding them. The murders were inflicted on those already marginal to power in Maumere. The existing elites in town were beneficiaries of a genocide.

We actually still do not know why the instruction came down through the military chain of command to murder so many civilians in Indonesia at the end of 1965, when incarceration and trial might arguably have achieved the same political purpose (Melvin 2017). Remarkably enough, nobody among the Maumere elite seemed to ask that question afterwards. It was as if, having become part of a murderous new political regime, they preferred to think of its defining moment as a kind of natural cataclysm, irresistible and inscrutable. It was one they were well placed to survive. If there had been a problem at all, it appeared to them in retrospect to have lurked within the citizenry of Sikka themselves. Bollen attributed the disaster to a dangerously naive toying with communism out in the countryside—something he had tried with too little success to address with his mission work before the storm struck. Like other priests who wrote about 1965 afterwards (Prior 2006a, b), Bollen proved himself gullible in the extreme to New Order propaganda, with its unlikely allegations of communist conspiracies against public order arising from within unruly portions of society. *Menjaring Angin* was politically more sophisticated. But it, too, attributed the disaster to the politics of dissent out in the countryside, which had needlessly created feelings of enmity against the Catholic establishment in the town. Both accounts suggest that the disaster had a silver lining for those who belonged to that establishment. For it had brought to a sudden and perhaps even cathartic end the factional fights that had dragged on for a decade or more. Afterwards, there was no more talking back by Kanilima rebels, and no more stabbing of priests' horses by heathen peasants in the night.

This does not mean complicity was general. Many who did participate in the killings did so out of fear, as da Gomez correctly explained to the students in Jakarta afterwards. One priest actually protested while the killings were still ongoing. Fredrik 'P.D.' da Lopez confronted the military commander, demanding that he release detainees destined for execution. But when the commander wrote to the bishop to reign in this troublesome priest, the protests stopped. The Kanga'e students in Jakarta, relatives of Djong, who had expressed their outrage to da Gomez, took their protests a little further. But when the military threatened them, too, they backed down. Peer group pressure led to some of the worst civilian perpetrators being socially ostracised. Local Catholic Party branch chairman Meak, prosecutor Elkel, and political activist Nico Bela, and civilians who had played prominent executive roles in Komop, felt exposed when their military protector Soemarno was transferred out of town in October 1966. They had already made themselves unpopular in town by shamelessly feeding Soemarno's passion for money, women, and violence at the expense of the locals. They continued to extort money from ethnic Chinese businesses even after Soemarno had left, and then one of them caused outrage to bubble over when he raped a female high school student. Da Gomez organised a demonstration against the three in June 1967 (which led to da Gomez himself being detained for a time). Elkel ended his days in jail, where in October 1967 he was murdered by an ethnic Chinese inmate named Liem Jauw Kheng.

However, when the New Order ended in 1998, and with it much military privilege, neither da Gomez, nor da Lopez, nor the Kanga'e students, most of them still strong, chose to raise the history of 1966 afresh. In 2012, two skeletons were discovered by sand miners working the riverbank just below Maumere's jail. Jail officials who were called thought immediately of Djong and the prosecutor Simatupang. Fearing controversy, they quickly reburied them. They took no DNA samples and did not notify possible relatives. Djong's relatives heard of the discovery. But they did not demand an investigation. They told Rev John Prior and me in May 2017 the family had agreed during a customary ritual held in 1990 that the case was closed. Tawdry mass graves such as those I photographed behind the Catholic high school in Bola (Fig. 5.3) are remembered by older locals—sometimes down to the names of those who lie there. But, in a land where the dead are otherwise honoured with megaliths, they remain unmarked dumping places for those who failed. None of the dozens of mass graves around Sikka district have been exhumed. The genocide has been wiped from the historical memory (Fig. 5.5).

Fig. 5.5 'Ritual burning of communist papers: so that no one without the right can read them' (*Dian*, Catholic magazine published in Ende, 24 September 1976)

While town elites collaborated to survive, people in the countryside just felt completely abandoned by their leaders. Locals described the violence with the words 'Sikka killing Kanga'e.' For years after 1966, this was their mantra of grief and anger. It was a leitmotif in the book *Menjaring Angin*. In the 1970s people in the interior historicised the conflict by speaking of themselves as *krowe*, meaning that they had been 'chased' from the coast by the 'foreigner' Sikka. Their story went back to the first battles against the raja of Sikka in 1904, then to the protests against the raja in 1948 and 1953, and ended with the murders of 1966 (Metzner 1982).

Leonardo Lidi lived in a village near that of Djong's home. He was 17 years old when he saw 33 people decapitated at a nearby football field. The executioners were acting on the orders of soldiers, who afterwards also burned down several public schools. He wrote a song about it. When asked about it in 2010, he first went inside the house to change into his traditional costume. He then picked up his drum for accompaniment, and sang it as reverently as if the events they narrated had happened a year ago.

Translated from the local Sikka language, via Indonesian, into English, its lyrics read as follows (Yunus 2010).[5]

Wohe Hoer (Lamentation) (14 November 65)

Father Bollen leaves
Flores
Political temperatures
are high
He goes to Germany
Then disaster happens
Society is divided
Don't know where to go
Nothing to hold on to
They go to the forest
To save themselves.

We ourselves
Don't know where to
hide
Lost our way
Only the pastor and
the Lord
That's the only way
No idea what we did
wrong
Where people were
taken to.

To anyone who still has ears to hear
and eyes to see
Don't know why folks were destroyed
To whom we should complain
There's just one way
To the pastor and the Lord

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CHAPTER 6

Citizenship and State Formation in Postcolonial Indonesia

Abstract The riddle of Murder in Maumere is solved. Violence is attributable not simply to the military acting alone, or to societal factionalism by itself, but to a particular model of state governance. The 1945 revolution had been premised on the republican idea that citizens represent their interests directly and democratically to the central state through a political party. By the mid-1960s, however, many elites within the Republic of Indonesia, at the centre and in the provinces, had abandoned that idea. They favour disconnecting citizens from the central state and reattaching them to trusted local elites, who are free to act despotically. The genocidal violence of 1965–1966 was an anti-republican counter-revolution. It returned Indonesian citizenship to a form of indirect rule. Today's decentralisation adheres to the same logic, fed by a deep distrust of the central state. But dissatisfaction is growing with the corrupt patronage politics it entails. Is there a future for democratic republicanism in the global south?

Keywords Citizenship • Postcolonial • Violence • Decentralised despotism • Central state • Republicanism • Democracy • Indonesia • Global south

But if you have any reverence for Persuasion, the spell of my voice that would appease your fury—Oh please stay.
Athena, in Aeschylus, Oresteia, 893

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Have we now solved the murders in Maumere? This final chapter assembles the pieces and reaches a verdict. Clearly, it wasn't a simple whodunnit. There are too many actors, with unclear or contradictory motivations, to make a black and white narrative of good versus evil. But neither is it such a complex story that we are left shrugging our shoulders at the intractability of violence in a postcolonial setting. Many features we recognise elsewhere in Indonesia in those years. Some are typical of twentieth-century postcolonial dramas around the world. They are even universal as the classical quotes at the top of each chapter are intended to illustrate. A verdict on Murder in Maumere might illuminate the history of citizenship in much of the modern world.

The chapter proceeds in four parts. The first is forensic. Why did the arc of contention in the little town of Maumere move from the bright if naive hopes of republican activists in the early 1950s to mass murder (by fellow citizens acting under military orders) in the mid-1960s? The next two pose the broader question: what light does this micro-historical episode throw on postcolonial citizenship? Is it even fair to give it that endorsement, or was this really atavistic chaos? One places the Maumere episode in the context of a particularly fraught phase of state formation; the other draws some generalisations about postcolonial citizenship practices at such junctures. Such a fraught phase and such practices are common in the postcolonial world today. I conclude that citizenship is unquestionably an appropriate lens on both. The last section asks how much of this 1960s provincial drama is still relevant today. That, after all, was the practical motivation behind zooming in on this obscure story in the first place.

The Puzzle Solved

Jan Djong's death was a complex political crime, involving local and national actors who interacted over a span of 20 years. Emancipation through the republic: that seductive promise exercised a powerful attraction on many of the players in this little provincial drama. When Djong first stepped onto the stage in 1948, he was taking up an invitation for action issued by Sukarno and Hatta at Pegangsaan Road Number 56 in Jakarta on 17 August 1945 when they read out their Proclamation of Freedom (*Kemerdekaan*). He did the same more famously with the demonstration on that day in 1953. The word *merdeka*, linguistic root of *kemerdekaan*, conveyed strong emotion (Reid 1998). It did not mean merely national independence. It was laden with personal emancipative

meaning. Originally connoting freedom from slavery, in the 1920s it acquired the anarchical exhilaration of freedom from all controls and interference in one's personal life. The word also had a modern ring to it—suggesting emancipation through the urban life. Djong had caught these intimations of modernity in the mountains at Hewokloang. No doubt the school at Mataloko had taught him something about it. Conversations with the well-travelled law student V.B. da Costa brought things to a head. He found the promise confirmed when their beloved President Sukarno on the radio extolled the heroism of the ordinary citizen, whom Sukarno called *Marhaen*. He read it in the exhortatory opinion pieces about 'Revolt' in A.A. Conterius' Ende-based newspaper *Bentara*. He heard it in the inflammatory speech Flores government head L.E. Manteiro gave in Ende in April 1953, threatening the raja of Sikka with arrest. The logic of the Republic was that, if enough personal commitment could be mobilised in the heart of the ordinary *Marhaen*, it would cut through the localistic, 'feudal' ties by which the colonial Dutch had maintained their rule. The citizen would connect directly to the centre through a political movement, and together they would build a dynamic new nation. Seen from little Maumere, Indonesian nationalism was cosmopolitan. It essentially promised to 'deterritorialise' politics, 'disembedding' them from oppressive local relations (Giddens 1991).

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, many people in Sikka had lost faith in this republican utopia. Young, educated clerks who had once keenly favoured republican ideas to displace ruling patrons had achieved a measure of success. They had moved from the margins to become local elites themselves. In Maumere, the raja was gone. The republican district head S.P. da Cunha who emerged to replace him was no longer interested in mobilising villagers. On the contrary, he regarded them as a noisy nuisance to good governance. At the same time, the new Sikka elite had become adept at keeping powerful players from Jakarta at bay. Seduction as a mode of republican governance had largely given way to a bargaining game of inducement met with threats of sabotage. The newly arrived Lt Col Gatot Soeherman, for example, keenly wanted to be a local player—he wished to become district chief—but found himself kept out by the local Catholic establishment. At one point he even came begging to the local branch of the Copra Cooperative for money, only to be given the cold shoulder. His campaign to unseat district head da Cunha leaned on the national secular party PNI, and on a nationalist agitator like Djong. But the PNI put little weight in the mobilisational scales in Sikka, and the local

establishment had long since stopped listening to Djong. He was back in the village.

The face-to-face patron-client relations by which the raja had conducted his rule in the small arena of Sikka were back. The new management used them effectively to buy off local dissent and to shut out the more demanding outsiders. The provincial middle class that, in its own way, holds Indonesia together was born at this time. Elsewhere my colleagues and I have called the zone they occupy 'Middle Indonesia' (Klinken 2014). They exercised authority within the local state-in-society through corrupt clientelism; they exploited their own poor through a predatory bureaucracy, and they had a well-developed capacity to cause trouble to power-holders in Jakarta. But they did sustain the state in the provinces.

At the national level, meanwhile, the various state fractions were by the early 1960s increasingly polarising into two rival blocs, each with sharply different visions of citizenship. A military elite with deeply anti-democratic ideas had been making headway against President Sukarno. Most generals wished to demobilise the citizenry. Underneath the stated reasons for their antipathy to the communist party—Cold War geopolitics, religion (fear of communist 'atheism'), property concerns (the land rights campaign the communists pushed so hard)—lay an aversion to *any* popular participation in the business of government. They had steadily built a narrative of the revolution in which only the military had saved the Republic, while civilians had betrayed the cause. However, in reality they were not in a position to act alone. If they wished to rule, they too would have to overcome their aversion and mobilise civilian support in the provinces. The rapidly expanding network of garrison units in provincial towns had a political brief—to build relations with influential local players who could help check the PKI. These relations were intended to be strictly local. The military did not envisage they would stretch back to the centre.

When the denouement came late in 1965, the military placed Sukarno under house arrest in Jakarta and set about operationalising their links with local 'trust networks' in the provinces. This involved considerable contortion, since the PKI had been a legal party enjoying presidential support. It led to much initial confusion among the mid-level officers tasked with carrying out the plan. An officer like Soeherman had regarded the local Catholic establishment as predatory, exclusive, and frankly localist in orientation. He had preferred working with groups that had a national orientation in their genetic make-up, such as the PNI and the PKI. At first

he could not believe his superiors were telling him to consign the Sukarno loyalists to oblivion and to listen to the abrasive anti-communist rhetoric of Catholic youths whipped up by Kanis Pari in Kupang. Only when his ambitious second-in-command Major Soemarno, who had worked out more quickly what the deal was, threatened him with the charge of PKI collusion (as the chief of staff had actually done to his superior in Kupang), did Soeherman come around.

The bloodbath that ensued under Soemarno's orders was executed on the back of local factionalism. It raised to an exponential degree the existing tensions that had built up over the preceding couple of decades. Those tensions pitted the local establishment, Catholic and patrimonial, against portions of the rural population that had looked, perhaps vaguely and confusedly, to national institutions to lift them from their dependency. As far as the locals on both sides of this divide were concerned at the time, the transformation in 1965–1966 away from (aspirations for) centralised democratic republicanism was not directed towards a centralised military dictatorship. It was directed towards an arrangement privileging local elites by their links with powerful central state agents. At the same time, the bloodbath only took place because the local military commander ordered it. He said he was acting under orders from above. No crime is more extreme than arbitrary mass murder. The law contains the strictest sanctions on such acts. But he and his superiors set the law aside. Afterwards, Soeherman said in public that all actions undertaken by Komop fell under his command responsibility.

Decentralised Despotism

Murder in Maumere took place at a particularly fraught, and too often misunderstood, moment of state formation. The most dangerous dynamic in 1965 was *not*, as has sometimes been said, the fact alone that the security apparatus of the state had acquired high capacities. After all, the original republic also wished an effective centralised state to arise from the de facto federalism the Dutch had left behind in 1949. Nor was it even the fact, normally seen as central, that the centralised state decided to apply wholesale repression to its population in 1965. In fact, much as central state military officers might have wanted to do this, they were simply not in a position to carry out such repression on their own. They had little idea who the 'communists' among the population were. The most hazardous dynamic, rather, was the fact that central state agencies allied themselves

with anti-democratic local elites, authorising them (forcing them!) to take their clientelistic factional fights to a level of extreme violence. It did that with the express purpose of destroying the direct, organised representational links that had existed between non-elite citizens and the central state. By the early 1960s, those links had already been degraded and could only be found in the communist party PKI and its affiliates, as well as a left wing of the nationalist secular party PNI. The anti-communist pogrom of 1965–1966 can be considered a violent form of indirect rule. Mahmood Mamdani (1996) called this type of arrangement *decentralised* despotism. This term may seem to introduce an unwarranted arbitrariness into a genocide that was, after all, centrally planned. But as far as its implementation was concerned, it helps to explain the fairly strong regional variation in the violence of that year. (Scholars of the genocidal 1965 violence now regard that variation as their key research challenge; see Kammen and McGregor 2012.)

Decentralised despotism here, to be clear, does not necessarily mean all central state capacities were decentralised. In fact the central state was bureaucratically quite powerful in 1965. But so was the central colonial state that invented indirect rule. It means that the central state insists on delegating certain vital relations with most of its citizens to local elites, who are free to exercise them despotically. There have been other times in Indonesian history when the term was arguably applicable as well. This little book began by describing Dutch colonial indirect rule practices; the Republic of Indonesia chose to maintain such practices in some areas for several years even after independence. Post–New Order decentralisation has some of the same characteristics, as we shall explore in a moment.

It is striking that precisely small towns such as Maumere have so often been the setting for violence since 1945. The worst violence in the revolution of 1945–1949 took place in and around small towns rather than big cities. The bloody Darul Islam revolt of the 1950s played out in such small towns as Garut in West Java rather than the big city of Bandung, and in South Sulawesi's rural and small-town hinterland rather than in Makassar. During the anti-communist bloodletting of 1965–1966, people in Jakarta took a long time to realise how horrifying the killings had been in the countryside. All the episodes of long-running communal warfare that followed the democratisation of 1998 were organised out of a number of provincial towns rather than big cities or in villages (Klinken 2007). Evidently these are *local* stories of violence. *Menjaring Angin* insists there was a local reason. That book was written 'to discover what lies behind the

fog that covers the tensions in Maumere with their many contradictory facets.' The explanation must lie in the intertwining of state and society that is uniquely found in the provincial town.

Some commentators have gone very far in attributing genocidal violence such as this to local reasons. In 'extremely violent societies,' according to Christian Gerlach (2010), three things come together: mass participation in violence, multiple motivations for violence, and the spreading of the resultant tempestuous violence to other groups besides the announced target group. He illustrates the thesis with a chapter on the Indonesian killings. Multiple motivations certainly seemed to be at work in Maumere. The Watublapi peasants hauled off to the big hole in the ground in the middle of the Maumere mission station's coconut plantation hardly belonged to the communist masses that the army leadership in Jakarta wished to exterminate. Their crime seems to have been a refusal to acknowledge the hierarchy of church and state led by the educated Maumere elite, a refusal with roots in history going back to Mo'ang Teka. The coalition that came together against them was also marked by the values and attitudes, and the social conflicts, prevalent in Sikka in the mid-1960s. This led Gerlach to conclude: 'Mass violence originates from complex processes deeply rooted in the society in which they happen or by which they are generated; they are not merely based on state policies and a rogue regime' (Gerlach 2010: 458). He even disavows the term 'mobilisation' as being too 'statist' and 'top-down' (p. 459). Others have similarly attributed the vehemence of collective violence such as this to an irreducible multiplicity of local and supralocal action agendas. Kalyvas (2003) observed that 'civil war' actions on the ground are often more closely related to local and private conflicts than to the 'master' political cleavage driving the war from the national perspective. 'It is the convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives that endows civil wars with their particular and often puzzling character, straddling the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the individual,' he wrote.

Yet Gerlach's term 'multiplicity' does not capture well the reality of what happened in Sikka. That reality was one of closely coordinated action, directed with extreme attention to detail by Major Soemarno. Kalyvas' term 'convergence' is better but still not quite there either. It suggests local and national collective actors forming a strategic alliance bridging contrasting motivations to engage in a programme of violence in and around one particular small town in the vast Indonesian archipelago. But

the term 'convergence' falls short when it suggests a contingent coming together of opportunistic but basically incompatible partners. In reality, this particular convergence had a logic and an underlying structure.

The problem at the level of the military part of the central state was how to extend the military's authority over far-flung local societies without compromising its own mission of national power. The logical answer was to build (unequal) personal relations with locally influential figures within the smaller towns. Ideology or a programme of governance beyond the military's own institutional interests did not come into play. This was not always the only active central military logic. Soeherman was initially still working with an earlier, revolutionary idea of central state institutions that connected with citizens on the basis of a political programme of secular, nationalist, and socialist participation. He found it hard to believe his superiors wanted him to abandon those ideological allies and connect instead with groups primarily interested in establishing local authority over challengers from the countryside. But he chose to yield to it when it became clear that is really what his bosses had in mind. The logic at the level of the Catholic Party activists in Maumere, meanwhile, was to seek good (if necessarily dependent) relations with central state institutions that could guarantee their security as well as provide them with preferential access to state resources. State executive institutions had more to offer in this regard than political parties. As the capacities of the central state had grown, subsidies in the form of fees, contracts, and jobs available through state-owned corporations and cooperatives became increasingly interesting to local elites. The Gabungan Koperasi Kopra was no longer just a copra cooperative for farmers. As we saw, it employed hundreds of people, owned a fleet of trucks, and distributed a range of government largesse that extended far beyond copra revenues. Whoever wished to exercise authority in Sikka must first of all control these material resources. That meant bending backwards to please those from Jakarta who seemed to have the most power over their allocation.

These two logics—top-down and bottom-up—were not incompatible. They were two sides of the one logic of what we may call (though obviously those involved did not) 'decentralised despotism.' It was similar to the logic the Dutch had pursued in the early twentieth century to bind together Batavia and its numerous regions, and to that described for Africa by Mamdani (1996). In this world, security worries trump the force of the better argument. Such a state exists for the powerful and is lubricated by decentralised factional patronage. In Sikka it was not the PKI but the vil-

lage Kanga'e who became the victims of this state construction. To keep that decentralised despotic arrangement in place, the military worked with these local influentials to punish insubordination in whatever way that was locally defined. The counter-revolution of 1965 was a kind of top-down social movement, initiated by the central state and supported by local clients of that state. Such movements are typically authoritarian, clientelistic, and potentially extremely violent. Complicity in the criminal bloodshed helped tie the local elites to the military once it was all over.

If we now step back and place Murder in Maumere in the history of twentieth-century state formation, we can see that it bears the hallmarks of a specific critical juncture in that history marked by decentralised despotism. In its broad sweep, this is a history of central state actors and local actors growing increasingly connected to each other. Charles Tilly, in his book *Trust and Rule* (2005), theorised the history of state formation in terms of a rapprochement between central state elites and local, living societies. Central elites seek access to resources controlled by the locals, such as fiscal revenues, natural resources, labour, and political support. Locals present themselves to the central state actors as more or less cohesive 'trust networks.' Such networks are usually hierarchical. They are characterised by a few patrons and many clients. Network bosses may see benefits in the state approaches and thus welcome them, or they may reject them as threats and thus engage in a variety of evasive or confrontational tactics. Mostly they will negotiate. Central state elites, too, have a choice of strategies to try to convince locals to collaborate. At first they may use blatant force—hence the 'pacification' campaign by Captain Christoffel and his men when confronting Teka in 1904. Locals remain primarily members of their 'trust networks'—clan, village community, tribe, religious congregation, trade guild, kingdom, or whatever. Christoffel was busy fighting all over the archipelago in the years when a modern state apparatus was under construction. At a later stage, central state elites may use money—hence the *Indonesianisasi* subsidies that created the local state-dependent lower middle class in the 1950s. Also quite late is a central attempt to build ideological commitment—hence, the nation-building visits by Sukarno and Hatta and nationalist political party work by the PNI and PKI. This last denotes a stage of full citizenship. Here integration reaches complete success and the central state has direct contact with all of its citizens on an individual basis. Trust networks lose their compelling power or even dissolve. At this stage, national commitment tends to prevail. Individual citizens feel committed to the idea of a nation that gives

them freedom and welfare. They readily pay their taxes to protect those freedoms. Such commitment remained a distant vision in Sikka in the 1950s, mentioned more in utopian speeches and other acts of citizenship than seen in reality.

In between these two extremes of zero and full integration is a grey zone. Here the bartering between state actors and patrimonial local society representatives is marked by a mixture of material inducements, violence, and ideological commitment. Flores, and most of the rest of Indonesia, fell into this grey zone in our period. The bloodbath inflicted around Sikka by Soemarno in 1966 was a case in point. In comparison with Christoffel's 1904 campaign against Teka, the violence Soemarno unleashed six decades later spoke of a much higher level of integration. It cannot be separated from either the local factionalism linked to state copra money among leading members of local society or the emancipatory hopes created in many local hearts by the arrival of the republic in the first place. This hybrid, fuzzy boundary zone between state and society is theoretically of great interest. Joel Migdal (2001) called it 'state-in-society.' John Smail earlier (1968) wrote of the 'thin wet sheet.' Such zones are common around the world. Sikka in the 1950s was typical of many postcolonial societies. This is the zone that North et al. (2009) in their book *Violence and social orders* situate at the cusp of a transition from a 'natural society' marked by clientelism to an 'open access society' marked by full citizenship and the impersonal rule of law. In this zone, according to Partha Chatterjee (2004), we find 'popular politics in most of the world.' This is the zone where, in our *Clients to Citizens* project, the distinction between clients and citizens takes on an existential significance.

The 1950s and early 1960s were the first time that state-citizen relations were in a position to move out of the grey zone of negotiated patrimonialism towards state-citizen integration based on commitment. Central state administrators and military personnel had been coming to Maumere for half a century, but after 1945 something changed and that led their relations with locals to become more charged than ever before. Where once the few who came were content to keep in the background, letting locally legitimate figures do most of the work, now many more came, and they sought direct contact with the bulk of the local population. They shared the same space in the little town of Maumere. Once the Republic came to Flores, all kinds of central state institutions began to impress themselves more and more on daily life in the little town and its hilly surrounds. There were new schools, and political parties, an election

and rumours of more, government regulations on the copra business, subsidies for the *Indonesianisasi* of local business, mass media such as the radio, and commercial passenger flights from Denpasar and Makassar landing at Maumere airport. The number of government clerks in the town increased dramatically. They were impressed when President Sukarno visited Flores, twice (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2), as did Vice President Hatta. They talked about the dressing down that the plucky young Flores chief



Fig. 6.1 Senior high school students reverently raise the Indonesian flag at a sort of nationalist shrine dedicated to 'Bung Karno' (President Sukarno), probably in Ende, in the 1950s. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

Fig. 6.2 Catholic parade with national symbols, probably in Ende in the 1950s. (Photo permission Superior Provincialis SVD Ende)

Manteiro gave the ageing Raja Don Thomas of Sikka, and about the arrival of Soeherman, the first Kodim commander in Maumere.

Some of the forces introduced to Maumere in those years tended towards fuller integration, but others tended towards reifying the grey zone. Which were stronger? The overall constellation of forces favoured maintaining the halfway house of decentralised despotism. The main institutional conduit for *Marhaen* to 'share in governing and being governed' (as Aristotle put it) was the national, and therefore secular, political party. The upstart young Tartonain da Silva, who didn't come from Maumere but established the communist party PKI in Sikka after attending meetings in Java, was one of the novel actors to come to town. He acted knowing perfectly well that what he did would make the town's Catholic hierarchy deeply unhappy. His confidence that presidential favour would give him the edge over the established local hierarchy, however, proved in 1966 to be misplaced. The bureaucracy, on the contrary, was open only to educated individuals. It moreover had inherited a long tradition of authoritarianism lacking transparent accountability mechanisms. The resources it had to distribute made it an arena of contention among elites, who were able to cream off rents from it while at the same time sabotaging the work

of rival factions within the bureaucracy. The rise of Laurens Say and P.S. da Cunha, vying with each other for authority over Maumere through control of copra revenues, was initially premised on the twin republican programme of building a democratically accountable civilian bureaucracy and a socially beneficial state-led economy. But when challenged by unqualified *Marhaen* from the hills, da Cunha responded that only he was 'the right man in the right place' and made himself complicit in a genocidal programme of extermination directed at those in the hills.

Postcolonial Citizenship

Let us now generalise the Djong citizenship story to Indonesia, indeed to the postcolonial world, as a whole. What does it tell us about the nature of postcolonial citizenship, of citizenship in the grey zone? Should we even use the word citizenship for it? If the many players in the Maumere drama were citizens of the republic, then what kind of citizens were they?

In the concluding sentence of his book entitled simply *Citizenship* (2015: 131), Étienne Balibar writes that '[i]nsurrection, in its different forms, is the active modality of citizenship: the modality that it brings into action.' He traces the 'insurrectional' origins of citizenship to ancient Greek practices. They included 'the indefinite office of the people, the principle of equaliberty, demands for "the right to rights" in the face of exclusion in its various forms, the "tribunal role" of conflicts and struggles, etc.' Regrouping these insurrectional elements can give institutional form to movements to 'democratise democracy' today (p. 119). '[T]he political community,' in short, 'rests on the conjunction of citizenship with different insurrectional modalities of emancipation or the conquest of universal rights' (p. 33). Djong was engaged in such an active modality of citizenship. It was for this that he was tortured to death on 1 March 1966.

There were many Jan Djongs in Indonesia's provinces in these times. They were all postcolonial citizens, bringing insurrectional modalities to their local political arena, even while lacking a clear ideological justification for it. Flores itself had another called Buang Duran (Barnes 2003). Once a Catholic school teacher, he had travelled to Java to trade during the Japanese occupation and had learned about communism there. When he returned to his village in Adonara after the war, he started a tax revolt against the Dutch, who jailed him. Upon the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, he was released and had good relations with the local military commander. His ideology was an eclectic mix of Marxism, nationalism,

and messianism. He advocated equality for all, practised deliberate cleanliness, and had his followers build bridges. But some relatives questioned his anti-clericalism, and the disagreement turned into a fight that escalated out of hand. Troops called in made the melee worse, and Buang Duran was sentenced to a long jail term for sedition by the young Republic. Upon his release, a broken man, he was caught up in 1965 and was murdered by the military.

In the jungled interior of Central Kalimantan I learned about another Jan Djong, named Hausmann Baboe (Klinken 2004). This Dayak Catholic mission boy turned against the mission when he bigamously married a Muslim woman in 1922 and befriended visiting Javanese communists. He introduced newspaper debate to the riverside Dayaks, eventually became a wealthy crocodile skin trader, and is today regarded as the father of politicised Dayak ethnicity. More Jan Djongs can be recognised in Anton Lucas' (1991) depiction of 'homegrown communists' who unleashed a rather inchoate social revolution against the aristocratic rule in several towns on Java's north coast in the weeks after Sukarno's *Proklamasi* of 17 August 1945. Another local revolution, ideologically as inchoate but much more bloody, saw Islamic villagers in Aceh and North Sumatra take on aristocrats early in 1946 (Reid 1979). The revolutionary 'youths' that Ben Anderson described so romantically in his *Java in a Time of Revolution* came from the Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) and from the traditional bands of criminal 'tough men' (*jago*). 'When society itself succumbed to chaos and disintegration, the counter-institutions of the pesantren and the *jago* band offered a model of a transcendent order,' he wrote. Hence the 'whole society moved to free itself from the cycle of routine and regularity, and accepted the suspended soaring of the spirit which underlay the pesantren's conception of itself' (1972: 10). Robert Cribb ascribed the social basis of the PKI in revolutionary Jakarta, somewhat less romantically, primarily to 'gangsters.' Apparently, he wrote, '[t]he PKI promise of social justice through revolution struck a chord not only with messianic inclinations but also with the ethos of social gangsterism' (2009 [1991]: 31).

All these 'homegrown' disruptors of the peace were inspired by the rumours of a revolutionary republic. Probably none could have given a coherent ideological account that resembled western democratic precepts. Few met the standards of civic behaviour de Tocqueville recommended as essential for the citizen: a sense of trust and tolerance towards fellow citizens, a strong notion of the common good, readiness to take part in rea-

soned debate, and some emotional affiliation with the nation or the globe. As others have written who have observed citizens at work in societies in the grey zone, their citizenship practices were active rather than deliberative, political rather than procedural, communitarian rather than liberal-individualist, illegal and unorganised rather than civil (Lazar and Nuijten 2013; Robins et al. 2008; Auyero 2001; Chatterjee 2004). Conventional citizenship theory hardly recognises such practices as constituting citizenship. But the de Tocquevillian norms that they violate have been laid down by the winners of citizenship struggles, once the scrap is over. Beautiful as they are, they do not throw any light on the struggle itself. Instead of a normative handbook, critical citizenship studies offer 'the prism through which to address the political' (Nyers 2007: 3). Seen through this prism, the contest in Sikka in the 1950s was certainly a citizenship contest. It was about expanding the political community so it also included representatives from the rural mountains that the townsfolk so feared and despised.

The performative language in which this contest was conducted was mixed. It was a hybrid of village tropes inherited from the violent days of Dutch colonial pacification on the one hand, and national rhetoric of popular sovereignty on the other. Mountain participants in the demonstration paraded the streets of Maumere with bamboo matting signs declaring 'Regnat Populus.' But the people in town saw only tribal warriors in the fierce image of the firebrand Teka and quickly put up their shutters. Djong's subsequent 'scorched earth' campaign against priests and tax collectors only confirmed the image of anarchy to them. Yet ultimately they—the townsfolk—recognised that the grievances were real. Helped by the copra patronage of Say, which he insisted on distributing broadly, they accepted Djong into their midst. He and his rural associates won a place on the numerous committees at which affairs of state were discussed locally.

The twilight zone of rituals and institutions that emerged in the space between society and the state in Maumere was the scene of the most interesting dynamics in the transitional period under review here. And they were by no means all negative (as Helmke and Levitsky 2004 also pointed out in their study of informal institutions). Within this zone, clientelistic rivalry was mixed up with republican and egalitarian notions of citizen participation. Thus, the Kanilima ethnic organisation demanded representation in the new democracy as the antidote to rule by hereditary rajas. The corrupt and manipulative micro-territoriality of Copra Foundation politics made and broke local elite careers, but they also represented a popular claim to the public good of copra taxes. The youth militias,

whether Catholic or PNI or air force, bolstered patronage politics with their 'shows of force' and their credible threats of violence, but they also embodied a popular voice in the affairs of state. Much the same can be said for the rituals of the demonstration, the politically motivated corruption trial, elections, and assembly debates. The new forms of public authority that were established in the interstices between state and society were neither natural developments of 'traditional' authority (whatever that may have been) nor of the pure modern state but borrowed elements from both. They had dynamics of their own that had enough local legitimacy to be a sustainable if somewhat messy basis for local patronage democracy. Similar rituals and institutions abound in other polities with low institutional capacity and low economic development, from the Congo, through Afghanistan, to provincial India, where they have produced a large literature (Chatterjee 2004). They represented perhaps the authentic postcolonial citizenship. It was only when the most repressive, armed central state officials began to exert their own far more exclusive hegemony over these local forms of citizenship that the uneasy modus operandi broke down into mass slaughter.

For a good while, if asked whether it was better for the unqualified and unruly mountain people to participate in these matters or whether the police should instead repress them, the consensus in town favoured the former. Many townsfolk somehow admired Djong's campaign for equal citizenship, even including its 'scorched earth' tactics. That put them close to that fundamentally *political* notion of citizenship that Aristotle had first enunciated. Antagonism, a kind of democratic 'anarchy,' simply defines politics in a democracy. As Rancière (2001) wrote when commenting on Aristotle, anything short of that involves 'the reduction of politics to the police.'

Precisely the reduction of politics to the police ended the Indonesian experiment in provincial citizenship in 1965. Many other postcolonial experiments in non-ethnic, secular, democratic, and centralised republicanism came to an end around the world at around the same time. The coup of 1953 ended it in Iran. The overthrow of Qasim ended it in Iraq in 1963. The Indonesian New Order gave itself that name because—perhaps by analogy with the 'New Order' (*Neuordnung*) the Nazis wanted to impose on Europe after their military victory—it regarded the preceding years as marked by disorderly failure. Their New Order saw citizen politics from the revolution to 1965 as overwhelmingly destructive. Fervent mobilisation had in its eyes produced nothing but ideological polarisation,

political deadlock, and eventually economic paralysis amid hyper-inflation. The Maumere elite soon began openly to chime in that the Kanilima protesters represented nothing so much as anarchic rural messianism. Democracy of a kind did exist in the New Order, but it was bourgeois democracy in which political parties had no presence in the villages and only experts had the freedom to express their opinions in public. Policing (by the military) was essential to ensure these controlled plebiscites were a 'success.'

Samuel Huntington (1996: 2) infamously provided a rationale for this approach with his observation that political violence in newly independent countries (such as Indonesia) arose from a lack of governance capacity. He made this point by means of a quote:

> "I do know," Walter Lippmann has observed, "that there is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self-governed if possible, well-governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, governed." Mr. Lippmann wrote these words in a moment of despair about the United States. But they apply in far greater measure to the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The politics of 'order' insisted that mobilisation should be delayed until society was mature enough, and institutions strong enough, to cope with it. 'Sequencing'—the idea that institutional development should precede democratisation (Carothers 2007)—has consequently been an influential idea in Indonesia. Citizenship figured in public discourse only as admonitions to observe social harmony and deference to authority. The ideal state-citizen relation was described in organic terms of the father (*bapak*) and his child (Shiraishi 1997). Citizen rights or the idea that the state had obligations were left unmentioned.

The problem with this bourgeois Huntingtonian and New Order view, of course, is that it seriously misinterpreted the violence of 1965. Huntington saw the military as the one body capable of being 'institution builders' in the postcolonial world. But in Indonesia it was precisely the source of the violence. New Order historiography of 1965 avoided the problem only by turning reality on its head. It attributed the primary responsibility for the 1965 violence to social factionalism, along class or (more often) religious lines. An example of this historiography is the (in some respects pioneering) dissertation by Hermawan Sulistyo (2000) on the bloodbath in the sugar-growing area of Jombang-Kediri in East Java.

The behaviourism that dominated American social science in the 1970s made the idea of irrational violence arising from society look tenable. But we have seen that civilian involvement in the killings in Sikka bore no resemblance to the *amok* frequently assumed in such studies of 1965. Many recent studies have reached the same conclusion.[1] A policing paradigm that gets its basic facts wrong is a weak basis for recommending against popular participation in government.

Today?

It now seems difficult to imagine the seductive power that the central republic evoked in the Indonesia of the 1950s and 1960s. The New Order began by promising local anti-communist elites a share in governing if they would participate in a spate of killing first. That promise turned out to be illusory. The repression and the economic policies exercised by the military-backed New Order were both highly centralised. By the end, the notion that a centralised republic was in itself emancipatory had taken a severe beating. Distrust of the central state remains high in Indonesia after Reformasi. The 1998 movement that overthrew Suharto aimed at reclaiming the centralised republic for democracy, but it was hijacked the following year by provincial movements aiming at something less than that. Since then, political energy in Indonesia has been absorbed overwhelmingly in local arenas, where the direct election of local government executive heads has been suffused with clientelism and local nativism (Aspinall and Berenschot 2018). It seems unlikely that the centralised republic will regain its appeal any time soon. The erosion of citizen rights, rights that were once seen as guaranteed by a centralised, democratic republic, can be attributed to a remarkable consensus at many levels. Internationally, a discourse of the virtues of decentralisation has become a 'global trend' (Warner 2006). Some of that discourse can be traced to 'libertarian' distrust of all government. Out in the provinces, a rising middle class attracted by bureaucratic rent-seeking is loath to hand back the increased powers that have been invested in their hands since 1999, despite the evident democratic deficit that has come with decentralisation. And even national elites, frustrated as they are with the inefficiencies of decentralised governance, do not appear to long for the return of strong national political parties. The parties have withered since 1999. Fed in part by popular dis-

[1] See, for example, Eickhoff et al. (2017).

gust with the rampant corruption practised by politicians of all parties, this decline has been welcomed by the retired generals who remain influential in Indonesian politics. To them, any revival of aspirations for a capable, centralised, and democratic modern republic is a reminder of the dangers of communism, which they crushed so effectively in the 1960s. Their fears echo the colonial Dutch, who were quick to label all nationalists 'communists.' If there should really be signs of such a republic re-emerging today, I have no doubt the threats issued by the retired generals will quickly become more concrete.

Decentralisation today resembles indirect rule, yet it is more popular than republicanism. Both decentralisation and indirect rule were justified in terms of the legitimacy of a locally rooted, communitarian culture, rather than in terms of social justice or the rule of law. National politics of all kinds are seen as deeply corrupt. People place more faith in the power of personal relationships and of religious or ethnic community—Tilly's 'trust networks'—than in impersonal institutions. Citizenship in a state with emancipatory agendas is seen as no longer realistic in today's globalised world. Instead, around the world, people whom David Goodhart calls Somewheres—who feel strongly about their local community and distrust elites in faraway capital cities—are polling strongly against the cosmopolitans he calls Anywheres (Goodhart 2017). In short, the political landscape has experienced an inversion since the 1950s.

Yet embryonic discussions can be overheard in Indonesia today that suggest a rethink is coming. While decentralisation was introduced in 1999 after a wave of demands from the provinces, dissatisfaction with its achievements has grown. Hundreds of district chiefs are in jail for corruption. The sleaze of local 'dynasties' is a popular complaint. Ethnic and religious favouritism ('sons-of-the-soil' jobism) led to some communal fighting during the transitional years and represent a continual source of irritation today among those excluded from it. Local elections are fought between rival patrons rather than between political parties with interest-based constituencies, using money rather than principles. The provision of services from health and education through to infrastructure development and environmental protection has lagged behind particularly in poorer districts (which have to rely on their own resources more than before). Negative experiences with decentralisation are causing a rethink among experts. Statistically, governance indicators are poorer in those parts of the former British Empire with a history of indirect rule than in other areas that were ruled directly. A study into this phenomenon concluded:

'Dispersed forms of domination hinder state governance when they create extremely powerful local intermediaries and limit state infrastructural power' (Lange 2004: 917). Dissatisfaction with the rise of local bossism stimulated by decentralising democracy in many parts of the world has led to a new literature on 'subnational authoritarianism' (Sidel 2014).

So what are the possibilities for inclusive provincial citizenship movements to, once more, make a difference in the future? Clearly there can be no easy answers to this question. When the state is embedded in society as deeply as it was and still is in the Indonesian provinces, and conversely when certain leading social fractions have so successfully hijacked the interests of the state, critical movements for change face enormous hurdles. It is possible that change might come only slowly, through negotiations bound by norms of provincial civility. Emancipative norms and norms of conflict avoidance and resolution invigorated that embryonic provincial state in the early 1950s, simply on the strength of a republican rumour. They retain a great deal of seductive power even today. As the authoritarian bargain fails in many parts of the global south, citizen self-making in the context of provincial societies shot through with trust networks could once more be the place to observe state formation at work. Civilisational learning does happen. Aeschylus' great trilogy *The Oresteia*, to which I alluded earlier, deals with the transformation of the bloody vendetta into a civilised order of social justice. Murder followed murder in the doomed house of Atreus, each driven by the Furies unleashed by the one before. The arbitrary, primitive rule of Might that makes Right was the guiding principle. Yet gradually a light begins to dawn on this dark savagery; the Furies resolve themselves into the pangs of conscience that bring self-fulfilment. Towards the end, Athena has brought all of them together and pleads with them: 'But if you have any reverence for Persuasion, the spell of my voice that would appease your fury—Oh please stay' (Aeschylus [transl. Robert Fagles] 1966: line 893). Such a journey towards light, towards a social order that offends neither reason nor humanity, also draws the citizens of Sikka, and of Indonesia. Today, if prognoses are correct that 'authoritarian bargains' are now less sustainable than they were a couple of decades ago, the opportunity structure for social movements of all kinds opens up. Some will be exclusionary, others inclusionary in nature. Then the precedents of provincial 'civic' citizenship discussed in this book, in the midst of all their contradictory impulses of conservatism, rent-seeking, and clientelism on one hand, and norms of reciprocity, negotiation, and hope on the other, might take on fresh relevance.

Where such provincial citizen movements are effective, however, they are not merely civilisational. They address the essentially exploitative character of the patronage system inherent in what I have described as decentralised despotism. In some places—mainly larger cities with diversified economies (Berenschot and Mulder forthcoming)—popular movements to reclaim the state from corrupt dynasties and oligarchs are already effective. What have elsewhere (mainly India) been described as 'post-clientelist initiatives' (Manor 2013) have seen voters increasingly reject corrupt incumbents. Recent studies have seen signs of such citizen movements against injustice becoming more effective in Indonesia too (Hiariej and Stokke 2017). But such struggles remain fragmented and institutionally fluid. Success will depend on aggregating these efforts across regions and across classes. 'Motto: Regnat Populus,' read the coconut-matting poster held high by the demonstrators in dusty little Maumere in 1953. That desire retains its potency today.

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This book examines the history of state formation in postcolonial Indonesia by starting with the death of Jan Djong, an activist and a former village head in the little town of Maumere. It historicizes contemporary debates on citizenship in the postcolonial world.

Citizenship has been called the "organizing principle of state-society relations in modern states". Democratization is today most intense in the non-Western, post-colonial world. Yet "real" citizenship seems largely absent there. Only a few rights-claiming, autonomous, and individualistic citizens celebrated in mainstream literature exist in post-colonial countries.

In reflecting on one concrete story to examine the core dilemmas facing the study of citizenship in postcolonial settings, this book challenges ethnocentricity found within current scholarly work on citizenship in Europe and North America and addresses issues of institutional fragility, political violence, as well as legitimacy and aspirations to freedom in non-Western cultures.

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